

Journal of Army Special Operations History

PB 31-05-2 Vol. 7, No. 1, 2011

Veritas

ARSOF IN THE KOREAN WAR: PART III



ZAYAL 53 H-REF





Cover Photo: PFC Richard Zayac, an illustrator for the 1st Loudspeaker & Leaflet Company in Korea, did this sketch during the war.

Veritas

CONTENTS

- i **Azimuth**
By Charles H. Briscoe
- ii **CA/PSYWAR Timeline: 1950-1953**
By Troy J. Sacquety
- 1 **From a Standing Start:**
U.S. Army Psychological Warfare and Civil Affairs in the Korean War
By Kenneth Finlayson
- 5 **A Picture is Worth a Thousand Words**
By Earl J. Moniz
- 10 **1st L&L in Korea:**
A Photographer's Record, 1952-53
By Charles H. Briscoe
- 26 **The "Proper Ganders" 1st Radio Broadcasting & Leaflet Group:**
Strategic Psywar in Korea, 1951-1954
By Robert W. Jones, Jr. and Charles H. Briscoe
- 46 **1st Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet (1st RB&L) Group Products for Korea:**
The Haynes Leaflet Collection
By Charles H. Briscoe and Jared M. Tracy
- 63 **Same Organization, Four Different Names:**
U.S. Army Civil Affairs in Korea 1950-1953
By Troy J. Sacquety
- 78 **The Refugee Evacuation from Hungnam:**
9-24 December 1950
By Charles H. Briscoe
- 94 **Smoke Bomb Hill:**
Birth of the Psywar Center, Part I
By Eugene G. Piasecki

ERRATA: On page 11, *Veritas* 2:2010, the caption for the mule-packed recoilless rifle photo should have read: **An Army mule loaded with a 75 mm Recoilless Rifle anti-tank (AT) weapon.** After training with mules at Camp Carson, the Rangers did not use pack animals in Korea. Thanks goes to LTC (RET) Moe Elmore for catching this error.





The Azimuth of the USASOC History Office

2010 was a rough year. Our compass needle was pulled by numerous magnetic surges. Mission priority shifts and personnel losses during a hiring moratorium caused several redistributions of the workload. A USSOCOM manpower survey validated our publications by contract for another five years. Quality control issues and constantly slipping completion dates for the \$750K engineer construction project for our new expanded facility were challenging. SWCS Archives and personnel had to be moved from Bank Hall and incorporated as the History Support Center (HSC) when construction ended. These were the biggest factors. Hence, four issues of *Veritas* for 2010 “slid off the plate,” books fell on the floor, and travel was severely curtailed. We did publish the 2nd edition of *All Roads Lead to Baghdad: ARSOF in Iraq*.

Pushing the ARSOF in Korea theme for *Veritas* into 2011 was a second order effect. On a positive note, more Psywar and SF Korea veterans have “come up on the net,” providing additional documents, letters, memorabilia, and photos. Thus, we’ll publish a total of five issues of *Veritas* on Korea. This one, 1:2011, third in the series, focuses on tactical Psywar and Civil Assistance (the UN term for Civil Affairs) and has an introductory article on strategic Psywar to prepare for the next. Issue 2:2011 will address the rebuilding of a Psywar capability in the Army and comprehensively treat the 1st Radio

Broadcasting and Leaflet (1st RB&L) Group which was dedicated to the Far East Command. Psywar became the largest Army SOF effort of the war. The final volume (3:2011) will include 8240th Army Unit (AU) missions, the Joint Activities Commission Korea (JACK), CCRAK (Combined Command for Reconnaissance Activities, Korea), and activities of Special Forces, 1952-1953.

Retired SF Master Sergeant Lowell W. Stevens, Sr., a respected, six-year veteran of the Vietnam War and “resident historian” of Camp Mackall, passed away and will be missed by the USASOC History Office. He was a valued commentator on ARSOF history who could be relied on to “tell it like it is.” Lowell Stevens was a “tough, but fair, soldier’s soldier.” Those that served in combat with him should feel honored. It was a pleasure to know and work with him. He was the epitome of a warrior who merits this final salute.

DOD computer firewalls keep getting better. If you cannot “break through” or do not get a response to your email, use the telephone numbers on the inside front cover. We are the last to know that you have stopped receiving *Veritas*. Those on distribution have their copies mailed by the publisher. “Snow birds” are permitted one address. Copies are not sent to business addresses. And, there are no secretaries or clerks in the History Office. Thanks for your support. CHB

VERITAS: *Veritas* is published quarterly by the United States Army Special Operations Command, Fort Bragg, North Carolina (ISSN 1553-9830). The contents are not necessarily the official views of, nor endorsed by, the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, USSOCOM, or USASOC. The contents are compiled, edited, and prepared by the USASOC History Office. All photos not credited are courtesy of the USASOC History Office.

COPYRIGHT: Material in *Veritas* may be reprinted, except where copyrighted, provided credit is given to *Veritas* and the creators.

COPIES: Copies of previous *Veritas* issues are no longer available. A limited number of the current issue is maintained at the USASOC History Office.

PERMISSION TO REPRINT VERITAS ARTICLES & MATERIALS: Reprinting well-received *Veritas* articles in a modified version and/or without the documentation (endnotes) degrades serious historical scholarship. If this professional courtesy cannot be accorded, requests will be denied. Permission to use photographs from private collections was granted only to the USASOC History Office. These photos, like the illustrative sketches, customized maps, and schematics used in *Veritas* articles are NOT available for public use.

QUESTIONS: Address questions and comments to USASOC, ATTN: AOHS *Veritas*, E-2929 Desert Storm Drive, Fort Bragg, NC 28310, or e-mail one of our editors.

FIREWALLS AND SPAM BLOCKERS: DOD computer FIREWALLs routinely place unrecognized addresses into a Junk E-Mail box. Encryption is another problem. Personal computer SPAM blockers further delay and negate responses. Therefore, if you would like your e-mail answered, please adjust your personal SPAM blocker before you send a message. Thanks.

SUBMISSIONS: Submit manuscripts, art, illustrations, and photos to the address above. Digital format is preferred. All article submissions must cover ARSOF topics from WWII to the present, be based on primary sources, and have active participant voice. See articles in *Veritas* for examples. Please provide contact information for all submissions. If you have an article topic that falls outside these key parameters, please email one of our editors. The USASOC History Office reserves the right to edit all submissions for publication.

SUBSCRIPTIONS: Those wishing to subscribe to *Veritas*, should write to USASOC, ATTN: AOHS *Veritas* (Dr. Sacquety), E-2929 Desert Storm Drive, Fort Bragg, NC 28310 or email Dr. Sacquety at sacquett@soc.mil. Please include affiliation to Army Special Operations or list any applicable military service. This helps us build a support network for future *Veritas* articles. **If you send an email and do not receive a response, it is likely because of firewalls being constantly upgraded. If this is the case please assume that we did not get your message.**

COMMAND HISTORIAN AND EDITOR:

Charles H. Briscoe, PhD
1910-432-3732
charles.briscoe@ahqb.soc.mil

ASSOCIATE EDITORS:

Kenneth Finlayson, PhD
1910-432-4320
kenn.finlayson@ahqb.soc.mil

Troy J. Sacquety, PhD
1910-432-9324
sacquett@ahqb.soc.mil

Eugene G. Piasecki
1910-432-9780
eugene.g.piasecki@ahqb.soc.mil

Jared M. Tracy
1910-396-5906
jared.tracy@ahqb.soc.mil

Michael E. Krivdo, PhD
1910-432-9435
michael.krivdo@ahqb.soc.mil

ART DIRECTOR:

Daniel W. Telles
tellesd@ahqb.soc.mil

GRAPHIC DESIGNER:

Laura Goddard
laura.goddard@ahqb.soc.mil

PHOTO EDITOR:

Earl J. Moniz
monize@ahqb.soc.mil

ILLUSTRATORS:

Mariano Santillan
mariano@santillan.cc

Frank E. Allen
fallen1364@sbcglobal.net

CA/PSYWAR TIMELINE: 1950-1953

1950

June – North Korea invades South Korea. President Harry S. Truman responds by ordering U.S. military support to Korea. Psychological Warfare Branch, Far East Command, drops the first leaflets and makes the first radio broadcasts within four days of the attack. These first leaflets target the South Korean civilian population, telling them that help is on the way.

August-September – Driving southward, North Korean forces capture Pohang (6 September), but fail to push Republic of Korea Army (ROKA), Eighth U.S. Army (EUSA) and UN forces from the Pusan Perimeter and off the peninsula.

Newspapers around the world reported the North Korean invasion of South Korea.



September – General (GEN) Douglas A. MacArthur named Brigadier General (BG) Crawford F. Sams as the Chief of Health and Welfare, General Headquarters, United Nations Command, Republic of Korea. BG Sams sets up the UN Public Health and Welfare Detachment, 8201st Army Unit, which is the genesis of the main U.S. Army Civil Affairs (CA) effort in the Korean War.

15 September – UN Forces under the command of GEN Douglas A. MacArthur make an amphibious landing at Inch'on and begin sweeping east across the peninsula, in conjunction with the EUSA breakout north from the Pusan Perimeter.

26 September – GEN Douglas A. MacArthur announces the liberation of Seoul.

October – The Tactical Information Detachment (TID), the U.S. Army's only tactical Psywar unit, is rushed from Fort Riley, Kansas, to Korea. It arrives in Pusan on 15 October. GEN MacArthur transfers responsibility of the UN Public Health and Welfare Detachment to EUSA.

1 October – U.S. forces cross the 38th Parallel two days after ROKA forces.

15 October – President Truman and GEN MacArthur meet at Wake Island to discuss the prospects of an expanded war and Soviet or Chinese intervention.

Four LSTs unload on Inch'on's Red Beach, 16 Sep 1950, the day after initial landings.





American soldiers ready a 75 mm recoilless rifle as they man an improvised position in South Korea while trying to stem the Communist advance, 31 July 1950.

20-21 October – UN forces capture P'yongyang. UN Civil Assistance (CA) teams begin a military government and reconstruction role at P'yongyang, and the port city of Chinnamp'o. The X Corps CA effort at Wonsan, Hamhung, and Hungnam is initiated by MG Edward M. Almond.

26 October – UN forces reach the Yalu River.

November – On 4 November, the TID is redesignated as the 1st Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company, the EUSA tactical Psywar element. Chinese Communist Forces (CCF) infiltrate North Korea and attack UN forces on both sides of the peninsula. Surprised by the Communist offensive, CA teams begin evacuating wounded ROKA soldiers and North Korean civilians supporting the UN from P'yongyang, and the ports of Chinnamp'o, Wonsan and Hungnam.

1951

January – Secretary of the Army Frank Pace, Jr., names BG Robert A. McClure to be the Chief of Psychological Warfare (CPW). The UN Public Health and Welfare Detachment, is first designated the UN Civil Assistance Command (UNCAC), and then renamed the UN Civil Assistance Command, Korea (UNCACK), 8201st Army Unit (AU).

April – The Department of the Army approves the activation of the 1st Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group (1st RB&L), 2nd Loudspeaker and Leaflet (L&L) Company, 5th L&L Company, and 301st RB&L Group.

June – In the UN Security Council, Soviet Representative Jacob Malik proposes a cease-fire and armistice along the 38th Parallel, which is accepted in principle three days later by U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson. To prepare for peace negotiations, a neutral zone is established around Kaesong, the agreed-upon meeting site.

July – U.S. Air Force aircraft drop the first propaganda leaflets on Communist troops manning static positions. The first contingent of the 1st RB&L arrives in Japan to perform strategic Psywar functions.

July-August – UN Commissioners and North Korean representatives meet at Kaesong to negotiate the agenda for Armistice negotiations. Initial talks break down over Communist allegations of Kaesong neutral zone violations.

August-September – The 4th Mobile Radio Broadcasting Company (MRBC) establishes *Radio Pusan* in Korea. The 1st RB&L takes responsibility for *Radio Tokyo* and the *Voice of the UN Command* (VUNC).

October – Greece and Turkey join NATO. Of the thirteen NATO nations having armed forces, only Portugal does not send troops to the UN Command in Korea. Peace talks resume at a newly erected conference facility at Panmunjom. Establishing a Military Demarcation Line (MDL) between North and South Korea is the first order of business.

November – The 4th MRBC establishes *Radio Seoul*.

1952

April – The U.S. Army Psychological Warfare Center, comprised of the Psychological Warfare School, Psychological Warfare Board, 6th RB&L Group, and 10th Special Forces Group (SFG), is established at Fort Bragg, NC.

1953

July – Delegates from North and South Korea and the United Nations sign an armistice ending hostilities, and create a four-kilometer wide demilitarized zone (DMZ) between Communist and UN forces along the 38th Parallel. Each side withdraws two kilometers from the Military Demarcation Line. Despite reaching a cease-fire, tensions remain high on both sides. UNCACK is disbanded, and reformed as the Korea Civil Assistance Command (KCAC), 8201st Army Unit (AU).



North Korean leader Kim Il Sung signed the armistice in P'yongyang in 1953.

From a Standing Start: U.S. ARMY PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE AND CIVIL AFFAIRS IN THE KOREAN WAR

BY KENNETH FINLAYSON

Following World War II, United States Army special operations units virtually vanished in the rapid demobilization. The start of the Korean War on 25 June 1950 was the catalyst for the revival of the Army's special operations capability. The Army brought back the Rangers as company-sized units, stood up the 8240th Army Unit to train anti-Communist North Korean partisan forces and revived its nascent Psychological Warfare (Psywar) and Civil Affairs (CA) capability.¹ This issue of *Veritas* features the development of the units that figured prominently in the growth of tactical and strategic Psywar and the organizations developed to handle the humanitarian assistance and civil-military government efforts. Of significance to Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF) was the establishment of the Psychological Warfare Center at Fort Bragg, North Carolina which resulted in the birth of Special Forces. In several notable respects, ARSOF as it exists in today's Army is the result of the special operations capabilities developed during the Korean War.

In contrast to World War II when America was attacked by Imperial Japan, the Korean War was a clash of competing Cold War ideologies. The United States as a nation was not directly threatened by the North Korean invasion. Instead, the Korean War was the "hot" aspect of the Cold War, and was the most serious direct confrontation between the Communist bloc and the capitalist West. Throughout the war, the Army walked a fine line between adequately supporting operations in Korea against its primary mission of opposing the Soviet forces in Europe. In this battle, the United States Defense Department quickly recognized the need to counter the extensive Communist propaganda.

When the war started in June 1950, the U.S. Army's entire Psywar capability consisted of a thirty-man Tactical Information Detachment (TID) at Fort Riley, Kansas. Directing the effort to build up its Psywar capability was the Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare (OCPW), headed by Brigadier General (BG) Robert A. McClure. The OCPW moved quickly to build up the Army's Psywar



The Korean War began with the North Korean invasion of the south on 25 June 1950. The United States Army was ill-prepared for the war and had to rapidly build up all of its capabilities.



General Douglas A. MacArthur meets South Korean President Syngman Rhee. MacArthur requested Army Psywar elements to bolster Rhee's fragile government in the early days of the war.

capability, concentrating on the two primary methods for disseminating information, printed leaflets and radio broadcasting. Psywar courses were swiftly established at the Army General School at Fort Riley to train soldiers

The U.S. Army was faced with an almost insurmountable problem of refugees on the battlefield. Army Civil Affairs units were instrumental in the effort to provide food and medical care and to keep the roads clear of the hordes of displaced civilians.



This leaflet was produced by the 1st Loudspeaker & Leaflet Company to induce the surrender of North Korean People's Army soldiers. An enemy soldier surrendering while in possession of the leaflet was guaranteed safe conduct to the rear.



to man the newly created units. In the interim, BG McClure sent the TID to Japan, the first Psywar elements to support General (GEN) Douglas A. MacArthur's Far East Command (FECOM).²

The Army fielded the 1st Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company (1st L&L), the 1st Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group (1st RB&L) and the 4th Mobile Radio Broadcasting Company (4th MRBC) to meet the need for producing and disseminating leaflets and directly broadcasting information at the tactical and strategic levels in Korea.³ Simultaneously, the 2nd, and 5th Loudspeaker and Leaflet Companies and the 301st Mobile Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group were formed and trained, and the 5th L&L and 301st RB&L deployed to Europe. Built from scratch, these units were manned by established artists, journalists and technicians from the civilian advertising, publishing, and radio news industries. Their missions were as varied as the backgrounds of the soldiers.

On the battlefield in Korea, the units supporting the Eighth US Army (EUSA) deployed loudspeaker teams with manpack and vehicle-mounted systems in support of the divisions on the frontlines. Often operating in "no-man's land" forward of friendly lines these "bullet magnets" broadcast directly to the North Koreans and Chinese and were frequently the target of enemy patrols and indirect fire as they conducted tactical Psywar.⁴ At the strategic level in support of FECOM, the 1st RB&L artists and lithographers translated complex themes into simple visual products, producing millions of leaflets that were disseminated on both sides of the front lines. Those targeting the Communist forces were designed to lower morale and induce surrender. The units also produced



Korea Civil Assistance Command SSI

leaflets and information sheets focused on the South Korean civilian population and were a primary means of providing public information. Other Psywar units performed a similar function using radio broadcasting to reach both sides.

Mobile teams initially based in Japan deployed into Korea and established a number of radio stations in Seoul, Pusan, Taejon, and in other locations as well as briefly in the North Korean capital of P'yongyang.⁵ The 4th Mobile Radio Broadcasting Company (4th MRBC) produced radio scripts that were translated into *Hangul* (Korean) and Chinese for transmission over the Korean Broadcasting System radio network. The teams broadcast the speeches of South Korean President Syngman Rhee as well as provided the prepared newscasts that reached throughout the South. The information distributed by the Psywar teams was instrumental in the successful operations of another ARSOF operation in Korea, Civil Affairs.

The Korean War also presented monumental problems for the U.S. Army in dealing with the nearly insurmountable health and sanitation needs of large numbers of refugees and the requirement to establish civil-military government in the occupied North Korean cities, notably in P'yongyang.⁶ A succession of organizations, the UN Public Health and Welfare Detachment, which became the United Nations Civil Affairs Command Korea (UNCACK), then the Korea Civil Affairs Command were formed as the main U.S. Army effort to administer the civil affairs mission. The formation of the UN Public Health and Welfare Detachment was directed by GEN MacArthur and designed to support Lieutenant General



Brigadier General Robert A. McClure, the director of the Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare. McClure was responsible for the establishment of the Psychological Warfare School.

Richard Zayac was an illustrator for the 1st Loudspeaker & Leaflet Company. He designed many of the leaflets distributed by the company and captured images of frontline operations. A selection of his work appears in this issue.



Walton H. Walker's Eighth Army. The other major U.S. combat formation in Korea, Major General (MG) Edmond M. Almond's X Corps was not an element of EUSA and hence, had to conduct its civil affairs operations using its organic assets. Notable uses of Civil Affairs in Korea encompassed governance in the occupied territories of North Korea and humanitarian assistance, which included the evacuation of large numbers of refugees from the ports of Chinnamp'o, Wonsan, and Hungnam.⁷ As was the case with Psywar, the CA organization was rapidly and often painfully built up to meet the mission in Korea.⁸ This expansion rejuvenated the stateside training base for both elements, in the case of Civil Affairs at Camp Gordon, Georgia. For Psywar, it resulted in the establishment of the Psychological Warfare Center at Fort Bragg, North Carolina.

Under the impetus of BG Robert A. McClure, the director of OCPW and the strongest advocate for rebuilding the Army's Psywar capability, a new training facility was established on Smoke Bomb Hill at Fort Bragg in 1952. Originally formed in 1951 as the Psychological Warfare Division of the Army General School at Fort Riley, Kansas, the new Psychological Warfare Center was activated at Fort Bragg on 1 May 1952. The Center was composed of the Psychological Warfare School (Provisional) with a Psychological Operations Department and the Special Forces Department, the 6th Radio Broadcast and Leaflet Group (6th RB&L), the Psychological Warfare Board, and the 10th Special Forces Group.⁹ By virtue of the establishment of the Psychological Warfare Center, the linkage between today's ARSOF units,

particularly the 4th Military Information Support Group (4th MISG) and the seven U.S. Army Special Forces Groups is a result of the Army's effort to meet the Psywar requirements of the Korean War.

Veritas 2011:1 features articles on the 1st Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company, the 1st Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group, and the 4th Mobile Radio Broadcasting Company as well as other units associated with the Psywar effort in Korea. In all cases, the voices of the veterans of these units are prominent in describing the missions and conditions under which they operated. The artistic talents of illustrator Richard Zayac and photographer Sergeant Herbert Shevins of the 1st L&L are featured.¹⁰ Included in the coverage of the Psywar effort is an article addressing the birth of the Psychological Warfare Center at Fort Bragg. This issue looks at the Civil Affairs organization in EUSA as it evolved during the Korean War and highlights the X Corps evacuation operations at the ports of Hungnam and Wonsan. The legacy of the Korean War Civil Affairs and Psywar missions is embodied today in the 95th Civil Affairs Brigade and the 4th Military Information Support Group at Fort Bragg. ♣

Kenneth Finlayson is the USASOC Deputy Command Historian. He earned his PhD from the University of Maine, and is a retired Army officer. Current research interests include Army special operations during the Korean War, special operations aviation, and World War II special operations units.

Endnotes

- 1 **Military Information Support Operations (MISO) and Civil Affairs are the primary topics addressed in this issue of *Veritas*. Among the many volumes written on these topics, several provide background information on the Korean War and the formation of the Army's Psychological Warfare Center. Noteworthy sources include, but are not limited to:** Stanley Sandler, *"Cease Resistance: It's Good For You:" A History of U.S. Army Combat Psychological Operations*, 2nd Ed., (Fort Bragg, NC, Army Printing Facility Fort Bragg, 1989), United States Army Special Operations Command History Office Reprint, Fort Bragg, NC; Alfred H. Paddock, Jr., *U.S. Army Special Warfare: Its Origins* (Manhattan, KS, University of Kansas Press, 2002); Paul M. A. Linebarger, *Psychological Warfare* 2nd Ed. (New York, Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1954); Frank L. Goldstein, *Psychological Operations: Principles and Case Studies* (Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, Air University Press, 1996); E. Grant Meade, *American Military Government in Korea* (New York, King's Crown Press, 1951); Stanley Sandler, *Glad to See Them Come and Sorry to See Them Go: A History of U.S. Army Tactical Civil Affairs/Military Government, 1775-1992* (Fort Bragg, NC, Army Printing Facility, 1992), U.S. Army Special Operations Command Reprint.
- 2 Charles H. Briscoe, "A Clearer View of Psywar at Fort Riley & Fort Bragg, 1951-1952," *Veritas: The Journal of Army Special Operations History*, Vol 5, No. 4, 2009, 62.
- 3 Charles H. Briscoe, "'Volunteering' for Combat: Loudspeaker Psywar in Korea," *Veritas: The Journal of Army Special Operations History*, Vol 1, No. 2, 2005, 46-60; Robert W. Jones Jr., "The Ganders: Strategic Psywar in the Far East Part I; Introduction and movement to the Far East," *Veritas: The Journal of Army Special Operations History*, Vol 3, No. 1, 2007, 59-65. Robert W. Jones, "The Ganders: 1st Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group Conducts Psywar in Korea-Part II," *Veritas: The Journal of Army Special Operations History*, Vol 3, No. 3, 2007, 41-58; Charles H. Briscoe, "The 1st L&L in Korea, A Photographer's Record, 1952-1953," *Veritas: The Journal of Army Special Operations History*, Vol 3, No. 4, 2007, 14-25.
- 4 Briscoe, "'Volunteering' for Combat: Loudspeaker Psywar in Korea."
- 5 Jones, "The Ganders: 1st Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group Conducts Psywar in Korea-Part II."
- 6 Charles H. Briscoe, "The UN Occupation of P'yongyang," *Veritas: The Journal of Army Special Operations History*, Vol 6, No. 1, 2010, 63-82.
- 7 Charles H. Briscoe, "Do What You Can!: UN Civil Assistance, Chinnamp'o, North Korea, November-December 1950."
- 8 Troy J. Sacquety, "A Civil Affairs Pioneer: Brigadier General Crawford F. Sams, U.S. Army Medical Corps," *Veritas: The Journal of Army Special Operations History*, Vol 6, No. 1, 2010, 60-62.
- 9 Paddock, *U.S. Army Special Warfare: Its Origins*, 141-142.
- 10 Earl J. Moniz, "A Picture is Worth a Thousand Words," *Veritas: The Journal of Army Special Operations History*, Vol 1, No. 2, 2010, 60-62; Briscoe, "'Volunteering for Combat.'"

This leaflet entitled ***Communists Deny People Freedom*** was designed to convey the message that ***"Under Communism, Propaganda Replaces the Truth..."*** Leaflets of this nature were common products of the Psywar units.

Aerial photograph of Smoke Bomb Hill at Fort Bragg, North Carolina in the 1970's. At this time, little had changed since the Psychological Warfare Center was established in 1952. The photograph is oriented from the southwest in the lower left corner to the northeast in the upper right corner.



A Picture is Worth a Thousand Words

BY EARL J. MONIZ



Psywar artist Dick Zayac (right) at his workstation in the Propaganda Platoon of the 1st L&L in Korea.

In our recent research on the Korean War, we uncovered a few pencil drawings. One of the drawings included a faded identification: "Zayac 53 Korea." Through modern technology and some amateur sleuthing, we were able to identify and locate the artist.

Born and raised in Detroit, Michigan, Richard (Dick) Zayac was attracted to art at a young age. As a teenager, he studied at the Detroit Institute of Arts and the Society of Arts and Crafts. While majoring in commercial art at Cass Technical High School, he received scholarships to the Art Students League of New York and the Pratt Institute in New York City.

In 1950, war broke out on the other side of the world. World events overtook educational plans. Zayac was drafted and assigned to the 1st Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company (1st L&L) in Korea.

The 1st L&L consisted of artists, photographers, scriptwriters, loudspeaker teams, and linguists. They worked together to conduct psychological warfare designed to shorten the conflict, assure the civilian



This pictograph Psywar surrender leaflet was a simple roadmap to freedom for many soldiers.

population that help was on the way, and that the end of the war was just around the corner.

All of the images displayed in conjunction with this article are products of psychological warfare pioneer Dick Zayac. The Psywar leaflet depicting a map and routes through the lines was actually reconnoitered by Zayac himself. He wanted to assure himself that the map depicted everything in its proper perspective. Considering today's Psychological Operations (PSYOP) "reach back"

support, Zayac's recon remains one of those daring feats upon which legends are built.

The 1st L&L was so successful at upsetting enemy plans and encouraging loyal support that on 18 May 1952, in Taegu, the unit was awarded the Korean Presidential Unit Citation. It read, in part: "Over one billion leaflets have also been prepared and dropped over enemy troops and civilians in North Korea contributing greatly to the weakening of morale of enemy soldiers and to the improvement of morale of loyal citizens of the Republic of Korea."

Dick Zayac returned home to begin a commercial artist career that continues to flourish today. From his studio in Michigan's North Woods, Zayac continues to paint in the plein air style he has perfected. Zayac's work is included in private collections from Chicago to Tokyo. ♣

*"Psychological warfare channels the abilities of the artist toward the goal of winning, and thus terminating, war. While he is helping to bring an end to the war, the Psywar artist may perform the added function of recording it to keep its bitter memory alive, so that others may know what it is like."*¹

Earl J. Moniz has been a digital information specialist in the USASOC History Office since 2001. After retiring as a Special Forces communications specialist in 1990, he earned his undergraduate degree in teaching from Fayetteville State University in 1994 and his Master of Library Science from NC Central University in 1998. Current projects include the organization of the History Office reference and research facility; the installation and implementation of the History Office digital asset management solution; and the collection, organization, and preservation of History Office electronic documents, files, and data.

Note:

"First RB&L News Special Supplement," 10 April 1955. The artwork used in the 1955 special supplement was borrowed and never returned. If anyone knows the whereabouts of the original artwork, please contact the USASOC History Office so that it can be returned to Dick Zayac.



Working from the trenches, Zayac starkly rendered the realities of war. The box with carrying straps is a portable loudspeaker.



In contrast to the dark, harsh sketches of his war years, Zayac's current work consists of peaceful, light-filled watercolor street scenes.



A Loudspeaker Team races back to the relative safety of the Main Line of Resistance (MLR) after a night broadcast mission.

1st L&L EQUIPMENT AND WRITERS



1st L&L Motor Pool with camera trailers.




The 1st L&L soldiers that worked at EUSA G3 Psywar Division.




Loading and unloading equipment was a constant for the Loudspeaker Teams.

The portable photo and print trailers were kept in the motor pool.



WORKING AREAS



The Psywar leaflet cycle from start to finish was accomplished at the L&L Company.



Broadcasting in comfort from a front line bunker was not typical for Loudspeaker Teams.



Entrance to the L&L Compound.

AERIAL DELIVERY

Loading Leaflet Bombs.



1st L&L soldier with a leaflet bomb used as an office symbol.



There were so many Psywar leaflets dropped over Communist lines, much of it simply hand-tossed out the open windows or doors of low-flying aircraft, the enemy soldiers always had a choice of colors for toilet paper.

Delivering 1st L&L Company Psywar leaflets to K-16 Airfield in Korea.

1st L&L in Korea: A PHOTOGRAPHER'S RECORD, 1952-53

BY CHARLES H. BRISCOE



1st L&L Company unofficial jacket patch


The Korean War veterans of the 1st Loudspeaker & Leaflet (L&L) Company, Eighth U.S. Army, a key lineage unit of the 1st Psychological Operations Battalion (Airborne), held their first reunion at Fort Bragg, N.C., from 22-24 May 2007. Four 1st L&L Psywar veterans who were killed in action in Korea were commemorated on 24 May 2007 when their names were added to the U.S. Army Special Operations Command Memorial Wall. The 1st PSYOP Battalion

dedicated their classroom to the 1st L&L Company and a Korea Psywar display was exhibited at the Airborne and Special Operations Museum in downtown Fayetteville, N.C. A former 1st L&L Publications Platoon veteran provided a collection of unit photos from 1953 for the display.

These photos preserved the daily routine and unit personalities in the 1st L&L in Seoul, Korea, from 1952-1953. They captured the essence of tactical Psywar and are an invaluable historical record worth sharing with today's Army Special Operations Forces. Since former Sergeant Herbert Shevins from Brooklyn, New York, was responsible, the following essay revolves around his photographic contribution as the unit mission shifted from supporting the propaganda war to maintaining vigilance during the armistice. The final tasks were quite different from those envisioned in late summer 1950.

When North Korea invaded South Korea on 25 June 1950, the Special Projects (SP) Division in the G-2 (Intelligence) of Far East Command headquarters in Tokyo, Japan, provided the Psywar capability for the command. General (GEN) Douglas A. MacArthur ordered its creation in November 1949 to plan Psywar

The Main Line of Resistance (MLR) in Korea, 1952-1953, showing the three U.S. and two ROK corps sectors.



1st PSYOP Bn
DUI



U.S. Army Ground
Forces Command SSI



U.S. Far East
Command SSI



Eighth U.S. Army,
Korea SSI



The 1st L&L Company cadre board the Yokohama ferry to Pusan, Korea, on 15 October 1950, bound for Eighth U.S. Army, Korea, then located at Taegu in the Pusan Perimeter.



The original 1st L&L Company officers in Seoul, Korea, October 1951. Front L to R: 1LT Hillard J. Trubitt, L/S Platoon, MAJ Donald W. Osgood, Company Commander, CPT Jay V. Russell, Executive Officer, 1LT Richard L. Keator, L/S Platoon. Back L to R: 1LT James E. Dalzell, Publications Platoon, 2LT Quillian D. Clements, L/S Platoon, and 1LT John W. Rich, III, Propaganda Platoon.



LT Frank C. Kurpiel and SFC John Eugene "Gene" Sacotte



CPT Herbert B. Avedon



SSG Joseph F. Lissberger



Left: 1LT James E. Dalzell, original 1st L&L Publications Platoon Leader, aboard the Yokohama ferry bound for Pusan, Korea, 15 October 1950. After Korea, 1LT Dalzell graduated from the Special Forces Course of the U.S. Army Psychological Warfare School in 1954. Above right: Dalzell's Valentine's card reflects what was required to make the 1st L&L operational by April 1951. (courtesy Louise Dalzell).

measures to counter Communist aggression in Asia. Mr. J. Woodall Greene, a retired colonel who had been the deputy director of the general's WWII Psywar campaign against Japan, had a staff of four personnel to accomplish that theater mission.¹ The robust Psywar capability built by the Army during World War II had been eliminated in post-war military reductions.

The immediate need for tactical Psywar in Korea was their highest priority. The Tactical Information Detachment (TID) at Fort Riley, Kansas, provided Psywar support to the Army's Aggressor Force during countrywide maneuvers.² Alerted for Korea, the twenty-man TID became the nucleus for an Army Loudspeaker & Leaflet Company effective 1 September 1950. The detachment packed its limited equipment, departed Fort Riley on 9 September, and left Seattle, Washington, on 15 September aboard a U.S. Navy transport headed to Japan. Told that their heavy equipment would be shipped separately to Korea, the 1st L&L cadre boarded the Yokohama ferry to Pusan, Korea, on 15 October bound for Eighth U.S. Army (EUSA) in Taegu, Korea.³

The 1st L&L Company was activated on 4 November 1950 with eight officers, ninety-nine enlisted men, three printing presses, twelve loudspeakers, and twenty-seven vehicles authorized. The unit administratively fell under the EUSA Special Troops Command, but the G-2 exercised operational control. No priorities were given for equipment, U.S. Army Psywar School-trained personnel, or required language skills. It took until April 1951 to find the original TID assets lost in Japan, get them shipped to Korea, and collect critical TO&E (Table of Organization and Equipment) equipment to become combat effective.⁴



**1LT Jay V. Russell,
Loudspeaker Platoon
Leader & Company
Executive Officer, 1950-1952.**



**CPL F. Dwight Blanchard, L/S
repairman, 1951-1952.**



**This Quonset hut at I Corps headquarters served as 1LT
Ivan G. Worrell's home for three months in 1953 before
he became the L/S Platoon Leader.**

The 1st L&L's mission was to conduct tactical propaganda operations for a field army and provide qualified Psywar specialists as advisors to the army and subordinate corps staffs. Dissemination of tactical propaganda was to be done by leaflet, information sheets, and loudspeakers.⁵ A company headquarters element supported three operational platoons: Propaganda, Publications, and Loudspeaker (L/S). Combat requirements justified a twenty-five percent enlisted overstrength effective 24 April 1951, but the company never reached full strength.⁶

This was what the 1st L&L looked like when Private (PVT) Herbert Shevins was assigned to the Publications Platoon in early November 1952 as a photo lithographer.⁹ Captain Herbert B. Avedon, signal officer for the Ranger Force in Italy and a Morale Operations officer for OSS Detachment 101 in Burma during World War II, was the company's second commander. Lieutenant Frank C. Kurpiel was Publications Platoon leader and Sergeant Joseph F. Lissberger, a U.S. Navy-trained printer and photo lithographer, had just replaced Sergeant First Class (SFC) Gene Sacotte as the platoon sergeant and Print Shop supervisor. They were operating Harris Seybold 1722 and Davidson (original TID assets) offset printing presses with twelve-hour work shifts. Two trailer-mounted 250-kilowatt generators powered all print equipment.¹⁰

One of two forty-foot M109 mobile print vans, parked adjacent to the Print Shack on the athletic field, had been converted into a photography work area. The adjoining

Continued on page 16.



**1LT Ivan Worrell, L/S Platoon
Leader, was one of the few
graduates of the U.S. Army
General School Psywar Officer
Course assigned to the 1st
Loudspeaker & Leaflet Company
in Korea in 1953. His American
Army officer classmates were
assigned to the 6th Radio
Broadcasting & Leaflet Group
(slated for Fort Bragg, NC)
and the 5th L&L Company
going to Germany.**



**SSG Duane D. Luhn, a L/S
Platoon section repairman,
worked out of the same I Corps
Quonset hut in 1953-1954.**



**BG Martin, EUSA (R), and CPT Oliver M. Rodman (L), the
third company commander, inspect USAF personnel
from the 581st Reproduction Squadron, Clark AFB, the
Philippines, who were training with the 1st L&L in 1953.**



I Corps SSI



IX Corps SSI



X Corps SSI

SGT HERBERT SHEVINS, PHOTO LITHOGRAPHER,

PUBLICATIONS PLATOON, 1st L&L,
SUMMER 1952-CHRISTMAS 1953.



Basic Combat Training (BCT) at Camp Kilmer, NJ, February 1952.



Lifeboat drill on the USNS Marine Lynx enroute to Korea, Fall 1952.



1st L&L Company photographer, 1952-1953.



Training for combat in Korea at "Fort Lost in the Woods," MO.

Herbert Shevins of Brooklyn, New York, was drafted into the Army in early February 1952, two years after graduation from Samuel J. Tilden High School where he was awarded art medals and athletic letters for swimming and gymnastics. His father and brother were veterans, the former of the Naval Expeditionary Force in 1916 (Vera Cruz, Mexico) and World War I, and the latter of the WWII Navy in the Pacific. Since Shevins was a professional lifeguard at Brighton Beach Bay (Post #9), he wanted to follow family tradition by volunteering for the Navy. However, the postwar reduction of its Underwater Demolitions Teams (UDT) prompted Shevins to begin a jewelry making apprenticeship with the Dason Ring Company in Manhattan. His draft notice interrupted these plans.

On 14 February 1952, Herbert Shevins, a newly-sworn-in Army Private (PVT), left Manhattan with a busload of New Yorkers for basic training at Camp Kilmer, New Jersey. High aptitude scores qualified him for advanced


training at Fort Belvoir, Virginia, as an engineer topographer and photo lithographer. Contrary to most Army military occupation specialities (MOS) assignments, this was a natural fit for Shevins because photography had been a favorite hobby since childhood. After being trained as a photo lithographer, instead of being assigned to an Army print plant in Japan, he was shipped off to Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, for combat training. "The post supposedly had terrain similar to Korea," remembered Shevins. "There we were put through an abbreviated form of basic infantry combat training. To keep from getting separated during night patrols we squashed fireflies on the back of the man's shirt in front of us. It was simple, but kept us from getting 'lost in the woods.' "

In the summer of 1952, PVT Shevins boarded a troopship bound for Pusan, Korea. It seemed like almost all the troops were seasick. At the replacement center (depot) new arrivals were given winter clothing and assignments.




1st L&L road sign at the main intersection.

CPL Herbert Shevins
& SSG Joseph
Lissberger relax
by the water tower
that was needed
to clean the
photographic plates.



The Federal G-513, 94x43 tractor, 4.5 ton, 4x4 was used to move the mobile camera vans.



Setting the Hansch camera, April 1953.

Since Shevins was going to the 1st L&L, he got aboard the night train for Seoul. Bundled up in woolen overcoats and pile caps, the weaponless replacements slept on the boxcar floors with duffle bags as pillows. The 1st L&L company clerk met the train. PVT Shevins and another soldier threw their bags into his jeep and off they went.

PVT Shevins was assigned to the Publications Platoon as the photo lithographer. He later became the company photographer. In this capacity he captured soldier life and recorded the evolving Psywar mission of the 1st L&L from the summer of 1952 through Christmas 1953. Shevins served three company commanders during his tour: Captain (CPT) Herbert B. Avedon, Signal Corps (a WWII OSS and Army Psywar School-trained officer); CPT Oliver W. Rodman, Ordnance Corps; and CPT Raymond E. Forbes, Infantry. Shevins' Korean War time covered the stalemate, the September 1953 ceasefire, POW (prisoner of war) exchanges, and the Armistice periods. After the Armistice, the 1st L&L publication products were no longer

Psywar. Loudspeaker teams assisted with POW problems, civil action, and humanitarian projects in South Korea.

Having acquired sufficient overseas points and with his replacement on hand, Sergeant Shevins flew home. He was discharged on 20 January 1954, at Fort Dix, New Jersey. The married veteran used his GI Bill to attend a diamond setting school in Manhattan and then apprenticed with Leonard Sunna, an accomplished diamond and gem setter from Vienna. After that training Shevins worked for some very fine jewelry firms. He set a ring for Charles Revlon, the founder of Revlon, jewelry for movie stars, and a huge necklace for the CEO of Reynolds Tobacco Company. Centered about a 104-carat pear-shaped brown diamond, this project took three months to complete. In 1960, he went into business for himself remounting diamonds and gems for upscale department store chains countrywide. One of his proudest accomplishments was getting a patent.⁸




Propaganda Platoon illustrators did their work in the G-3 Psywar Section of EUSA headquarters. Enemy uniforms, equipment, and arms were used as props.




South Korean artists worked side-by-side with 1st L&L illustrators in the G-3 Psywar Section at EUSA headquarters.




Publications Platoon photo vans with Federal G-513, 94x43 tractor, 4.5 ton, 4x4 in the corner of the motor pool.



PFC Paul A. Wolfgeher checks print run on the Harris Press.



Weekly Loudspeaker Team Talks were distributed to the L/S teams of the 1st L&L.



The Psywarrior was a weekly newsletter produced by the Propaganda Platoon. It contained troop gossip, intramural sports scores, propaganda themes, and international news. Though both were clearly marked "Restricted Security Information" true names were used and distribution was not controlled.

van contained a Hansch camera to make photographic layout plates for the printers. Shevins took most official photos with a 4x5 Speed Graphic camera. He was also issued an 8 mm Bell & Howell movie camera.¹¹ Not all L&L personnel worked in the company area—a former private school north of Seoul's East Gate—based on their missions.

The Loudspeaker (L/S) Platoon received its operational assignments directly from the chief of the G-3 Psywar Division at Eighth Army headquarters. The L/S teams worked and lived with the front line infantry units that they supported. The platoon leader rotated back and forth between I, IX, and X Corps headquarters, coordinating requirements while two section sergeants and a L/S repairman supported three to five L/S teams assigned to five corps [three American and two Republic of Korea (ROK)].¹² Propaganda Platoon, assisted by several Korean and Chinese artists and translators, worked in EUSA headquarters in downtown Seoul. They published weekly


Psywarrior newsletters for the 1st L&L personnel and *Loudspeaker Team Talks* for EUSA G-3 Psywar. *Team Talks* contained guidance and broadcasting messages for L/S teams in the field.¹³

Chinese and Korean propaganda scripts and taped broadcasts were approved by Projects Branch Chief of the G-3 Psywar Division before being distributed to L/S teams. English, Chinese, and Korean translations were done by university-educated writers isolated from reality in Seoul. Most scripts were too sophisticated for the majority of the target audience—uneducated conscripted Chinese and North Korean peasants.¹⁴


The Publications Platoon turned the artwork, photography, and written messages prepared by the Propaganda Platoon into paper leaflets, information sheets, and posters for dissemination by L/S Teams, Air Force and Army aircraft, and artillery. Leaflets were



1st L&L Company L/S interpreter, Lin Tse-shin, broadcasts to Chinese Communist Forces (CCF) in the 15th Infantry Regiment, 3rd Infantry Division, I Corps sector. The "mouth muzzle" is actually an early lip microphone.




Leaflet rolls being loaded into 105 mm Base Ejection (BE) Smoke shells at the EUSA Ammunition Supply Point (ASP) prior to being shipped to Corps artillery units.



Reality of "door kicking" propaganda leaflets from a C-47 aircraft in flight.



CPT Leonard Kleckner, I Corps Psywar staff officer, briefs L-19 pilot 1LT Albert D. Ackley on a leaflet drop in 1951.



Schematic shows the steps involved in dispersing airdropped propaganda leaflets after the "pull fuse igniter" on the bundle's explosive time cord was yanked by the "door kicker."

delivered to a nearby Army ordnance company where they were packed into 105 mm artillery shells for shipment to howitzer battalions supporting the front line units. Artillery delivery of leaflets was the most accurate.¹⁵

Still, the primary means was to airdrop packages of leaflets with time fuses from C-47s. The leaflet packages were shoved, "kicked," and thrown out like they had been in WWI and WWII.¹⁶ Some fifteen million propaganda leaflets were dumped on enemy front line troops each week by Psywar units.¹⁷

The enlisted men of the Publications and Propaganda Platoons were housed eight men to a classroom in the school building. They slept in sleeping bags on folding cots. The company officers lived in the school principal's house. Everyone washed and shaved in an aluminum wash pan. Houseboys provided hot water each morning, shined shoes, arranged the laundry, dusted the rooms, and cleaned the floors. The enlisted men in the school shared a common toilet and shower room. Waste was taken away weekly by a Korean horse-drawn "honey wagon."¹⁸ There was a daily work routine.

Each morning unless it was raining, a company formation was held outside. Then, everyone went to breakfast. Company physical training was rare. After the morning meal the soldiers went off to work areas. The Propaganda Platoon soldiers carrying M1 carbines boarded a 6x6 truck to go to EUSA headquarters for the day. These "privileged" troops came back for the evening meal.¹⁹ L/S teams assigned to support the infantry lived in the field and only returned when they were wounded, sick, going on R&R (rest & recreation leave), or finishing their tour and departing for the States.

Private Shevins soon discovered that the only Psywarriors that got to experience combat were those that volunteered to "kick" propaganda leaflets behind enemy lines or the L/S team members on the front lines. Combat time before the Armistice could shorten tours to nine months. The only threat to 1st L&L troops in Seoul were small bombs and mortar shells dropped by North

Continued on page 22.



An aerial view of the 1st L&L Company compound. Note its close proximity to civilian housing and the old Seoul race track where the EUSA aviation Detachment was based.



The main street view of the 1st L&L compound shows the USAF GP medium tents. M2 .50 cal machineguns were mounted atop the tower to the left and in the round command bunker below the American flag during alerts. When SSG Joe Lissberger, Publications Platoon sergeant, "cut loose on some infiltrators from the command bunker one evening, CPT Oliver Rodman almost had a heart attack."



Bunk area in 1st L&L Billets.



A "pick-up" game of touch football in the motor pool.




The houseboys arranged to have local laundresses wash and press uniforms.



Christmas at the Korea Cabana Club in the 1st L&L Company.




A caricature of the third 1st L&L Company commander, CPT Oliver W. Rodman (wearing his trademark Army-issue horn rim glasses) was prominently placed in the Korea Cabana Club.



The fourth 1st L&L Company commander, Infantry CPT Raymond E. Forbes, poses below his caricature in the Korea Cabana Club. Publications Platoon illustrators established the tradition.



1st L&L Thanksgiving Dinner Menu and Christmas Card for 1952.



The enlisted R&R center in Kyoto, Japan was the Rakuyo Hotel, a Special Services Hotel across from the railway station. L to R CW: Rakuyo Special Services Hotel Kyoto Card, 1LT Jay Russell's drink chit for the 1st L&L Company Club, and CPL Herbert Shevin's Korea Cabana Club Card.

"BED CHECK' & 'WASHING MACHINE' CHARLIES" aka "PISS POT PETES"

North Korean Air Force (NKAF) "Bed Check Charlies" aka "Piss Pot Petes" (Army nicknames) a.k.a. "Washing Machine Charlies" (Navy nickname) operated throughout the Korean War, but the operational tempo of these low level harassment bombing flights increased in the last six months before the Armistice, when the front lines were static. The North Koreans used Soviet Polikarpov Po 2 (*NATO designation MULE) biplanes dating to 1927; 1935 vintage Beriev MBR 2, pusher type seaplanes and these WWII era aircraft: the Yakovlev Yak 18A (*MAX), a low wing armed liaison airplane; Lavochkin, low wing La 9 and La 11 (*FANG) fighters, and Tupolev Tu 2 (*BAT) twin engine light bombers. The Soviets had used them all during World War II as liaison, ambulance, mine layers, bombers, and night interceptors and raiders. Powered by large, often exposed radial engines and constructed mostly of wood, they were noisy enough to harass troops at night, difficult to track

on radar, and too slow to intercept with jet aircraft. After some Bed Check Charlie flights destroyed an F 86 *Sabre* jet and several F 51 *Mustangs* on crowded forward air strips and fifteen million gallons of aviation fuel and huge quantities of munitions stored in dumps at Inch'on, the intruders became a priority for the F4U 5N all weather, radar equipped night fighter Corsairs of the U.S. Navy 7th Fleet. Several night fighters from VC 3's Dog Detachment aboard the USS *Princeton* (CVA 37) were detached ashore to K 16 airbase at Pyongt'aek, Korea, to intercept the NKAF intruders.¹ Lieutenant Guy "Lucky" Pierre Bordelon shot down three Lavochkin 11s and two Yakovlev 18s and chased off two Tupolev 2s flying night combat patrols between 29 June and 16 July 1953. Bordelon became the only U.S. Navy ace in Korea, the only propeller ace in the war, and America's last Corsair ace. He received the Navy Cross and Silver Star for his valorous actions.



An F4U 5N all weather, radar equipped Corsair like that flown by LT Bordelon in 1953.

LT Guy "Lucky" Pierre Bordelon was the only U.S. Navy ace and the only propeller ace in the Korean War.




NKAF AIRCRAFT



Polikarpov Po 2 (MULE)



Lavochkin La 11 (FANG)



Beriev MBR 2 Seaplane



Tupolev Tu 2 (BAT)



Yakovlev Yak 18A (MAX)

Endnotes

- 1 Lt. Guy Bordelon, Night-Fighter Ace, US Navy F4U 5N Corsair Pilot at http://www.acepilots.com/korea_bordelon.html accessed 12 May 2010; F4U Corsair, at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/F4U_Corsair accessed 12 May 2010; LT Guy Bordelon interview in Donald Knox and Alfred Koppel, *The Korean War: The Concluding Volume of an Oral History: The Uncertain Victory* (NY: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1988), 246-250.



1st L&L poster soliciting support for the Bookhan Mountain Orphanage from church groups in the United States.



CPL Herbert Shevins' photo at the Bookhan Mountain Orphans Music Academy was used in the contribution solicitation poster.



GEN Maxwell B. Taylor, EUSA commander, visits 1st L&L in September 1953 to see the most advanced mobile color photolithograph printer in the Far East (L to R: GEN Taylor, COL Hall, G-3 Psywar, EUSA, CPT Raymond E. Forbes, fourth company commander, and Mr. Kimbal, Davidson Printing Press Company Technical Representative).



ROK Army soldiers are awarded Psywar occupational specialties after one year on-the-job (OJT) training with the 1st L&L Company.



I Corps security awareness poster printed by the 1st L&L after the Armistice.



KATUSA (Korean Augmentation to U.S. Army) guard billets in the 1st L&L compound.

Korean Peoples Air Force “Bedcheck Charlies,” a.k.a. “Piss Pot Petes,” pilots flying slow propeller airplanes (seventy to ninety knots) low level from the Sariwon airfield in North Korea.²⁰

Still, whenever the air raid alarm was sounded, the L&L soldiers donned their helmets, grabbed M1 carbines, .45 cal automatic pistols, and the two M2 .50 cal heavy machineguns, and ran to man defensive positions around the school compound. A Korean KATUSA (Korean Augmentation to the US Army) security platoon guarded the main gate, the rear service entrance, and occupied a watch tower. The Psywarriors positioned one M2 machinegun atop the main water tower and had another M2 inside the command bunker that faced the street directly below the main building. They were not allowed to engage “Bedcheck Charlie” because their walled compound was surrounded by civilian houses.²¹

Since “Charlie” targeted the nearby ammunition and gasoline storage areas, the L&L soldiers were often rewarded with a little fireworks display before going back to their bunks in the schoolhouse. Publications Platoon Sergeant Lissberger surprised the company commander when he “cut loose” with his M2 machinegun against a group of infiltrators probing the back perimeter. The next morning the soldiers searched the area and found a mute Chinese soldier hiding in a drainage ditch. He had escaped from the nearby temporary POW compound.²²

POW interviews provided current material for L/S teams on line. Broadcasting the names of those recently captured was quite helpful. Better still were the POW-recorded surrender appeals to former comrades.²³ These POWs explained how well they were being treated by



인민군 3사단 동지들이여
이것은 유엔군쪽으로 넘어온
분대장이 보내는 편지다



CPL Herbert Shevins photographed these Chinese POWs for EUSA G3 Psywar Leaflet 8420. They dressed in padded uniforms for the Psywar leaflet. (Photo and Leaflet above)



ROK minister's daughter who posed for a propaganda leaflet created a major flap for the 1st L&L Company.

UN troops. Promise of good treatment was emphasized in the leaflet messages and safe conduct passes.²⁴ CPL Shevins often traveled to the Chinese POW compound at Yong Dong Po to photograph recently captured soldiers for propaganda leaflets. The Propaganda Platoon Leader's great idea to use the photograph of a ROK minister's pretty daughter on a leaflet caused a real flap...after the official received a copy of one that had been dropped.²⁵ Free time to enjoy Seoul was welcomed by the Psywarriors.

The L&L soldiers usually had a day off per week and those not being disciplined were given a Rest and Relaxation (R&R) furlough in Japan every twelve months. Since photography had been his hobby since childhood, Shevins carried his personal 35 mm camera whenever he went into town or outside Seoul. He also served as the company photographer for ceremonies, formations, and holiday activities. This made him the logical choice to compile the farewell gift, *Remember?* The U.S. Army and South Korean government recognized the contributions of the 1st L&L soldiers during the war as well.

The 1st Loudspeaker & Leaflet Company, EUSA, the first and only tactical Psywar unit deployed to Korea, was awarded the Republic of Korea Presidential Unit Citation and two U.S. Army Meritorious Service Citations for its distinguished service from 1950-1954. One soldier (Sergeant Lawrence O'Brien, Loudspeaker Team Chief with 7th Infantry Division) was awarded the Silver Star for gallantry in action in May 1950 that saved the life of Commanding General, MG Claude Ferenbaugh, after he was ambushed. A number of Loudspeaker Team personnel received Bronze Stars for Valor, Air Medals, and Purple Hearts.²⁶ While several Loudspeaker Team members were wounded in action (WIA), only four 1st L&L soldiers were killed in action from 1950-1953.

These fallen Korean War Psywarriors were honored by the U.S. Army Special Operations Command during its memorialization ceremony on 24 May 2007. They are the legacy of the 1st MISO Battalion (Airborne) today. †


Charles H. Briscoe has been the USASOC Command Historian since 2000. A graduate of The Citadel, this retired Army special operations officer earned his PhD from the University of South Carolina. Current research interests include Army special operations during the Korean War, in El Salvador, and the Lodge Act.

Endnotes

- 1 COL Kenneth K. Hansen. *Psywar in Korea* (Washington, DC: Joint Subsidiary Activities Group, OJCS, 1960): 7, 26.
- 2 Hansen, *Psywar in Korea*, 26. MAJ Homer Caskey took the Technical Information Detachment overseas. After the TID was expanded to become the 1st L&L Company, it was subsequently commanded by Majors John T. Dabinett and Donald W. Osgood and Captains Herbert Avedon, Oliver W. Rodman, and Raymond E. Forbes
- 3 Department of the Army. Operational Research Office. Technical Memorandum ORO-T-3 (FEC). George S. Pettee, *US Psywar Operations in the Korean War* (23 January 1951), 29; "PSYWAR Hits Korean Enemy Right Where It Hurts the Most," *The Army Times*, 20 May 1953; and 1st L&L Company, EUSA, APO 301, Seoul, Korea, Standing Operating Procedure (SOP) dated 10 August 1952, hereafter cited as 1st L&L Co. SOP.



Ten boxcar loads of print paper erroneously delivered to Seoul instead of Japan had to be unloaded, moved to the 1st L&L, stacked and covered in 48 hours to prevent weather damage.



- 4 Pettee, *US Psywar Operations in the Korean War*, 2, 7, 23, 24, 29; Hansen, *Psywar in Korea*, 26, 194, 196; (Retired) Lieutenant Colonel Jay V. Russell, telephone interview by Dr. Charles H. Briscoe, 16 November 2004, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Ft Bragg, NC, hereafter cited by name and date. **When war broke out in Korea, MAJ Alfred L. DiBella from the G-2 Psywar Branch, Special Projects Division, Supreme Command Allied Powers (General Douglas A. MacArthur's headquarters) in Tokyo was dispatched to Seoul. In January 1951, General Mathew B. Ridgway transferred responsibility for Psywar from G-2 to G-3 in EUSA, where it became a G-3 Operations division rather than a special staff section. He increased the manning to eight officers and nine enlisted men, and named DiBella acting chief. Prior to that Majors DiBella and Edwin Rios, 1LT Fred W. Wilmot, and a master sergeant conducted the tactical Psywar campaign for EUSA until 1st L&L Company was deemed combat operational in April 1951. Airborne and ground loudspeaker efforts were experimental. Only two trailer-mounted loudspeakers and two airborne loudspeakers had been in service. The 1st Cavalry Division lent its loudspeaker trailer to the 25th ID in the summer and fall of 1950. The U.S. Marines used their loudspeakers throughout the fall. Attempts to use them at the Chosin Reservoir in winter were unsuccessful. With the temperatures from -10 to -20F, the generator would not start.** (Retired) LTC Fred W. Wilmot, telephone interviews by Dr. Charles H. Briscoe, 10 November 2004 and 29 November 2004, USASOC History Office Classified Files, hereafter cited by name and date respectively.
- 5 T/O&E 20-77, Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company, Army, 1 September 1950, hereafter T/O&E 20-77.
- 6 Change 1 to T/O&E 20-77 dated 24 April 1951; (Retired) MSG Joseph F. Lissberger, telephone interview by Dr. Charles H. Briscoe, 8 February 2007, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter cited by name and date.
- 7 Herbert Shevins interview, Dr. Charles H. Briscoe, 21 February 2007, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter cited by name and date.
- 8 Shevins interview, 21 February 2007; Shevins email to Briscoe, "Draft Article for Veritas," 13 September 2007.
- 9 Shevins interview, 21 February 2007.
- 10 Lissberger interview, 8 February 2007.
- 11 Lissberger and (Retired) MSG Francis D. Blanchard interviews by Dr. Charles H. Briscoe, 22 May 2007, Fort Bragg, NC, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter cited by name and date.
- 12 (Retired) MAJ Ivan G. Worrell interview by Dr. Charles H. Briscoe, 12 April 2007; Worrell interview by Dr. Briscoe, 22 May 2007, Fort Bragg, NC, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter cited by name and date; Duane D. Luhn interview by Dr. Charles H. Briscoe, 23 May 2007, Fort Bragg, NC, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC; Russell interview, 16 November 2004; Russell interview by Dr. Briscoe, 14 January 2005; Blanchard interview, 15 June 2005.
- 13 Eighth US Army. G3, PSYWAR Division, Seoul, Korea. "Weekly Loudspeaker 'Team Talk'" flyers, 14 April 1952; 24 November 1952, MAJ Alan J. Dover Collection, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC; 1st L&L Co. SOP dated 10 August 1952, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC; Lissberger and Blanchard interview, 22 May 2007.
- 14 1st L&L Co. SOP dated 10 August 1952.
- 15 CPT Herbert Avedon, Special Projects Branch, EUSA G3 PSYWAR Division, memo to COL Hall dated 14 November 1952, subject: Psywar Commentary Nr. 1, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.
- 16 Avedon memo to COL Hall dated 14 November 1952.
- 17 Avedon memo to COL Hall dated 14 November 1952.
- 18 Shevins interview, 21 February 2007.
- 19 Shevins interview, 21 February 2007.



U.S. Army Meritorious
Unit Insignia



Republic of Korea
Presidential Unit Citation

1ST L&L Co. CASUALTIES, KOREA, 1950-1954

CORPORAL JOSEPH C. RATTI, Cook, Illinois, went missing in action (MIA) on 30 April 1951, while on a leaflet-dropping mission over North Korea. He was a Psywar leaflet "kicker" aboard a C-47D *Skytrain* transport, 21st Troop Carrier Squadron, the "Kyushu Gypsies," 374th Troop Carrier Wing, that was shot down in the vicinity of Wonsan. Presumed dead on 31 December 1953, CPL Ratti's status was changed to killed in action (KIA).

PRIVATE FIRST CLASS DAVID R. COOPER, Decatur, Georgia, a loudspeaker team member, was killed in action (KIA) on 16 July 1952, during an enemy 122 mm mortar barrage.

PRIVATE ANTHONY E. AREZZO, Auburn, New York, was killed in action (KIA) on 15 June 1953, when his loudspeaker team was caught along a road in an enemy mortar ambush.

PRIVATE BERNARD ALMEIDA, Bristol, Rhode Island, went missing in action (MIA) on 6 July 1953, after a heavy Chinese mortar and ground assault on Pork Chop Hill. Declared dead on 7 July 1954, PVT Almeida's status was listed as killed in action (KIA).

The U.S. Army Special
Operations Command Memorial
Wall at Fort Bragg, N.C.

20 Stephen E. Pease, *Psychological Warfare in Korea 1950-1953* (Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1992), 131-132; Robert F. Futrell, *The United States Air Force in Korea 1950-1953* (NY: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1961): 620, Rose Interview #1, and Hansen, *Psywar in Korea*, 313-314, 316. "Bedcheck Charlies" operated throughout the war, but low-level flights increased during the last six months when the front lines were static. CPL Herbert Shevins created this photographic record of the 1st L&L in 1953 as a farewell gift to departing soldiers. James A. Field, Jr., *History of United States Naval Operations: Korea* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1962): 455; Robert F. Futrell, *The United States Air Force in Korea 1950-1953* (NY: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1961): 622-623.

21 Lissberger interview, 8 February 2007; Lissberger and Blanchard interview, 22 May 2007; Shevins interview, 21 February 2007. Selecting different targets almost every night for two weeks in April 1953, the Communist airmen flew PO-2s, LA-11s, and Yak-18s against Chunchon, Kimpo, and EUSA front-line troops. On the night of 26/27 May 1953, five to eight PO-2s dropped small bombs and mortar rounds over the Seoul area. June was filled with attacks: 15/16 June nine aircraft raided Seoul and shook President Syngman Rhee's mansion with bombs; 16/17 June some 15 Po-2s, La-11s, and Yak-18s made the most damaging attack of the season, starting several fires in Seoul, one which destroyed fifteen million gallons of fuel at Inch'on. These attacks took place during periods of bright moonlight. Futrell, *USAF in Korea 1950-1953*, 622.


22 Lissberger interview, 8 February 2007; Lissberger and Blanchard interview, 22 May 2007; Shevins interview, 21 February 2007.

23 Gerald A. Rose, May 1952, Korea, letter to parents, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Ft Bragg, NC.

24 "War Without Weapons," *Pacific Stars and Stripes* (17 March 1951); Hansen, *Psywar in Korea*, 59.

25 Shevins interview, 21 February 2007.

26 Charles H. Briscoe, "'Volunteering' for Combat: Loudspeaker Psywar in Korea," *Veritas*, 1:2, 57.



1st Loudspeaker & Leaflet Co.

The "Proper Ganders" 1st Radio Broadcasting & Leaflet Group: STRATEGIC PSYWAR IN KOREA, 1951-1954

BY ROBERT W. JONES, JR. AND CHARLES H. BRISCOE

On 28 June 1950, a 374th Troop Carrier Wing C-46 *Commando* transport plane carrying more than twelve million leaflets left Ashiya Airbase in Japan bound for South Korea. Captain (CPT) Howard B. Secor's crew tossed out hundreds of bundles of crude, hastily-prepared leaflets urging panic-stricken South Koreans to resist the Communists in Seoul, Taejon, and other cities captured by the North Korean People's Army (NKPA). Dropped less than twenty-four hours after President Harry S. Truman committed the United States to South Korea's defense, the leaflets assured the populace that help, in the form of troops from the United States and the United Nations, would soon be on its way.¹

Shortly after 8 a.m. the next day, the telephone rang in the quarters of Major (MAJ) Thomas O. Mathews, G-2 Psychological Warfare Officer, U.S. Army Far East Command (FECOM) in Tokyo. When his wife answered, retired Colonel (COL) J. Woodall Greene, the civilian Chief, Psychological Warfare Branch (PWB), asked to speak with her husband because "I have something very important to tell him." She explained that her husband was already on the way to the office. When Mathews got to work, Green told him that he needed "thirty minutes



Since the 1st RB&L Group was a Table of Distribution (T/D) unit, it did not have an official distinctive unit insignia (DUI) or crest. The soldiers wore the U.S. Army Far East Command General Headquarters (GHQ) shoulder sleeve insignia (SSI) on their uniforms.

of radio time tonight for psychological warfare (Psywar) in Korea." Twelve hours later, the U.S. Army was conducting its first Psywar radio broadcast in Korea, largely through the efforts of MAJ Thomas O. Mathews, who on 29 June 1950 had no staff, no transmitters, no translators, and no news facilities.³

When the NKPA invaded South Korea in late June 1950, the U.S. Army was not prepared for war in many crucial areas; one was Psywar. Shortly after the war began, the FECOM/PWB hustled to meet operational requirements and assume responsibilities far beyond the scope of a four-person staff section. Amazingly, the PWB staff performed all FECOM Psywar in the frantic first few months of the war even though ever-increasing tasks continually overwhelmed them. After 1951, the Psywar Branch was expanded to a section (Psychological Warfare Section) in the G-2. Help from the States first addressed the tactical Psywar mission.

THE 1ST LOUDSPEAKER AND LEAFLET COMPANY (1ST L&L)

The 1st Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company (1st L&L) arrived in November 1950 to support the theater army, the Eighth U.S. Army (EUSA), because the U.S. Army still lacked strategic Psywar assets. The post-WWII military demobilizations had eliminated those capabilities. Not only would the Korean crisis prompt the creation of the 1st Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group (1st RB&L) to fill the strategic void in theater, but other steps were taken to ensure that the U.S. Army would not again be caught unprepared to conduct Psywar. By the time the ink had dried on the 1953 Armistice, the Army's strategic and tactical Psywar capabilities had solid foundations with the "Proper Ganders" (1st RB&L) in Japan and its 4th

"PSYWAR"

The U.S. Army term Psychological Warfare (Psywar) dates to World War I. There were three levels of Psywar during WWII, tactical; strategic; and consolidation (occupation/post-conflict).² In the late 1950s the term Psywar (Psychological Warfare) was replaced by PSYOP (Psychological Operations). In 2010, Department of Army created MISO (Military Information Support Operations), combining PSYOP, Information Operations (IO), and Public Affairs.

"PROPER GANDER"

During training, Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) Homer E. Shields, commander of the 1st Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group, had a contest for a cartoon mascot to cultivate unit identity. Even with a collection of trained artists, it was a challenge. The "Proper Gander" cartoon figure, drawn by Seattle native, Private Gudmund B. Berge, won the contest and earned the drafted architect a three-day pass.⁵



Mobile Radio Broadcasting Company (MRBC) in Korea, the 1st L&L Company in Korea, the 301st RB&L Group and the 5th L&L Company in Germany, and the 6th RB&L Group and 2nd L&L Company at the newly-established U.S. Army Psychological Warfare Center, Fort Bragg, North Carolina.⁴

During World War II the U.S. Army built an extensive Psywar capability in the European and Pacific theaters. As early as the North African campaign, General (GEN) Dwight D. Eisenhower relied on Brigadier General (BG) Robert A. McClure, eventually appointing him to head his Psychological Warfare Division in the Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (PWD/SHAEF). McClure not only supervised staff sections at Corps, Army, and the European Theater of Operations (ETO) headquarters, but ensured that Mobile Radio Broadcasting Companies with organic radio broadcast, printing, and loudspeaker capabilities were employed at the tactical level.⁶



General Dwight D. Eisenhower awarded Brigadier General Robert A. McClure a Distinguished Service Medal at the end of WWII. McClure was the pick of the Army G-3, Major General Charles L. Bolte, to revitalize Psywar in the service.

In the Southwest Pacific Area Command, GEN Douglas A. MacArthur created his own Psywar staff in 1944, establishing a G-2 Psychological Warfare Branch (PWB) with more than thirty soldiers. By war's end, the PWB was nearly five hundred strong. In the final phase of the offensive against Japan, tactical loudspeaker teams supported infantry units in the Philippine and Okinawa campaigns.⁷

After World War II, the U.S. Army inactivated all tactical Psywar units and reduced the strategic capability to small staff sections at major headquarters. Considering future Asian contingencies, GEN Douglas MacArthur re-established a Psywar capability in the G-2 (Intelligence) of FECOM headquarters in 1947. It was the "Special Projects Division" of G-2.⁸ Major General (MG) Charles A. Willoughby, the FECOM G-2, selected retired COL J. Woodall Greene, a divisional Psywar staff officer and executive officer of the PWB staff in WWII, to head this element. Greene's staff of one civilian and two officers was tasked to develop a Psywar plan for the Far East. The G-2 PWB was one of few FECOM assets capable of responding to the invasion of South Korea in June 1950.⁹

The Army as a whole was totally unprepared to conduct Psywar when the Korean War began. By 1948, the only Psywar unit in the active Army was a Tactical Information Detachment (TID) at Fort Riley, Kansas. This small element (four officers and twenty soldiers) supported the Aggressor Force in Army Field Forces maneuvers against U.S. troops by employing loudspeakers and leaflets at the tactical level. Arriving in Korea in October, it became the cadre for the new 1st L&L Company, though a lack of equipment limited its ability to conduct tactical loudspeaker operations until early 1951.¹⁰ More significantly, there was a gap in strategic Psywar capability.¹¹

Although FECOM/PWB made token radio broadcasts from Tokyo and prepared leaflets in response to the North Korean invasion, the U.S. Army had little that resembled a "pipeline" to train Psywar officers and soldiers to meet growing wartime requirements. According to Dr. Alfred

H. Paddock (*U.S. Army Special Warfare, Its Origins*) the Army had fewer than ten Psywar-qualified officers on active duty in the summer of 1950. The Army sent six officers to attend a semester-long Psywar course at Georgetown University in October 1950. This stop-gap measure was insufficient. More substantial efforts were needed.¹²

On 15 January 1951, Secretary of the Army Frank Pace, Jr. ordered the creation of a Psychological Warfare Division (PWD) built from the small Psywar Section in the Army Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3 (Operations). Pace named BG Robert A. McClure to serve as Chief of the new Psywar Division. Using his WWII experience, BG McClure began attacking the problem by first creating Psywar officer and enlisted courses at the Army General School, Fort Riley, Kansas.¹³

THE 1ST RADIO BROADCASTING AND LEAFLET GROUP (1ST RB&L)

Concurrent with creating a training program to meet the demands posed by the Korean War, BG McClure directed formation of a new strategic Psywar unit called a Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group (RB&L), to create, produce, and disseminate the Psywar products that the unit's name suggested.¹⁴ McClure turned to his old executive officer at PWD/SHAEP, U.S. Army National Guard Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) Homer E. Shields, to command the 1st RB&L. Mobilized with the Indiana National Guard in 1942, Infantry Lieutenant Shields had become executive officer, Seventh Army Combat Propaganda Team in March 1944 and served in North Africa, Italy, and Southern France. Then-MAJ Shields became Chief of Psywar at Sixth Army in October 1944 and eventually worked for BG McClure at SHAEP headquarters. After WWII, Shields returned to Indianapolis and became District Manager of the Circulation Department of the *Indianapolis Times*, but kept his National Guard commission.¹⁵

LTC Shields and his staff had a monumental task. They had to organize, write the table of distribution (T/D) for soldiers and equipment, assemble, equip, train, and deploy the three hundred-man 1st RB&L to the Far East in less than four months. Manpower was dependent on Army Reserve and National Guard unit activations, call-ups of individual ready reserve (IRR) USAR soldiers, and selective service Army draft quotas. There was no guarantee that those assigned to this newly created unit would have college educations or specialized civilian skill experiences appropriate for Psywar (i.e. journalists, artists, printers, photographers, and graphic designers).¹⁶ Fortunately, the Adjutant General had just started a program to identify those personnel well-suited to the new unit's mission amongst Army draftees, National Guard, and IRR.

Before Shields got to Fort Riley, a Classification and Analysis (C&A) station was established at Fort Myer, Virginia, to screen Army basic trainees for college degrees and specific job skills and to identify individuals capable of performing specialized tasks. During the C&A process, men with specific vocational and

commercial credentials were queried about their civilian backgrounds to identify certain factors (i.e., education, job experience, language ability), that would make them good candidates for the 1st RB&L and other Psywar units scheduled for formation. Interestingly, evaluations were based heavily on the "gut reactions" of the interviewers, as those trainees queried did not have to produce evidence of their education, qualifications, or skills; their word was simply accepted.¹⁷ Despite this lack of verification, the Army C&A evaluators seemed to have "terrific insight into who would fit into the 1st RB&L," remembered Thomas M. Klein, a draftee slated for Psywar assignment.¹⁸ "It was a rare display of putting round pegs in round holes," recalled 1st RB&L recruit Robert C. McConaughy. "I came to the Army General School in early 1951 fresh from a broadcaster job at an independent radio station in Lincoln, Nebraska."¹⁹



LTC Homer E. Shields, the first commander of the 1st RB&L Group, in his Tokyo office.

BIRTHPLACE OF PSYOP

While Fort Bragg is the current home of MISO, the modern birthplace of this capability was Fort Riley, Kansas. The Army General School at Fort Riley was the hub of activity for U.S. Army Psywar at the beginning of 1951. There, the Army established Psywar courses to train staff officers and enlisted soldiers, organized and trained the 1st and 301st Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Groups and the 2nd Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company. The 301st RB&L, a U.S. Army Reserve unit from New York, was slated for Europe, eventually going to Mannheim, Germany. The last Psywar unit trained at Fort Riley was the 6th RB&L Group that went to Fort Bragg, North Carolina, in the summer of 1952.

Because of the initial C&A screening, over one-third of the enlisted men assigned to the newly-created 1st RB&L were college graduates. Many were WWII veterans who had used the GI Bill to go to college or to acquire technical skills that proved suitable for Psywar. To Navy veteran Gudmund Berge, receiving a telegram announcing "Greetings" came as a complete surprise. Having enlisted under the U.S. Navy V-12 program in 1944 (an accelerated commissioning program for prospective naval officers), Berge attended Whitman College in Walla Walla, Washington before Navy ROTC at the University of Washington (UW) and served a summer aboard a destroyer escort before his discharge as a seaman in August 1946.²⁰ He returned to UW to complete his architecture degree. After passing his architect licensing exam and accepting a job in Seattle, Berge discovered that his WWII navy service did not fulfill his two-year national service obligation. "You must remember the times. You didn't question the government. You had a job to do and you did it. I had received my education via the GI Bill and I was ready to pay it back," said Berge.²¹ After basic training at Fort Ord, California, the new private was sent to Fort Myer, Virginia, for screening by the C&A section. Given a choice of service as an Army combat engineer or assignment to a new unit, he selected Fort Riley, Kansas in January 1951.²² After "painting a [eight by fourteen foot] mural of Fort Riley on a mess hall wall," remembered Berge, "I earned an assignment to the 1st RB&L Group as a graphic artist for leaflet design."²³

Other "Proper Ganders" with college educations had similar experiences. With his draft notice in hand, University of Michigan graduate Thomas M. Klein reported to Fort Sheridan, Illinois, in December 1950. Shipped directly to Fort Myer for C&A, he soon heard about "this Psywar outfit [1st RB&L]. It seemed pretty interesting so I asked to be assigned to the Headquarters Company," remembered Klein.²⁴ A Masters degree in economics got him posted to the Group's Research and Analysis Section, though he was transferred to the 4th Mobile Radio Broadcasting Company (MRBC) in Pusan to prepare radio scripts during the summer of 1952.²⁵ Likewise, Hanno Fuchs, James T. McCrory, and John Davenport were college graduates working in news media, advertising, and graphic arts. Their experience caught the attention of the C&A section for prospective Psywar candidates.²⁶

For those declared "4-F" (unfit for duty) by draft boards during WWII, the receipt of a draft notice during Korea came as a mighty shock. William L. "Bill" McCorkle "had been classified as '4-F' in 1944 because of asthma," and was working as a sports reporter at the *Borger News-Herald* in Texas when he got his notice in November 1950.²⁷ Robert J. Herguth, kept out of WWII because

of a heart murmur and a spot on his lung, finished a journalism degree at the University of Missouri and was a copy editor for the *Peoria Star* in Illinois when the Korean War began. "Reclassified as '1-A,' I was drafted to serve as a military policeman (MP), sent to basic, and was about halfway through advanced MP training when I was pulled out to go to the 1st RB&L. The Army was looking for people with [civilian] skills so they did not have to train them. And, there were a lot of guys with college educations and skills that the Army could use. So I was a 'fit' for the 1st RB&L," Herguth recalled.²⁸ After

McCorkle and Herguth were evaluated at Fort Myer, they were assigned to the 1st RB&L at Fort Riley.

Not all 1st RB&L Group soldiers were screened at Fort Myer, but when the Army discovered their skills in basic, they became Psywar candidates. Such was the case

of St. Joseph's University graduate Anthony M. "Tony" Severino. He was in infantry basic training at Fort Jackson, South Carolina, when his company commander denied a request for reclassification, stating, "It is an honor to die for your country!" Discouraged but not willing to give up, Recruit Severino and another college graduate visited the classification building that night. There, they found "a lone corporal working overtime. He listened to our pleas and the next day we were transferred," said Severino.²⁹ Sigmund S. "Sig" Front had been trained as an infantry platoon radio operator in the Army National Guard's 31st Infantry ("Dixie") Division, but became an individual replacement for Korea after his unit was taken off the Federal activation list. A New York School of Radio and Television Technique degree and his West Virginia radio announcer experience got him transferred to the 1st RB&L.³⁰

Many of the first group of 1st RB&L officers were Army Reservists with WWII combat experience. Most lacked "official" Psywar experience or schooling. Their college educations, technical specialties, and work experiences between WWII and Korea were deemed critical and merited assignment to the 1st RB&L.

Princeton Ph.D. recipient Robert A. Horn was an associate professor of political science at the University of Chicago when he got his USAR recall notice. The WWII veteran was recalled as a captain to head the Operations Research Section.³¹ Frederick P. Laffey, who "loved being behind the mike," had worked a variety of civilian radio jobs in his home state of Massachusetts before and after the war. He was a military intelligence enlistee during WWII. When recalled to active duty as a USAR captain, he became radio program manager of the 4th MRBC in Korea.³² Eddie T. Deerfield, a former B-17 radio operator/aerial gunner in the 303rd Bombardment Group during

The RB&L Group, which spreads strategic propaganda, is the 'Long Tom' (the 155 mm Gun M1 & M2 used during WWII & Korea) of Psywar and it supports the field army.

— LT Ernest Codine, QMC, former staff and faculty member at the Psychological Warfare Center, Fort Bragg, NC, December 1952

"It was a rare display of putting round pegs in round holes..."

— Robert C. McConaughy

WWII, used his GI Bill to earn a journalism degree at Northwestern University. During his senior year, while working as a "journalism specialist," he applied for and received a USAR commission as an infantry second lieutenant. Deerfield was working as a reporter for the *Chicago Times* when he was recalled to active service with orders to report to the 1st RB&L at Fort Riley in April 1951.³³ Alvin Yudkoff enlisted in the Army in 1943 to be a Japanese interpreter after attending the University of Michigan. In WWII he was in charge of a *Nisei* (second generation Japanese-American) Military Intelligence detachment during the invasion of Okinawa, translated during the surrender on the USS *Missouri*, and performed occupation duty in Japan. Afterwards, he became a magazine writer and documentary filmmaker before being recalled to active duty as a USAR first lieutenant to supervise radio script production in the 1st RB&L.³⁴ Princeton ROTC graduate Robert L. Carlisle, Sr. was a field artillery officer in WWII. After being discharged in April 1946, he joined the USAR and entered the newspaper business, first reporting for the Passaic *Herald-News* in New Jersey before joining *Newsweek* in New York. It was after a Detroit assignment that he received his recall notice in July 1950.³⁵


Other college graduates were tapped as personnel fillers for the 1st RB&L in Japan and Korea. William T. Barry volunteered for the Army in 1943 and after infantry basic he was assigned to the 150th Infantry Regiment, Panama Canal Zone. Commissioned through

Officers Candidate School at Fort Benning in May 1945, Second Lieutenant (2LT) Barry joined the USAR before completing a bachelors degree in English at Princeton. After his recall to active duty at Fort Knox, Kentucky, 1LT Barry was levied for Korea in December 1951.³⁶ Arthur E. Holch, with a masters degree from the Medill School of Journalism at Northwestern University, had worked as a print reporter for the Denver *Rocky Mountain News* and CBS and NBC radio when he was drafted in 1948. After a year in New York reporting for the *Armed Forces Press Service*, he joined NBC television as part of the *Camel News Caravan* with host John Cameron Swayze. Exchanging his corporal stripes for a reserve commission in Military Intelligence, 2LT Holch elected not to join the NBC-sponsored USAR 406th Mobile Radio Broadcasting Company (which became the 301st RB&L Group) because he thought it was off to Korea. Instead, it went to Europe. Thus, his recall notice contained orders to report to Fort Riley where he was assigned to the 1st RB&L Group slated for FECOM.³⁷ As Robert L. Carlisle, Sr. recalled, "Art Holch and I had no direct psywar experience . . . but journalism experience was presumably of value."³⁸


It was March 1951 when the LTC Homer Shields introduced a ten-week training program directed by Lieutenant Mickelson and Master Sergeant Kennedy to the officers and men of the 1st RB&L. According to Robert C. McConaughy, "the three-phase training program addressed basic infantry fundamentals, general Psywar subjects, and six weeks of specific Psywar activities."³⁹ On 2 May 1951, the Psychological Warfare Unit Officers Course, No. 1, with forty-three officers attending, began using the original program of instruction introduced by LTC Shields. The final phase included classes in Psywar, organization for Psywar, strategic intelligence, tactical and strategic propaganda, and propaganda analysis.⁴⁰

The PWD course was based on Field Manual (FM) 33-5, *Psychological Warfare in Combat Operations*, August 1949. The examples came from European experiences.⁴² When the officers asked about Korea, "the instructors said that they were not allowed to talk about current operations." This surprised 2LT Arthur Holch, but that was typical for U.S. Army Psywar then. It was Euro-centric because the Soviets were the major threat.⁴³

Since there was no PWD enlisted Psywar course in January 1951, Privates Gerald P. Deppe, John Stoddard,



In 1951 and 1952, the Psychological Warfare Department (PWD) of the Army General School held four officer and two enlisted Psywar classes, ultimately producing 334 graduates from all four services and some Allied nations. In early 1952, the PWD became a separate and independent Army School, the Psychological Warfare School, when it relocated to Fort Bragg, North Carolina, to become part of the U.S. Army Psychological Warfare Center.



Officer graduates of the Psywar Warfare Course were awarded the following Psychological Warfare MOS: 9301 Psywar Intelligence Officer; 9305 Psywar Staff Officer; 9306 Psywar Propaganda Linguist; and 9332 Psywar Interpreter.⁴¹

Hal Curren Weed, Robert McConaughy, Al Busse, Spencer, and Jackman, working with 1st RB&L officers that had Psywar experience, wrote seventy hours of classroom instruction for approval by the Psywar Division.⁴⁴ This mirrored the PWD Psywar Unit Officers course. The ETO Psywar veterans emphasized their WWII experiences in classes that ranged from "Introduction to Psywar" to "News Writing." "They, in turn, depended heavily upon newcomers—men who had the proper background but no actual experience at the job," wrote Quartermaster Corps LT Ernest Codine, a former member of the staff and faculty of the Psychological Warfare Center, Fort Bragg, NC, in December 1952.⁴⁵ "1LT Jack Morris took the writers and conducted drills on how to think and write with limited information. But, we were also soldiers and had to go to the rifle range and bivouac in the field," recalled Anthony J. Severino.⁴⁶

The final phase of 1st RB&L training at Fort Riley culminated in a field exercise during which leaflets and radio broadcasts were developed and disseminated.⁴⁸ LTC Shields integrated all the elements into a single exercise to test unit capabilities. Based on intelligence reports, artists and writers prepared leaflets that were lithographed by unit photographers and printed by the press operators. Simultaneously, radio scriptwriters wrote programs that were aired by radio technicians.⁴⁹


As the soldiers were deemed qualified, they were assigned to one of the three 1st RB&L companies. The Table of Distribution (T/D), a "constant work in process," evolved and was modified by the Psywar Board, whose members were PWD cadre and 1st RB&L officers. Still, it served as the template for other RB&L groups.⁵⁰ The Headquarters Company, the largest element, had nineteen officers, three warrant officers, and one hundred and eleven enlisted men. It handled Group administration, maintenance, and logistics, and contained a Research and Analysis Section "responsible for the preparation and composition of propaganda material" at the theater level.⁵¹ The 3rd Reproduction Company with three officers and fifty-four enlisted men created strategic

leaflets, newspapers, and other documents and produced them on four high-speed Harris offset printing presses, the "Cadillac" model. With sixteen officers and ninety-nine enlisted men, the 4th MRBC could transmit Psywar messages from both fixed and mobile radio stations.⁵² Its three radio platoons were capable of repairing and operating captured or indigenous fixed transmitters as well as their own mobile transmitters mounted on 6x6 trucks. As the organization began to stabilize LTC Shields and his officers struggled to locate, requisition, and acquire the basic Psywar equipment needed for individual and unit training in order to be considered combat effective.⁵³

Fort Riley, a major training and wartime mobilization base, had plenty of World War II-era uniforms, boots, and field gear, but the Psywar-unique equipment was a problem. Most specialized equipment had been declared surplus and sold after the war. "With the end of World War II, the U.S. Army . . . rapidly dismantled its extensive psychological operations network. Psywar was dropped from Army training programs, from military schools and curricula, and from Tables of Organization and Equipment (TO&E)."⁵⁴ In response to the Korean War, the Army Psywar Board identified new requirements and arranged to buy equipment "off the shelf." Two of the critical items for the Group were printing presses and truck-mounted radio broadcast systems. The printing presses could be purchased from commercial sources, but they took a few months to assemble. Printers then had to learn the idiosyncrasies of the presses. The mobile radio broadcast systems were based on WWII designs, but used the latest technology. In the meantime, operators and maintenance personnel assisted the Fort Riley printers and did OJT (on-the-job training) with local area radio stations. It would be late December 1951 before the 1st RB&L received its radio vans in Japan.⁵⁵ But despite equipment shortages the 1st RB&L was assigned to FECOM to support the strategic Psywar mission in Korea and would go overseas in the summer of 1951.

Unbeknownst to most 1st RB&L soldiers, a maelstrom of messages and letters had passed between FECOM

As part of the graduation activities for the Psywar Unit Officers Class #1, the 4th Mobile Radio Broadcasting Company's mobile radio station, a prototype custom-made system for Korea, was set up for visiting dignitaries. It had taken several months to have the two vans built. The truck shelter on the left was the production studio and the one on the right contained the radio transmitter and receiver. The SCR-696 intercept radio was to be replaced by the AN/MRR-4 receiver and the SCR-698 transmitter was to be replaced by the AN/MRT-5.⁴⁷ In the center of the photo are BG Robert A. McClure, the Army Chief of Psychological Warfare (indicated by arrow) and recalled to active duty COL J. Woodall Greene, PWD, G-2, FECOM.





Troops line up to depart Fort Riley by bus on 12 July 1951.

and BG McClure and the Office of Psychological Warfare staff in the Pentagon pressing for a May 1951 deployment. The G-2 PWD in Tokyo wanted the RB&L in theater by June 1951, even though the unit was not fully manned and the mobile radio broadcast systems had not yet arrived. LTC Shields offered an acceptable compromise by dividing the unit movement into three echelons. A small advance echelon (ADVON) would be sent to augment the PWD staff as soon as possible. The main body would follow in July 1951. The final echelon would complete training on their newly-arrived equipment and accompany it to Japan in September 1951.⁵⁶ Meanwhile, the 1st RB&L "rear detachment," trying to reach full strength, would be plagued by constant personnel turnover caused by higher priority replacement fills for the 1st L&L in Korea, European linguists transferred to the USAR 301st RB&L preparing to leave for Germany, and the "mustering out" of reservists who had fulfilled their two-year obligations.⁵⁷

These challenges notwithstanding, the twelve-man ADVON left Fort Riley for Japan in mid-June 1951. LTC Shields gave them two missions: Support current Psywar operations in FECOM by assisting the PWD with radio broadcasts and leaflet design; and prepare for the arrival of the main body in July.⁵⁸

The main body, the second and largest echelon, was slated to depart Fort Riley for San Francisco, California, by train in early July 1951, but nature intervened. Kansas was hit by a horrendous five-day rainstorm on 11 July that caused massive flooding statewide. Two feet of flood water rendered the Fort Riley and Manhattan, Kansas train stations inoperable. Busses were leased on 12 July 1951 to carry the 1st RB&L main body the two and a half hours to the Lincoln, Nebraska, train station to begin their three-day journey.⁵⁹

After spending a few nights at Camp Stoneman outside Pittsburg, California, the men of the 1st RB&L main body were trucked into San Francisco to board USNS *General A.W. Brewster* on 18 July 1951. When the *Brewster* left California for the five-day trip to Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, nearly five hundred soldiers were packed into compartments in the ship's hold. They slept on canvas



LTC Homer E. Shields says goodbye to Colonel Ellsworth H. "Whitey" Gruber, Psychological Warfare Division, Fort Riley, Kansas, on 12 July 1951.⁶⁰



"It gets pretty tiresome to sit on a train for 48 hours so at stops we had drills or exercised."
- LTC Homer E. Shields.



Troops prepare to depart Camp Stoneman outside Pittsburg, California, for the Port of Embarkation, San Francisco.



The main body of the 1st RB&L Group traveled to Yokohama, Japan aboard the USNS *General A.W. Brewster* in July 1951.



When the 1st RB&L troops re-boarded the USNS *Brewster* in Hawaii, they discovered that an additional 1,200 infantry replacements destined for Korea had been taken aboard.



1st RB&L living space in the troop hold went from crowded to severely cramped during the second leg of the voyage from Hawaii to Japan.

and metal framed bunks stacked four-to-six high. Upon arriving in Hawaii, the ship's captain recommended that the soldiers be kept aboard to prevent AWOLs (Absent Without Leave). LTC Shields chose to ignore the suggestion and used the public address system to announce that as the troop commander, he was authorizing twenty-hour passes in Honolulu. He told everyone that he was assuming personal responsibility that everyone would



En route to Japan on the USNS *General Brewster*, the 1st RB&L soldiers organized and presented a variety show to entertain all aboard and pass the time. (L to R: Hal Weed, Bud Perfit, and Gerry Deppe).




Yokohama harbor as seen from the deck of the USNS *Brewster* by the 1st RB&L soldiers. The infantry replacements for Korea stayed aboard as the "Proper Ganders" disembarked to the music of an Army band greeting the new arrivals.

make the troop muster at 9 a.m. the following day. The men returned his respect when one hundred percent of the unit was in formation the next morning.⁶¹

The real surprise came when the 1st RB&L soldiers reboarded the *Brewster*. They discovered that 1,200 more troops, mostly infantrymen, had been loaded onboard, making the three-week voyage to Japan very cramped. To alleviate the uncomfortable conditions, the Psywar soldiers pooled their talents. They organized, directed, and put on a variety show for everyone aboard. Others worked on the ship's daily news sheet, published twice daily, broadcast news on the PA system, watched movies, organized boxing and wrestling matches on deck, or attended religious services. Many RB&L soldiers, like Private William L. McCorkle, read "a book a day, including favorite classics by Ernest M. Hemingway, John E. Steinbeck, Jr., John R. Dos Passos, and F. Scott Fitzgerald."⁶² A popular book was *Thunder out of China* by American journalist Theodore H. White on the Communist takeover of China.⁶³ After nineteen days at sea the USNS *Brewster* docked at Yokohama, Japan.

1ST RADIO BROADCASTING AND LEAFLET GROUP (1st RB&L)



When LTC Homer Shields and the “Proper Ganders” got to Tokyo, they found that their mission, as originally detailed at Fort Riley, had been considerably expanded to cover gaps at the tactical level. The 1st RB&L’s area of operations for printed products now began where the 1st L&L Company’s ended, forty miles behind the line of contact.⁶⁴

Initially attached to FECOM under the direction of GHQ Psywar Section to support the United Nations Command fight in Korea, the 1st RB&L Group was subsequently assigned and administratively redesignated the 1st Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group, 8239th Army Unit (AU).⁶⁵

A new mission statement accompanied these actions: Conduct strategic propaganda operations in direct support of military operations; support the national world-wide propaganda effort; and provide operational support to tactical propaganda operations in the Far East Command.⁶⁶

To provide Asian cultural training, Shields instituted formal hourly classes four days a week on 31 August lasting through 22 October 1951. The focus was Chinese and Korean culture, geography, economics, history, and politics. Attendance was mandatory for all enlisted soldiers and optional for officers.⁶⁷ Subsequent unit training covered military intelligence topics and reviewed infantry tactics.

The Group’s strategic Psywar effort targeted enemy soldiers, emphasizing four themes: “Surrender and get good treatment”; “Surrender and return home alive after the war”; “The invincibility and strength of the

UN”; and “Survival” stressing that “Life was better than dying in the war.” Messages for civilians highlighted the divisive nature and exploitive behavior of the Soviet and Chinese Communists. They were designed to undermine Communism as a whole.⁶⁸ Those notices warning civilians about future airstrikes demonstrated the benevolence as well as the power of the United Nations.⁶⁹

1LT Eddie Deerfield later explained that, regardless of the theme, the practical goal was to discredit the myth of the Communist ideal painted by the enemy: “Our mission was to destroy this illusion . . . by convincing audiences that democracy was the best means of achieving freedom and bettering their lives.”⁷⁰

HEADQUARTERS COMPANY

The majority of the 1st RB&L worked at FECOM General Headquarters (GHQ) in Tokyo, making use of modern radio studio and production facilities on the sixth floor of the Empire Building. In addition to preparing “Truth and News” scripts, they assisted the *Voice of the United Nations Command* (VUNC) with radio programming.⁷¹ While some soldiers were writing radio scripts, others, working with dedicated teams of Chinese and Korean civilian linguists (Department of the Army employees who translated the English into Korean, Mandarin, and Cantonese), prepared propaganda leaflets.⁷²

The 1st RB&L soldiers in Tokyo worked and lived in a significantly improved environment than they had at Fort Riley. Though American saturation bombing during

“Our mission was to destroy this illusion...by convincing audiences that democracy was the best means of achieving freedom and bettering their lives.

— 1LT Eddie Deerfield



These photographs show some of the devastation wrought on South Korea's capital after being invaded, occupied and liberated twice in twelve months. The North Koreans captured Seoul in July 1950. UN forces liberated the South Korean capital in September 1950 and were in the process of rebuilding when Chinese and North Korean forces recaptured it in January 1951. UN forces liberated it again on 15 March 1951. The bottom left photo shows the only streetcar still operating in the capital.

By late summer 1951, the entire 4th MRBC had relocated to Seoul and platoons were dispatched to Taejon and Taegu. The capital became the most sensitive location.⁸¹ Fifty years later, Sigmund S. "Sig" Front remembered "arriving at the *HLKA* (Radio Call letters for Korean *Radio Pusan*) building, which had been *RCA* [Radio Corporation of America] headquarters in Korea before the war. *RCA* had installed a thousand-watt transmitter and erected a huge tower in the heart of the city."⁸² The *RCA* building, like the nearby Capitol and City Hall, was pockmarked by shellfire. The North Koreans had stolen most of the equipment and radio tubes before they withdrew. U.S. Army radio engineers had pieced together transmitting equipment salvaged from throughout Seoul and had gotten the station operational again, transmitting at five thousand watts.⁸³

Unlike the luxurious 1st RB&L living conditions in Tokyo, life for the 4th MRBC soldiers in the South Korean capital was spartan. "When I arrived in Seoul, there was no running water, little electricity except from military generators, little fuel for cooking and none for heat," recalled Sig Front. "We had cots and sleeping bags and slept in our clothes. Much of the time the temperature was below zero. We had a Coleman burner to heat C Rations for breakfast, lunch and dinner. I never had a hot meal made by cooks until I did a story on the 1st

Marine Division. The Marines not only had plenty of meats, potatoes, canned fruits and vegetables, but also peanut butter and fresh bread. They gave me a huge can of peanut butter, the size of a gallon paint can, which I shared with the guys and the Koreans who had begun to live in our building since they did work for *HLKA*."⁸⁴

To accomplish all the mundane tasks required to operate *Radio Seoul*, the 4th MRBC enlisted local help and arranged food and compensation with UNCACK. This arrangement prompted many workers to move their families into the facility, increasing the demand for food. Eventually, "we fed some forty people, families with young children, of fathers doing some task for the station," Sig Front remembered.⁸⁵

With a local support structure in place, the 4th MRBC could focus on improving the quality of their radio messages. They began creating popular broadcasts based on a detailed target audience analysis. These were carefully aligned with strategic Psywar themes. Regularly scheduled broadcasts contained messages just long enough to get the themes across without boring listeners or putting them at risk. Writers also searched out topics of interest that reinforced UN themes.

Operating quite independently, the isolated 4th MRBC detachments at Korean radio stations controlled content by preparing daily news broadcasts, producing

special features, and arranging commentaries. As communication links improved between the 1st RB&L headquarters in Tokyo and the 4th MRBC in Seoul, so did coordination, cohesion, and support. From soldiers initially gathering news from open sources or short telephone calls to the Group, teletype machines linked Tokyo to all Korean radio stations, provided U.S. wire service news, and standardized news coverage across the group.⁸⁶

The 4th MRBC writers discovered that there were sufficient stories, international and national, to go around.⁸⁷ One special UN broadcast was designed to generate pride among Turkish troops, who had “returned to Korea after being nearly wiped out by the Chinese in late November 1950. Their General got on the radio and taunted the Chinese Army Command in the North,” recalled Sig Front, “telling them where the Turks were going to be on the line, and dared them to attack.” A day later the VUNC repeated the taped broadcast. “They went across the line their first night, with the old style knives [the] Turks have used for hundreds of years, and butchered a lot of Chinese in their trenches. They were never challenged again by the Chinese,” remembered Front. “I admired those Turks and will never forget them.”⁸⁸

Although the strategic Psywar themes were carefully articulated, the 4th MRBC reporters continued to gather local human interest stories to keep the population aware and informed. Private First Class (PFC) Sig Front taped radio news broadcasts in the field. His “Tape Team” consisted of himself and two interpreters, one Korean and one Chinese, going about in a jeep to “cover the same stories as all foreign correspondents,” Front explained.⁸⁹ “We developed special topic broadcasts that we thought would depress the North Koreans. The North Koreans had not had biscuits [a staple which Koreans liked with

“We developed special topic broadcasts that we thought would depress the North Koreans. The North Koreans had not had biscuits for several years. When they discovered that Koreans in the south were enjoying biscuits again, intelligence agents reported that they were depressed about it. . . . There was no better way than to let them hear such statements first hand from citizens like themselves,”

— Sigmund S. Front

their meals] for several years. When they discovered that Koreans in the south were enjoying biscuits again, intelligence agents reported that they were depressed about it. Our Korean tape teams interviewed farmers, workers in factories, shop keepers, and people in the street to show the populace in the North that they were losing the war. There was no better way than to let them hear such statements first hand from citizens like themselves,” commented Front.⁹⁰



(Above) 1st RB&L leaflet #6505 entitled “Plan United – Turkey” dated 23 June 1952 was air-dropped over Chinese Communist Forces positions opposite the Turkish lines following the night attack.

Bok Cha Kim, a Korean actress-announcer, made radio broadcasts for VUNC in Tokyo. Women were preferred for most of the broadcasting aimed at North Korean soldiers and civilians.



To further improve quality, panels of native speakers were assembled to listen to proposed VUNC broadcast tapes. They evaluated how the message would be received by social groups, the accuracy of translations, and whether the language level was appropriate for the intended target audience. As the Chinese military presence grew in North Korea, broadcast evaluations became more important, yet at the same time, much more difficult. Despite the best efforts of the 1st RB&L and 4th MRBC personnel, broadcasts sometimes came across like canned speeches instead of natural conversations, providing little relief from the propaganda diatribes constantly broadcast by the Communists.⁹¹

The 1st RB&L Analysis and Evaluation Section in the headquarters used enemy news sources against them. Radio monitoring teams discovered that some of the enemy broadcasts were only done in specific languages and dialects. Selective presentations indicated that the enemy wanted to deny information to particular audiences. To overcome this enemy censorship, monitored broadcasts were translated into the languages not addressed and rebroadcast to those Communist-held areas attributing the information to *Radio Moscow*,



South Korean President Syngman Rhee (in front of the microphone) records a speech for the *Korean Broadcast System (KBS)*. In the center is 1LT Eddie Deerfield, 4th MRBC, and on the left is KBS radio technician Lee Tuk Bin.



1LT Eddie Deerfield (center rear) supervises local translators as they prepare broadcast scripts in Korean and Chinese from English copy written by 1st RB&L personnel in Tokyo.

Radio Peking, or *Radio P'yongyang*. These efforts added credibility to 4th MRBC broadcasts.⁹²

PFC Front remembered when a Korean in a well-tailored, expensive business suit walked into *HLKA* looking for a job. Explaining that "I needed someone who could copy *TASS* [*Telegrafnoe Agentstvo Sovetskogo Soyuza*, the Communist propaganda agency] in Korean and translate it into English. I found out that the well-dressed Korean was also well-educated, knew CW [Morse] code, and spoke and wrote very good English. It took him four hours to transcribe the *TASS* 'news,' and another four hours to translate it into English. After handing me the copies, he would have a very stiff drink and leave," said Front.⁹³ The ability to "scoop" Communist radio messages provided yet another valuable weapon in the evolving American Psywar arsenal.⁹⁴

The 1st RB&L regularly supported broadcasts for the South Korean government. Speeches of President Syngman Rhee, who stridently pressed for reunification, had to be "cleared for content" by the UN Command before live broadcasts. 1LT Deerfield and his soldiers meticulously screened Rhee's speeches before taping them. However, when the South Korean president went



This leaflet, with the theme, "The Communist Invasion," was designed to convince Chinese soldiers in Korea that the war could have been over long ago, but it was part of the Communist long-range plan for world conquest. It was dropped in June 1952 when the war had reached stalemate.

live "on the air," anything could happen. That was what PFC Front discovered when President Rhee ad-libbed the conclusion of his speech and proclaimed over the airways that "shoulder to shoulder we will fight with all United Nations Forces to reestablish ourselves as one country."⁹⁵ This caused major "flaps" in Tokyo, New York, Washington, Peking, and P'yongyang. 1st RB&L personnel working at FECOM had tighter constraints.


THE 3RD REPRODUCTION COMPANY

Turning strategic themes into approved Psywar product proposals was the mission of Headquarters Company personnel supporting the FECOM G-3 PWS in Tokyo. After weekly planning meetings, 1st RB&L writers prepared broadcast scripts drawing upon information from a variety of sources. Some of the scripts served dual purposes as Chinese, Korean, and Japanese civilian artists attuned the written English to accommodate the subtleties and nuances of Asian design. "Proper Ganders" worked side-by-side with the U.S. Army Asian employees to develop rough layouts having the greatest appeal to local Korean populations.⁹⁶ After resolving the finer points of a proposed leaflet, draft products were sent to PWS offices for final approval.⁹⁷


Once approved, armed guards escorted 1st RB&L couriers who took the leaflet proofs to the FECOM print plant in Motosumiyoshi, about halfway between Tokyo and Yokohama, where the 3rd Reproduction Company (3rd Repro) had co-located its four high-speed Harris presses.⁹⁸ The 3rd Repro lived and worked apart from the rest of the headquarters in Tokyo.⁹⁹ By the end of the conflict, they printed more than two billion leaflets for UN forces, preparing as many as twenty million a week.¹⁰⁰



The 3rd Reproduction Company headquarters and billets were located adjacent to the FECOM print plant at Motosumiyoshi, Japan.



CPL Richard N. Crimer, 3rd Reproduction Company, operates a Harris printing press at the FECOM print plant.



This 1st RB&L leaflet warns of a scheduled UN artillery strike. Similar ones were done for UN bombing raids.



SFC Furl A. Krebs, 3rd Reproduction Company, loads an M16A1 cluster bomb adapter with 22,500 (5" X 8") rolled Psywar leaflets at the FECOM Print Plant. (U.S. Army, 1 Nov 1950)

At the print plant, 3rd Repro technicians photographed artwork proofs and turned them into lithograph plates for high-speed printing in quantity. Then, the leaflets were either bundled for aerial delivery or rolled and packed inside leaflet bombs. The leaflet bombs were taken to Tachikawa Air Base for B-29 *Superfortress* delivery over Korea. Bundled leaflets were flown to Kimpo Air Base, outside Seoul, where they were loaded aboard C-46 *Commando* and C-47 *Skytrain* cargo planes for aerial dissemination.¹⁰¹


USAF aircraft delivered the most 1st RB&L leaflets. Trial and error refined air drop dissemination techniques. At the start of the war, leaflets were loaded unbound and then shoveled out open cargo doors. Once the door opened large volumes of loose paper swirled around the cargo compartment creating a whirlwind of billowing leaflets that was hazardous to the crew dropping them.¹⁰² To reduce that problem, the leaflets were wrapped in paper bundle "bricks"

and secured with twine. Once the brick was tossed outside the door, the twine was supposed to be broken by aircraft propwash. 1LT James B. Haynes, 1st RB&L S-3 (Operations) Section, went along on a leaflet drop to observe deployment by this method. When given the opportunity to throw some leaflets, Haynes stepped up. "No one told me to aim for the lower left corner of the door. So I threw [the bundle out] about chest high and the string broke before it got out the door, blowing the leaflets back into the cargo compartment of the aircraft," stated Haynes.¹⁰³

A better system was to attach a blasting cap and a short length of fuse with a fuse igniter to the knotted string.

Crewmen pulled the fuse igniter before they threw the brick out the door. Dropped at six or eight thousand feet, a foot of time fuse allowed the brick of leaflets to fall to one to two thousand feet before the blasting cap detonated, blowing apart the bundle and scattering the leaflets over the target area.¹⁰⁴

The 1st RB&L used a variety of aircraft to drop propaganda leaflets. Although small Army liaison and artillery spotter aircraft were used by the American divisions in Korea, the most commonly used airplanes were the USAF C-47, the C-46, and the B-26 *Invader* bomber. B-29 bombers based in Japan usually dropped leaflet bombs. The C-47s and C-46s could carry more cargo, but they were slow, unarmored, and unarmed. The B-26 was fast, but had a limited payload. The B-29 could carry a million and a half leaflets, but dropped from ten thousand feet, the dispersion pattern was very erratic.¹⁰⁵



String-bound packets of leaflets being man-handled out a C-47 cargo door often came apart and the inside of the aircraft became a maelstrom of paper.

Leaflets were flown to Kimpo Air Base, outside Seoul, where they were loaded aboard Air Force cargo aircraft for dissemination.



Like the radio broadcasts, the leaflets were refined during the course of the war to increase effectiveness. The 1st RB&L initially printed leaflets using proper Korean and Chinese. Highly academic language could not be read by a predominately uneducated target population of soldiers and civilians. By the summer of 1951, leaflet designers simplified their written messages, or used illustrations to offset the problem.¹⁰⁶ Significant cultural differences between Chinese and Koreans, however, made even simple translations less than effective.¹⁰⁷

By the summer of 1952, the 1st RB&L staff developed a basic Chinese dictionary of fourteen hundred characters. Prisoner interrogation reports revealed that most Chinese soldiers understood the simplified language.¹⁰⁸ Leaflets that became obsolete after a certain time were printed on paper which dissolved when exposed to the elements. In contrast, "Safe Conduct Passes" were printed on more durable paper which could be hidden and safeguarded until an opportunity arose to desert. They often resembled currency so enemy soldiers could conceal them from their superiors.¹⁰⁹ "When intelligence revealed that the



Korean military "door kickers standing-by" leaflet "bricks" containing pull-ring mechanical fuse igniters.

OPERATION MOOLAH




"Moolah," an American slang term for "money," was popularized in Prohibition-era gangster films.

One of the most well-known Korean War Psywar campaigns was also highly controversial. In November 1950, the Communists introduced the MiG-15 jet fighter (designed and produced by the *Mikoyan Gurevich* Design Bureau in Russia.) It was superior to all U.S. aircraft flying over Korea and was especially effective against B-29 *Superfortress* bomber formations. In response, the United States Air Force (USAF) quickly dispatched the F-86A *Sabre* to counter the MiG. Equality was not what the USAF needed, but rather a superior airplane to get a tactical “edge.” To learn what advantages they needed, the Air Force wanted a flyable MiG-15 for research and analysis. The problem was that MiGs avoided overflying UN-controlled territory (lending credence to the belief that pilots were Communist Chinese or Russian). The first MiG-15 captured was one that had crash landed on a sandbar in enemy territory. While this was helpful, the USAF still wanted an airworthy example.¹

In March 1953, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved a plan (Operation MOOLAH) to get a MiG-15 by enticing a pilot to defect. The plan was simple; the first pilot to deliver an operational MiG to UN forces would be given \$100,000 and provided political asylum in the U.S.; subsequent MiG-15

1st RB&L Operation MOOLAH
leaflets were printed in (L to R) Russian, and Chinese and signed by GEN Mark W. Clarke, Commander, UN Forces, Korea.



pilots would get \$50,000 for a flyable aircraft. The campaign was advertised by radio broadcasts and leaflet drops.²

The originator of the “Money for MiGs” idea remains in dispute. One source indicates that it originated in the Office of Psychological Warfare in the Pentagon.³ General Mark W. Clark claimed that he heard that Edward Hymoff, Bureau Chief of the *International News Service* in Korea, hatched it over a bottle of brandy flying to Korea in late 1952. There are other versions, making it difficult to attribute the source with any certainty.⁴

Regardless of from where or whom the idea originated, the UN Joint Psychological Warfare Committee approved Operation MOOLAH for execution on 1 April 1953. The 1950s equivalent to "Reach Back" employed by MISO units today was to give this high priority mission to the 1st

RB&L in Tokyo. The "Proper Gander" writers and artists got to work and finished the leaflets on 20 April 1953.⁵ The UN Commander in Korea, General Mark W. Clark, made the first radio broadcast in English. The radio message was repeated in Russian, Chinese, and Korean and followed by air-dropped leaflets. A million MOOLAH leaflets were dropped on North Korean airfields before the end of April and another half million followed in May 1953.⁶

Results were not immediately forthcoming. Not surprising, MiG-15s stopped operating over North Korea for eight days after the initial leaflet drop. Foreign radio broadcast monitors noted that the UN radio broadcasts in Russian had been jammed, but strangely those in Chinese and Korean had not. When the MiG-15s returned to the sky, UN jet pilots reported a noticeable decrease in flying skills and aggressiveness. Finally, in September 1953, two months after the Armistice, a North Korean pilot landed a MiG-15 at Kimpo Airbase near Seoul, South Korea. Ironically he knew nothing about the reward offer. The defecting pilot eventually received the \$100,000 reward and was accorded political asylum.⁷ Getting a flyable MiG-15 had no impact on UN air superiority in the Korean War. But, it was a coup for the West in the Cold War arms race especially after the American thermonuclear bomb (H-bomb) in 1952 had been followed a year later by a Soviet equivalent.

Soviet MiG-15 vs. U.S. F-86

General

1	<i>Crew</i>	1
33 ft 2 in	<i>Length</i>	37 ft 1 in
33 ft 1 in	<i>Wingspan</i>	37 ft 0 in
12 ft 2 in	<i>Height</i>	14 ft 1 in
221.74 ft²	<i>Wing Area</i>	313.4ft²
7,900 lb	<i>Empty Wt</i>	11,125 lb
10,935 lb	<i>Loaded Wt</i>	15,198 lb
13,460 lb	<i>Max. Takeoff Wt</i>	18,152 lb
364 gallons	<i>Fuel Capacity</i>	437 gallons
1x Klimov VK-1, turbojet, 5,950 lbf	<i>Powerplant</i>	1x GE J47-GE-27, turbojet, 5,910 lbf

Performance

668 mph	<i>Max. Speed</i>	687 mph
520 mph	<i>Cruise Speed</i>	513 mph
745 mi	<i>Range</i>	1,525 mi
50,850 ft	<i>Service Ceiling</i>	49,600 ft
9,840 ft/min	<i>Rate of Climb</i>	9,000 ft
49.3 lb/ft²	<i>Wing Loading</i>	49.4 lb/ft²
0.54	<i>Thrust/Wt</i>	0.38


Armament

- **Guns:** 2x NR-23 23mm cannons (80 rds/gun) & 1x Nudelman N-37 37 mm cannon (40 rds).
- **Rockets or Bombs:** 2x 100 kg (220 lb) bombs, drop tanks, or unguided rockets on 2 underwing hardpoints.
- **Guns:** 6 × 0.50 in (12.7 mm) M2 Browning machine guns (1,602 rounds/total).
- **Rockets:** variety of rocket launchers; e.g: 2 × Matra rocket pods w/ 18× SNEB 68 mm rockets ea.
- **Bombs:** 5,300 lb (2,400 kg) / payload on four external hardpoints.


The swept-wing U.S. F-86A and the Soviet MiG-15 were considered the top jet fighters of their day. In the Cold War arms race, analysis of the flying capabilities of the MiG-15 was critical to U.S. national security.



F-86A Sabre




MiG-15



Endnotes

- 1 Stephen E. Pease, *PSYWAR: Psychological Warfare in Korea 1950-1953* (Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1992), 66-67.
- 2 Pease, *PSYWAR*, 68.
- 3 June B. Young, Office of Psychological Warfare, Department of Army, interview by Dr. Charles H. Briscoe, 7 June 2005, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.
- 4 Pease, *PSYWAR*, 68; Mark W. Clark, *From the Danube to the Yalu* (New York: Harper Collins, 1988); Herbert Friedman, "Operation Moolah, The Plot to Steal a MIG-15," accessed 18 September 2007, <http://www.psywarrior.com/Moolah.html>.
- 5 "Operation MOOLAH" data sheet and leaflet products, 20 April 1953, Headquarters, 1st Radio Broadcasting & Leaflet Group (8239th Army Unit), APO 500, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC; Friedman, "Operation Moolah, The Plot to Steal a MIG-15."
- 6 Pease, *PSYWAR*, 71. The effort was in vain because by 1953, the MiG-15s were flying out of Chinese airbases and rarely ventured beyond the Yalu River border areas.
- 7 Pease, *PSYWAR*, 66-72.



Leaflet # 1153 was targeted at North Korean soldiers to cause depression by suggesting that their families were suffering under Communist domination. This leaflet was developed by the 1st RB&L. Red was favored because it symbolized Communism and had a strong visual effect. The leaflet numbering system allowed Psywar staffs elements to assess effectiveness based on numbers of enemy deserters that surrendered carrying it.

Chinese were short cigarette rolling paper, we printed leaflets on cigarette paper," said John A. Davenport. "When LT Mickelsen [graphic art officer-in-charge] told us that the Chinese were also short toilet paper, we hoped they used the right leaflet type for the right purpose."¹¹⁰

By the end of 1952 the 1st RB&L Group went through major personnel changes. As the USAR soldiers reached twenty-one months on active duty and draftees completed their twenty-four months of active service, they started rotating back to the United States to return to civilian life. Replacements for the original "Proper Ganders" were rarely Psywar School-trained. The small Psywar Division of the Army General School at Fort Riley conducted six Psywar officer and enlisted courses from 1951-1952 and produced a total of 334 graduates from all Army branches as well as some Allied nations. These numbers included original 1st RB&L personnel.¹¹¹ Few graduates from later Psywar courses were sent to the 1st RB&L or 1st L&L in Korea. Instead, they were assigned to other units.

By this time, Department of Army had decided to establish an independent U.S. Army Psychological Warfare Center and School at Fort Bragg, North Carolina in April 1952. Supporting the U.S. Army Psywar Center would be the newly formed 6th RB&L whose officers and men filled most of the last courses held at Fort Riley. Relocation of personnel and equipment to Fort Bragg caused a lapse in

formal Psywar training. Hence, sustained formal training to meet the continuing need for Psychological Warfare personnel in the Army, officers and enlisted, remained inadequate two years after the Korean War began.¹¹²

Armistice negotiations further reduced Army interest. But, when the driving force behind the rejuvenation of Psywar, BG Robert McClure, was reassigned to Iran, OPW in the Pentagon eroded.

After the Armistice, the FECOM G-3 Psywar Section retained several radio broadcast detachments to assist the South Koreans with program content and technical expertise.¹¹³ For the "Proper Ganders," however, their time in uniform came to an end in 1954, when the U.S. Army disbanded the 1st RB&L Group in Japan. The original "Proper Ganders" that shipped overseas in 1951 were a unique unit, filled largely by an effective U.S. Army Classification and Analysis (C&A) process.

"In Psywar units officers plan and supervise operations, while most of the actual writing and production of propaganda materials are done by enlisted specialists."

— 1LT Ernest Codine, QMC

[Army Information Digest (December 1952)]

When placed in command of this unit in 1951, LTC Homer E. Shields capitalized upon the experience, education, and technical skills possessed by highly creative soldiers to accomplish the critical strategic Psywar mission of the Korean War. The civilian talent assigned to the 1st RB&L in the first year of the war was truly amazing. That was key to success for the "Proper Ganders." While preparing their unit to go to Korea in the spring of 1951, experienced officers and well-educated, technically-proficient soldiers created the program of instruction and curriculum for future Psywar unit and staff officer and enlisted courses, built new Psywar TO&Es and T/Ds for the Army with improved technology and the latest equipment, and assisted in writing doctrine at all levels. The "Proper Ganders" of the 1st RB&L Group laid the foundations for postwar Psywar training and doctrine used to produce future generations of Army Psywarriors. ♣

Retired Civil Affairs Lieutenant Colonel Robert W. Jones, Jr. was assigned to the USASOC History Office from 2002 until early 2010. He now works in the Directorate of Training & Doctrine (DOTD), U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center & School at Fort Bragg, NC.

Charles H. Briscoe has been the USASOC Command Historian since 2000. A graduate of The Citadel, this retired Army special operations officer earned his PhD from the University of South Carolina. Current research interests include Army special operations during the Korean War, in El Salvador, and the Lodge Act.

Endnotes


- 1 Stephen E. Pease, *PSYWAR: Psychological Warfare in Korea, 1950-1953* (New York: Stackpole Books, 1992), 25-27.
- 2 U.S. Army General School, Directorate of Resident Instruction, Psychological Warfare Division, Fort Riley, KS. Psywar Unit Officers Course. Student Summary. PW 4201: Phases and Objectives of Military Propaganda I, undated in Robert L. Darcy Papers, Box 1, Folder 51, Manuscript Collection, U.S. Army Military History Institute, Carlisle, PA hereafter cited by title Darcy Papers with box and folder number. Darcy Papers, Box 1, Folder 12.
- 3 Murray Dyer, *Strategic Radio Psywar in FEC* (Washington, DC: Operations Research Office, Johns Hopkins University, 1951), 3-4.
- 4 Stanley Sandler, "*Cease Resistance: It's Good for You*": A History of U.S. Army Combat Psychological Operations (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1999), 206, 210, 218; Colonel Kenneth Hansen, *Psywar in Korea* (Washington, DC: Joint Subsidiary Activities Group, Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1960), 26; Charles H. Briscoe, "'Volunteering' for Combat: Loudspeaker Psywar in Korea," *Veritas*, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2005), 47; Alfred H. Paddock, *U.S. Army Special Warfare, Its Origins* (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1982), 99; George S. Pettee, *US PSYWAR Operations in the Korean War* (Washington, DC: Operations Research Office, Johns Hopkins University, 1951), 29; Paul A. Wolfgeher, interview by Steven Kuni, 2 January 2006, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC. In the post-WWII Psywar doctrine there were three levels: Tactical; Strategic; and Consolidation. Strategic level Psywar, aimed at achieving long-term effects on enemy combatants and populations, was the purview of Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Groups. Tactical Psywar, aimed at short-term effects on enemy troops close to the front lines, was the mission of a theater army Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company. In the Far East Command (FECOM) the strategic mission fell to the G-2 PWD/PWS assisted by the 1st Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group. In Korea the Eighth U.S. Army (EUSA) G-2 Psychological Warfare Division (PWD), assisted by the 1st Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company (1st L&L) conducted the tactical mission.
- 5 Gudmund Berge, 1st Radio Broadcast and Leaflet Group, interview by Lieutenant Colonel Robert W. Jones, Jr., 21 February 2007, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter cited by name and date.
- 6 Paddock, *U.S. Army Special Warfare*, 12-13.
- 7 Paddock, *U.S. Army Special Warfare*, 10-11.
- 8 Sandler, *Cease Resistance*, 206.
- 9 Pease, *PSYWAR*, 15; Hansen, *Psywar in Korea*, 6; Sandler, *Cease Resistance*, 322; Paddock, *U.S. Army Special Warfare*, 89.
- 10 Charles H. Briscoe, "'Volunteering' for Combat: Loudspeaker Combat in Korea," *Veritas*, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2005), 46.
- 11 Sandler, *Cease Resistance*, 206; Hansen, *Psywar in Korea*, 26; Briscoe, "'Volunteering' for Combat," 47; Paddock, *U.S. Army Special Warfare*, 99.
- 12 Paddock, *U.S. Army Special Warfare*, 93; LT Ernest Codine, "New Horizons in Psychological Warfare," *Army Information Digest* (December 1952), Vol. 7, No. 12, 27 in Darcy Papers, Box 4, Folder 8.
- 13 Sandler, *Cease Resistance*, 216; Paddock, *U.S. Army Special Warfare*, 46; Pease, *PSYWAR*, 16.
- 14 Paddock, *U.S. Army Special Warfare*, 98-99; Department of the Army, Training Circular TC-17, *Military Aspects of Psychological Warfare* (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 12 December 1950), 4.
- 15 Hansen, *Psywar in Korea*, 88; Thomas M. Klein with Robert Herguth and Robert McConaughy, *Psychological Warfare in Korea: Life and Times in the First Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group 50 Years Later, 1952-2002* (Greenwich, CT: Round Hill Productions, Inc., 2002), 123-124, 126 (hereafter cited as *Reunion Book*).
- 16 Paddock, *U.S. Army Special Warfare*, 93; James F. Schnabel, *United States Army in the Korean War. Policy and Direction: The First Year* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1978), 120-121. With the Selective Service Extension Act of 1950 President Harry S. Truman had the authority to mobilize Reserve and National Guard units, individual ready reservists, and draft men for war.
- 17 *Reunion Book*, 5; Paddock, *U.S. Army Special Warfare*, 93.
- 18 Thomas M. Klein, 1st Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group, interview by Lieutenant Colonel Robert W. Jones Jr., 1 March 2007, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter cited by name and date.
- 19 *Reunion Book*, 23, 207-08.
- 20 The Navy V-12 program sent officer candidates to college for a year of intensive instruction in science and mathematics. These candidates then attended either Navy or Marine Corps Officer Candidate School and were commissioned as either an Ensign in the Navy or a 2nd Lieutenant in the Marine Corps.
- 21 Berge interview, 21 February 2007.
- 22 Berge interview, 21 February 2007.
- 23 Berge interview, 21 February 2007.
- 24 Klein interview, 1 March 2007.
- 25 Klein interview, 1 March 2007; *Reunion Book*, 194-195.
- 26 Hanno Fuchs earned a Bachelor's degree in journalism from Syracuse University. He was attending Columbia University's Graduate School of Business while working at the well-known New York advertising firm of Young and Rubicam when he got his draft notice. Marquette University graduate James T. McCrory was working for the Milwaukee *Sentinel* as a reporter when he was drafted. John A. Davenport had trained at the Franklin School of Professional Art in New York City before being drafted. He was in Artillery basic training at Camp Atterbury, Indiana, when he was assigned to the 1st RB&L. *Reunion Book*, 173-174; James T. McCrory, 1st Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group, email to Lieutenant Colonel Robert W. Jones Jr., 26 June 2007, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter cited as McCrory email with date.
- 27 William L. McCorkle, 1st Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group, interview by Lieutenant Colonel Robert W. Jones Jr., 15 February 2007, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter cited by name and date; *Reunion Book*, 210.
- 28 Robert Herguth, 1st Radio Broadcasting & Leaflet Group, interview by Lieutenant Colonel Robert W. Jones, 15 February 2007, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter cited by name and date; *Reunion Book*, 184.
- 29 Anthony M. Severino, 1st Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group, interview by Lieutenant Colonel Robert W. Jones Jr., 5 August 2007, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter cited by name and date; Severino email to LTC Robert W. Jones Jr., 6 August 2007, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter cited as email with name and date.
- 30 Sigmund S. Front, 1st Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group, interview by Lieutenant Colonel Robert W. Jones Jr., 6 August 2007, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter cited by name and date.
- 31 *Reunion Book*, 188-189.
- 32 *Reunion Book*, 29, 188-89; 197-98.
- 33 Eddie Deerfield, 1st Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group, e-mail to Lieutenant Colonel Robert W. Jones Jr., 5 March 2007, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter cited as email with name and date; *Reunion Book*, 164-165.
- 34 Alvin Yudkoff, 1st Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group, interview by Lieutenant Colonel Robert W. Jones Jr., 15 February 2007, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter cited by name and date; *Reunion Book*, 250-251.
- 35 *Reunion Book*, 153-154.
- 36 William T. Barry, 1st Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group, interview by Lieutenant Colonel Robert W. Jones Jr., 8 August 2007, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter cited by name and date.
- 37 *Reunion Book*, 187.
- 38 Robert Carlisle "1st RB&L Group Synopsis," 20 August 2007, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.
- 39 *Reunion Book*, 24, 29; Headquarters, 1st Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group, Unit Training Program, Phase II: Psychological Warfare, 3 April – 16 April 1951 in Darcy Papers, Box 1, Folder 51.
- 40 1st RB&L Group, Unit Training Program, Phase II: Psychological Warfare, 3 April – 16 April 1951, Darcy Papers, Box 1, Folder 51; Donald F. Hall, "Psychological Warfare Training," *Army Information Digest* 6 (January 1951), 41-46; Department of the Army, Field Manual, *FM 33-5 Psychological Warfare in Combat Operations* (Washington, D.C.: G.P.O., 1949). Five additional manuals were prepared to accompany FM 33-5: *Psychological Warfare, the Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company; The Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group; Field Printing Techniques; Leaflet Dissemination; and Consolidation Propaganda*.
- 41 1st RB&L Group, Unit Training Program, Phase II: Psychological Warfare, 3 April – 16 April 1951, Darcy Papers, Box 1, Folder 51.
- 42 Hall, "Psychological Warfare Training," 41-46; *FM 33-5 Psychological Warfare in Combat Operations*.
- 43 Arthur Holch, 1st Radio Broadcasting & Leaflet Group, interview by Lieutenant Colonel Robert W. Jones Jr., 13 August 2007, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter cited by name and date.
- 44 *Reunion Book*, 24.
- 45 Codine, "New Horizons in Psychological Warfare," 23.
- 46 Severino interview, 6 August 2007.
- 47 U.S. Army General School, Directorate of Resident Instruction, Psychological Warfare Division, Fort Riley, KS. Psywar Unit Officers Course. Student Summary. PW 4552: Mobile Radio Broadcasting Company, Section I undated in Darcy Papers, Box 1, Folder 36.
- 48 *Reunion Book*, 24.
- 49 Paul M.A. Linebarger, *Psychological Warfare* (Washington, DC: Combat Forces Press, 1954), 301, 304; Sandler, *Cease Resistance*, 49; Pease, *PSYWAR*, 22, 25; National Archives. The Adjutant General's Office, Adjutant General Command Reports, 1949-1954, 1st RB&LG Command Report, 6-31 August 1951, Entry 429, Box 5015, Record Group 407; Hansen, *Psywar in Korea*, 88; *Reunion Book*, 26.
- 50 U.S. Army Field Forces. Office of the Chief, AFF. Fort Monroe, VA. Table of Distribution (T/D) 250-1201: Headquarters and Headquarters Company, Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group dated 18 July 1950 in Darcy Papers, Box 2, Folder 1 hereafter cited as T/D 250-1201 dated 18 July 1950; Charles H. Briscoe, "A Clearer View of Psywar at Fort Riley & Fort Bragg, 1951-1952" *Veritas*, Vol. 5, No. 4, 2009, 62.

- 51 1st RB&LG Command Report, 6-31 August 1951; Hall, "Organization for Combat Propaganda," 12-13; **The Research and Analysis (R&A) Section would be comparable to a combined Strategic Studies Detachment and Product Development Center found in a Psychological Operations Battalion today. It was not part of the original T/D 250-1201 dated 18 July 1950.** U.S. Army Field Forces. Office of the Chief, AFF. Fort Monroe, VA. Table of Distribution (T/D) 250-1201: Headquarters and Headquarters Company, Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group dated 18 July 1950 in Darcy Papers, Box 2, Folder 1.
- 52 U.S. Army Field Forces, Office of the Chief, AFF. Fort Monroe, VA. Table of Distribution (T/D) 250-1202: Reproduction Company, Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group dated 18 July 1950 in Darcy Papers, Box 2, Folder 1; Pease, *PSYWAR*, 22-24; 1st RB&LG Command Report, 6-31 August 1951.
- 53 U.S. Army Field Forces. Office of the Chief, AFF. Fort Monroe, VA. Table of Distribution (T/D) 250-1201: Headquarters and Headquarters Company, Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group dated 18 July 1950 in Darcy Papers, Box 2, Folder 1. U.S. Army Field Forces, Office of the Chief, AFF. Fort Monroe, VA. Table of Distribution (T/D) 250-1203: Mobile Radio Broadcasting Company, Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group dated 18 July 1950 in Darcy Papers, Box 2, Folder 1; Hall, "Organization for Combat Propaganda," 12-13.
- 54 Linebarger, *Psychological Warfare*, 93; Paddock, *U.S. Army Special Warfare*, 9, 11, 15, 17, 18, 20, 45; Sandler, *Cease Resistance*, 204-205.
- 55 Briscoe, "A Clearer View of Psywar at Fort Riley & Fort Bragg, 1951-1952," 66.
- 56 Memorandum from Colonel Edward J.F. Glavin, Acting Chief of Psychological Warfare, to Lieutenant Colonel Homer E. Shields, subject: Deployment of 1st RB&L, 15 May 1951, (National Archives, Entry 339, Box 19, Record Group 319); Message from Chief PSYWAR to Psywar Branch, Far East Command, subject: Urgent Personnel Needs, 27 May 1951, (National Archives, Entry 339, Box 19, Record Group 319).
- 57 *Reunion Book*, 24.
- 58 Berge interview, 21 February 2007; Herguth interview, 15 February 2007.
- 59 "The five most dangerous days in Kansas history," *Capital Journal* online, Topeka, Kansas, <http://cjonline.com/webindepth/flood/stories/070801_disasterousdays.shtml>; *Reunion Book*, 27.
- 60 COL Ellsworth H. "Whitey" Gruber, a linotype setter by day for the *New York Daily News*, commanded the USAR 301st RB&L Group. Its derivative unit, the 406th Mobile Radio Broadcasting Company, was a part of the U.S. Army Organized Reserve sponsored by the *National Broadcasting Company* through the Department of Army Industrial Affiliation Program. Composed chiefly of personnel from *NBC* and the *RCA* Institutes, the unit was scheduled for active military service on 1 May 1951. The 406th MRBC was organized in November 1948 and was commanded by Signal Corps Captain William B. Buschgen, a WWII veteran and *NBC* program engineer. Radio City studios and other *NBC* facilities of the network were made available for bi-weekly unit training and lectures. "NBC-Sponsored Unit Assigned Active Duty" *Audio Engineering* (May 1951) at http://www.aes.org/.../aes_nbc-sponsored-unit%20section-meeting-reports.pdf accessed 7 July 2010; SGM Herbert A. Friedman, "The 301st Radio Broadcasting Group" at <http://www.psywarrior.com/301stRadioBroadLeaflet.html> accessed 7 July 2010.
- 61 *Reunion Book*, 27.
- 62 McCorkle interview, 15 February 2007.
- 63 McCorkle interview, 15 February 2007.
- 64 Pease, *PSYWAR*, 22-24; Paddock, *U.S. Army Special Warfare*, 93.
- 65 **Because of the number of T/D units organized by FECOM during the Korean War, the command devised a four-digit number designation for T/D Army Units (AU) to facilitate accountability and reduce confusion.**
- 66 Far East Command. Headquarters and Service Command. General Order 61, Pease, *PSYWAR*, 99; W. Kendall and J. Ponturo, *FEC Psychological Warfare Operations: Theater Staff Operations* (Washington, DC: Operations Research Office, Johns Hopkins University, 1952), 58, 60-61.
- 67 The Adjutant General's Office, Adjutant General Command Reports, 1949-1954, Memorandum, Headquarters First Radio Broadcast and Leaflet Group, Subject: Training Program – Far Eastern Area, 30 August 1951; 1st RB&LG Command Report, 1-30 September 1951, National Archives, Entry 429, Box 5015, Record Group 407; 1st Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group, Unit Training Program, Schedule for Far Eastern Area Training with Reading Lists and Outlines for Far Eastern Area Training, 31 Aug-24 Oct 1951, n.d. in Darcy Papers, Box 1, Folder 52 and 53 respectively.
- 68 Sandler, *Cease Resistance*, 208; Pease, *PSYWAR*, 19.
- 69 "U.N. Swaps Warnings and Bombs For Peace Table at Panmunjom," *Newsweek* (18 August 1952), 16 in Darcy Papers, Box 2, Folder 10; 1st Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group. Leaflet #7079: "U.N. Artillery Power," 24 August 1951 from retired COL John P. Spickelmeier Papers, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC; Sandler, *Cease Resistance*, 249.
- 70 Eddie Deerfield, "Strategic Psychological Warfare in Korea Used Radio Broadcasts as Ammunition" *The Graybeards* (March-April 2006), 66.
- 71 Severino email to Dr. Charles H. Briscoe, 9 December 2005, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC; Hansen, *Psywar in Korea*, 89; Cecil A. Beckman, 1st Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group, interview by Lieutenant Colonel Robert W. Jones Jr., 7 August 2007, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter cited by name and date.
- 72 Herguth interview, 15 February 2007.
- 73 *Reunion Book*, 36; Berge interview, 21 February 2007; Herguth interview, 15 February 2007.
- 74 *Reunion Book*, 38-39.
- 75 *Reunion Book*, 38-39.
- 76 Deerfield e-mail to LTC Robert W. Jones Jr., 5 March 2007, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.
- 77 Deerfield, "Strategic Psychological Warfare In Korea Used Radio Broadcasts As Ammunition," 66-67; Severino interview, 6 August 2007.
- 78 Severino interview, 6 August 2007.
- 79 *Reunion Book*, 106-107.
- 80 Pease, *PSYWAR*, 100-102; Sandler, *Cease Resistance*, 209.
- 81 *Reunion Book*, 19.
- 82 Front, "Fourth Mobile Days," in *Reunion Book*, 63; Front interview, 6 August 2007; Front interview by Dr. Charles H. Briscoe, 2 June 2010, digital recording, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter cited by name and date.
- 83 Front, "Fourth Mobile Days," in *Reunion Book*, 64; Front interview, 6 August 2007; Front interview, 2 June 2010.
- 84 Front interview, 6 August 2007; Front email to LTC Robert W. Jones Jr., 6 August 2007; Front interview, 3 June 2010.
- 85 Front, "Fourth Mobile Days," in *Reunion Book*, 64; Front interview, 6 August 2007; Front interviews, 2 and 3 June 2010.
- 86 *Reunion Book*, 19.
- 87 Pease, *PSYWAR*, 103; Hansen, *Psywar in Korea*, 19.
- 88 Front interview, 6 August 2007; Front email to LTC Robert W. Jones Jr., 6 August 2007; Front interview, 3 June 2010.
- 89 *Reunion Book*, 66; Front interview, 3 June 2010.
- 90 Front email to LTC Robert W. Jones Jr., 6 August 2007; *Reunion Book*, 66; Front interview, 3 June 2010.
- 91 Pease, *PSYWAR*, 103-104.
- 92 Hansen, *Psywar in Korea*, 150. **By January 1952, the Research & Analysis Section of the 1st RB&L Group had become the Operations Research Section and was publishing a weekly Research Review with the latest radio monitoring news.** 1st RB&L Group, APO 500, *Research Review* (2 January 1953), Vol. 2, No. 1 in Darcy Papers, Box 3, Folder 17.
- 93 Front, "Fourth Mobile Days," in *Reunion Book*, 66; Front interview, 6 August 2007.
- 94 Hansen, *Psywar in Korea*, 156.
- 95 *Reunion Book*, 18-19, 65; Front interview, 4 June 2010.
- 96 Berge interview, 21 February 2007.
- 97 Pease, *PSYWAR*, 50. **The Psywar Section (PWS) was transferred from the FECOM G-2 to FECOM G-3 in 1951.**
- 98 **The FEC Printing and Publications Center was also known as the "AG (Adjutant General) Print and Distribution Center."** Beckman interview, 7 August 2007.
- 99 *Reunion Book*, 39; Hansen, *Psywar in Korea*, 89; Beckman interview, 7 August 2007.
- 100 Pease, *PSYWAR*, 37.
- 101 James B. Haynes, 1st Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group, interview by Lieutenant Colonel Robert W. Jones Jr., 6 August 2007, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter cited by name and date; Beckman interview, 7 August 2007; Pease, *PSYWAR*, 50.
- 102 Sandler, *Cease Resistance*, 208.
- 103 Haynes interview, 6 August 2007.
- 104 Pease, *PSYWAR*, 37, 63.
- 105 Pease, *PSYWAR*, 109-111; Sandler, *Cease Resistance*, 217, 231-232.
- 106 Pease, *PSYWAR*, 40.
- 107 Hansen, *Psywar in Korea*, 75.
- 108 Sandler, *Cease Resistance*, 242.
- 109 Pease, *PSYWAR*, 43-45.
- 110 John A. Davenport interview, 1st Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group, interview by Lieutenant Colonel Robert W. Jones Jr., 5 August 2007, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter cited by name and date.
- 111 Paddock, *U.S. Army Special Warfare*, 116-17.
- 112 Briscoe, "A Clearer View of Psywar at Fort Riley & Fort Bragg," 62.
- 113 Hansen, *Psywar in Korea*, 277-84.

1st Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet (1st RB&L) Group Products for Korea: THE J. B. HAYNES LEAFLET COLLECTION.

BY CHARLES H. BRISCOE AND JARED M. TRACY

2LT JAMES B. HAYNES



was born on 22 April 1928 in Enid, Oklahoma, the middle son of an oil businessman and his wife. A private education at Culver Military Academy was deemed best because the public schools in Shreveport, Louisiana, were lacking and Culver graduates had a high acceptance rate by Ivy League colleges. As a Princeton University history major Haynes attended ROTC Camp at Fort Bragg, North Carolina in the summer of 1949. Upon graduating in June 1950, he became Field Artillery Second Lieutenant (2LT) Haynes, U.S. Army Reserves. A fellow Culver and Princeton friend suggested volunteering for active service with one of the Psywar units then forming. Six weeks after writing to the Department of Army, 2LT Haynes got a telegram telling him to report in April 1951. After waiving a physical impairment, 2LT Haynes got orders to the 1st Radio Broadcasting & Leaflet Group at Fort Riley, Kansas.¹

Being a Princeton man helped with Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) Homer E. Shields, Commanding Officer of the 1st RB&L, who assigned him to the group Intelligence & Education (I&E) Office. His first task was to find copies of *Izvestia*, the Soviet state newspaper. Sergeant (SGT) Sarkov, a Russian Army defector who joined the U.S. Army via the Lodge Act, took him to the Aggressor Force headquarters at Fort Riley. SGT Sarkov, hungry for news from home, read it there daily. Success earned Haynes another challenge. "Get our enlisted college graduates and technicians qualified with the M-1 Carbine. They have to be Marksmen in order to go overseas. And, I want them to go to the field as well,"

said LTC Shields. Culver Rifle Team experience, help from other officers, an "M-1 pencil," and luck enabled him to succeed without casualties.²

Overseas in Tokyo, 2LT Haynes joined First Lieutenant (1LT) Robert D. B. Carlisle and Captain (CPT) Edward C. Janicek in the Group S-3 (Operations) Section, responsible for leaflet operations. Working with the S-2 (Intelligence) Section, target lists were developed. 2LT Haynes as the *ad hoc* 1st RB&L Liaison Officer to Far East Air Force in Tokyo enabled him to "show the Army flag" on B-29 Superfortress leaflet drop missions from Japan as well as C-47 drops in Korea. ♣

Charles H. Briscoe has been the USASOC Command Historian since 2000. A graduate of The Citadel, this retired Army special operations officer earned his PhD from the University of South Carolina. Current research interests include Army special operations during the Korean War, in El Salvador, and the Lodge Act.

Jared M. Tracy served six years in the U.S. Army, and became an historian at USASOC in December 2010. He holds bachelor's and master's degrees in history from Virginia Commonwealth University, and is completing a PhD in history from Kansas State University. Current research interests include the history of Military Information Support Operations and military-media relations.

Endnotes

- 1 James B. Haynes, interview by Dr. Charles H. Briscoe, 20 September 2010, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter cited by name and date. *SGT Sarkov died shortly afterwards, allegedly from a fall down the barracks steps. There were no witnesses, but Army Counter-Intelligence Corps agents investigating the "accidental death" of the Lodge Act soldier suspected foul play.* Haynes interview, 29 September 2010.
- 2 Haynes interview, 20 September 2010. *The other Princeton graduates in the 1st RB&L Group were 1LTs William H. Booth III, William F. Brown, William T. Barry, Robert D. B. Carlisle, Robert A. Horn, and John H. Fritz.* Haynes interview, 29 September 2010.

LEAFLETS ADDRESSING WAR SITUATION:

The leaflets depicted in this article are the products of the 1st Radio Broadcast and Leaflet Group. For each leaflet, a "cut sheet" (example below left) was produced that described the title, target audience, and thematic message. The 4-digit numbers that appear on the leaflets are the cataloging numbers from the original cut sheets.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
FAR EAST COMMAND
Military Intelligence Section, General Staff
Psychological Warfare Branch
APO 500

LEAFLET: "Mass Casualties"

LANGUAGE: Korean

DESIGNATION: Serial No. 1078. (Companion Leaflet No. 7061 in Chinese language with minor changes.)

TARGET: NKPA

REMARKS: To dramatize mounting Communist troop casualties.

ART WORK: Illustration showing barricade of dead North Korean soldiers.

TEXT:

Page 1:

A MOUNTAIN OF NORTH KOREAN DEAD!
(caption on NKPA bodies)

TO YOUR COMMUNIST LEADERS YOUR LIVES HAVE NO MORE
VALUE THAN SANDBAGS ---!

Page 2:

THESE FIGURES HAVE BEEN WRITTEN IN THE FLOOD OF COMMUNIST
SOLDIERS

The Single Day of May 22, 1951.....	11,945
The Single Day of May 23, 1951.....	5,138
The Single Day of May 24, 1951.....	7,339
The Single Day of May 25, 1951.....	9,969
The Single Day of May 26, 1951.....	7,174
The Single Day of May 27, 1951.....	16,400
The Single Day of May 28, 1951.....	13,237
TOTAL COMMUNIST TROOP CASUALTIES TO DATE.....	1,060,526

DON'T LET YOUR NAME BECOME A NUMBER ON THIS CASUALTY LIST
TOMORROW

JOIN THE MANY THOUSANDS OF YOUR WISE COMRADES WHO HAVE COME OVER
TO THE SAFETY OF THE UN LINES!

3834 1781 007



Title: Mass Casualties (Jun 51). **Target:** NKPA Soldiers. **Message on Front: (over picture)** A Mountain of North Korean Dead, **(main text)** To Your Communist Leaders Your Lives Have No More Value Than Sandbags. **Message on Reverse:** Total Communist Troop Casualties to date = 1,060,526. Don't let your name become a number on this casualty list tomorrow. The **reverse side** of the leaflet contains Communist Killed-in-Action (KIA) figures for one week in May 1951. During that seven-day period Communist soldiers were killed at an average of 10,172 per day for a cumulative total of 1,060,526 dead since the war's beginning in June 1950.

The "Cut Sheet"

Cut sheets provided psychological warfare illustrators with the necessary information to produce an individual leaflet. At the top is the originating authority for the message. This cut sheet originated at the Psychological Warfare Branch, Military Intelligence Section (G-2), General Headquarters, Far East Command (FECOM). Often cut sheets were dated, but surprisingly many were not, as was the case with this one. The top half of the sheet contained the leaflet's name, language, serial number designation, the target audience, background remarks, and description of artwork. This cut sheet was called "Mass Casualties" (serial number 1078), was in Korean, was aimed at North Korean People's Army (NKPA) soldiers, and would show a heap of them dead at the hands of UN forces. Below this section of background information was in-depth description of text to be placed on the leaflet. It was imperative that this information was researched, accurate, based on real circumstances, and credible. The more detailed the information (such as exact casualty numbers, unit designations and locations, and precise descriptions of planned operations), the more likely it would have the desired impact. It was equally imperative that the text was translated into the designated language exactly. In a style reminiscent of American commercial advertising, many Psywar leaflets contained an impactful image on the front along with a powerful catchphrase, as well as more detailed information (including instructions) on the reverse. This particular cut sheet depicts a pile of dead NKPA soldiers, and says on the front: "A mountain of North Korean dead! To your communist leaders your lives have no more value than sandbags!" On the reverse it goes into greater detail about specific casualty numbers between 22 and 28 May 1951. Then, finally, it gives specific instructions: "Join the many thousands of your wise comrades who have come over to the safety of the UN lines!" The cut sheet was meant to take all guesswork out of illustrating an individual leaflet.



Title: UN Day (Oct 51). **Target:** North Korean Soldiers and Civilians. **Message on Reverse:** Over the world, United Nations day is being celebrated with great rejoicing, for its noble principles were born out of the hearts and minds of freedom loving men. October 1951 marked the six-year anniversary of the founding of the United Nations, an international body designed to maintain peace. This leaflet shows that the international system of support for South Korea extends beyond a sole U.S. effort. However, aside from the Republic of Korea Army (ROKA) itself, the U.S. did in fact provide more soldiers to the UN effort than all of the other nations combined.

Title: Battle Line Casualties "Needless Death" (Dec 51). **Target:** NKPA Soldiers. **Message:** Over the last four months of delay (while the Communist officials recklessly stalled), 72,275 Korean soldiers were needlessly killed or wounded. This is equal to more than 250 of your full strength infantry companies. The reverse of this leaflet explains that in a meeting between UN and Communist forces in July 1951, the UN delegation proposed a cease-fire line. The Communist delegation refused to commit, arguing that it needed approval from Moscow (which it did not receive until November 1951 with tens of thousands more NKPA soldiers being killed in the meantime). This leaflet was intended to shake NKPA soldiers' confidence in their leadership, make them realize that their fate is being determined by Moscow, and to make them believe in the futility of continuing the conflict.



LEAFLETS ADDRESSING AGGRESSION:



Title: Suicidal Attack (1951). **Target:** NKPA Soldiers. **Message on Front:** Now! The Choice is Yours! Life or Death? **Message on Reverse:** North Korean Officers and Men. You have been committed to a suicidal attack by your Communist leaders. You have the opportunity to come over to the UN side. The choice is yours, Life or Death? The Psychological Warfare Branch, Military Intelligence Section, Far East Command, developed this leaflet based on intelligence of an imminent Communist offensive. It aimed to strike fear in enemy soldiers who, realizing that UN forces are prepared for their attack, now knew that they had little chance of survival. (The lead tank shows the Korean spelling of "UN" to clarify the situation). The leaflet offered NKPA soldiers their one last shot at "life."

Title: Communist Aggression (Apr 52). **Target:** North Korean Soldiers and Civilians. **Message on Front:** Communist Aggression Writes the Korean Tragedy. **Message on Reverse:** Communism - Divide by Hate, Conquer by Force. Oppose Communism, Resist Russia! This leaflet shows the inherently violent and destructive nature of Communism. The leaflet exposes the deceptive nature of Communism as it juxtaposes a hammer and sickle in the background (a symbol of unity between industrial and agricultural workers) with a trail of death in the aftermath of Communist aggression. The soldier depicted is identified as Chinese Communist.





Title: Chinese Invasion of Korea (Sep 52). **Target:** NKPA Soldiers. **Message on Reverse:** The China Army is enslaving Korea with a good name of Korean aid. Red China is driving you to death with so-called "The Aid." The front of this leaflet shows Mao Tse-Tung, Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party, invading Korea with Chinese troops while calling it "aid." It is intended to undermine Communist alliances by playing on Koreans' historic fears of foreign imperialism.

Title: Communism Exploits the Farmer (Nov 52). **Target:** Farmers of Hwang Hae-Do. **Message:** Farmers, Don't work for the Communists. Hide your grain! Hwanghae was the southwestern province in North Korea, an area controlled briefly by UN forces prior to the intervention and southward sweep of Chinese Communist Forces beginning in late-1950. The leaflet played on the exploitation of farmers by Communists and North Korean tax collectors.



1245

LEAFLETS ADDRESSING ANTI-MORALE:



Title: Communism Drives the Weary (Nov 52). **Target:** Farmers of Hwang Hae-Do. **Message on Front:** When you work on labor details you help the Communists prolong the war. **On the reverse** it advises farmers: Be crafty – pretend sickness – avoid political meetings. This leaflet encouraged farmers in southwestern North Korea to avoid excessive labor, which would hinder the Communists' ability to continue the war.



Title: No Care (Jul 53). **Target:** NK Soldiers and Civilians. **Message:** Your children are being taken away to Soviet Russia, Red China and many other foreign lands. Korean families are being broken up and Korean culture is being destroyed. This leaflet depicts a common psychological warfare theme of enemy soldiers missing their homes and families. It also warned NKPA soldiers and civilians that their culture was being destroyed by Communist leaders in China and the Soviet Union.



Title: You are Being Deceived (Oct 52). **Target:** North Korean Civilians. **Message on Front:** You are being deceived. **On the reverse** it explains: Why must your leaders bow to Russian masters? North Koreans, you are being deceived. Resist Communist Slavery! This leaflet depicts Kim Il-Sung, President of North Korea, kneeling before a Buddha-like idol of Joseph Stalin, General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The two sacrifices before the statue are "People" and "North Korea." The leaflet called on North Korean civilians to decry their leaders' subservience to the Soviet Union and to blame them for their hardships.



LEAFLETS ADDRESSING FALSE PROMISES:

Title: Corruption in North Korea (Apr 52). **Target:** North Korean Soldiers and Civilians. **Message:** Communist officials feast while the people live in poverty. This leaflet shows the “credibility gap” between Communist promises and reality—leaders enjoy lavish lifestyles while common people starve and live in poverty.



Title: Communists; Masters of Deceit (Apr 52). **Target:** North Korean People's Army (NKPA) soldiers. **Message:** The Communists have ruined your families and sold your country to Soviet Russia. North Korean soldiers march into the mouth of the serpent (Joseph Stalin) which has slithered from the Kremlin (background). The Korean word for “snake” (sa) is similar to the word for “death” and also the number four, considered in Korean culture to be bad luck (like the number thirteen in American superstition). This leaflet thus combines negative political and cultural implications.





Title: Russo-Chinese Plans for Korea (Dec 52).
Target: North Korean Soldiers and Civilians.
Message: The dumb ox Kim Il Sung plows up your land for Master Stalin while good servant Mao Tse Tung plies the whip. This leaflet derides the "dumb ox," Kim Il Sung, who voluntarily and unquestioningly takes orders from Joseph Stalin and Mao Tse-Tung. It suggests that Soviet and Chinese Communist leaders only confide in one another while orchestrating the continued fighting (and death) of Koreans. Here the hammer and sickle, a Communist symbol of unity, is presented as a painful, oppressive burden.



Title: New Year's Debt Settlement (Dec 51).
Target: North Korean Soldiers and Civilians.
Message: Based on the Korean custom of collecting debts before New Year's Day, the Korean dead petition for the return of their lives. This leaflet is based on the idea that Koreans regard trust as crucial to all professional and personal relationships. Repayment of debts is essential to building that trust. The Communists' inability to pay thousands of Koreans back for the lives lost represents a breakdown in the sacred bond of trust.

LEAFLETS ADDRESSING KOREAN UNITY:



Title: Homesickness (Jul 53). **Target:** North Korean Soldiers and Civilians. **Message:** If you were not forced to fight an aggressive war for your Communist Masters, you could be enjoying such a peaceful scene in a free and united Korea. This leaflet simply appeals to nostalgic memories of home, describes the Communists' imposition of war upon a peace-loving people, and alludes to the hopeful prospect of a free, unified Korea.

Title: Restoration of Peace in Korea (Jan 52). **Target:** NKPA Soldiers. **Message:** Will the Dragon Year Bring Peace? This leaflet contrasts the peaceful, democratic motives of the United Nations with the "cruel dictates of Communism." It portrays Communism as the only impediment to a peaceful, united Korea.






Title: Victory over Communism, (Jan 52). **Target:** North Korean Soldiers and Civilians. **Message:** Unite to drive out the Communist aggressors. The image is a historical reference to the Koreans' successful resistance of a series of Japanese invasions in the sixteenth century, known among other names as the Imjin War. The repulsion of Japanese forces remains a continuing source of pride. The leaflet describes Communism as a form of modern-day imperialism and as something that Koreans should repel as they did the Japanese invaders in the 1590s.




Front & Back

Title: One Blood – One People – One Nation (1951). **Target:** North Korean Soldiers and Civilians. **Message:** Tangun, Father of All Korea, One Father - One Blood – One Undivided Nation. According to Korean folklore, Tangun is the historic and spiritual founder of Korea. Legend places him in the twenty-fourth century B.C. A powerfully unifying figure in Korean culture, he is depicted here to promote national pride and to encourage resistance to foreign influence (Communism).



LEAFLETS ADDRESSING SURRENDER:

Title: Cold? (Feb 53). **Target:** NKPA Soldiers.
Message on Front: Do You Want to Die?
Message on Reverse: To save your life, escape to the UN or to the rear now! Tomorrow may be too late. This surrender leaflet emphasizes the harsh winter climate to entice North Korean soldiers to desert. Winter weather is especially brutal in the mountainous areas, with wind chills reaching far below Zero degree Fahrenheit.



Title: Safe Conduct Pass (1951) **Target:** NKPA Soldiers.
Message: Safe Conduct Pass. Officers and men of North Korea. Save your lives before it is too late. This leaflet informs potential Prisoners of War of the humane treatment they will receive, guaranteed by the Geneva Convention of 1949. It promised that North Korean soldiers that surrender to UN forces would receive food, medical care, and a safe return home after the war.



Title: Safe Conduct Pass (Dec 51). **Target:** NKPA and Chinese Soldiers. **Message:** Safe conduct pass in Korean, Chinese and English. Designed to resemble Korean currency. Disguised as a one-hundred won note, this safe conduct pass lists (on the reverse side) instructions for surrender and guarantees humane treatment.



Title: Methods of Surrender (1951). **Target:** NKPA Soldiers. **Message on Reverse:** Follow the picture instructions on the reverse side to insure safe arrival behind UN lines. Food, medical care and good treatment await you. On the front of the leaflet, the first frame (top right) depicts a NK soldier reading a safe conduct pass. The second frame (bottom right) instructs: "Destroy or Bury Your Weapons. Come Over the Open Roads Only." The third frame (top left) instructs: "Hold Your Hands High Over Your Head. Bring Your Wounded Brothers With You." And the final frame (bottom left) tells enemy soldiers about the good treatment they will receive in captivity.

LEAFLETS ADDRESSING SCIENCE & SUPERSTITION:



Title: Reported Disease in Korea (Apr 52). **Target:** North Korean Soldiers and Civilians. **Message:** Communist inefficiency, irresponsibility and apathy are reported to have caused widespread disease in Korea today. This leaflet counters Communist propaganda that the UN spreads disease.

Title: Surrender Appeal to ex-ROK troops now in Communist ranks. **Target:** Former Republic of Korea (ROK) Soldiers with the NKPA. **Message:** Tangun, the legendary Father of Korea stands before the ROK flag welcoming ex-ROK soldiers back to the Republic of Korea. This leaflet is a surrender pass for ex-ROK soldiers who joined the Communists' ranks. It contains an excerpt from a letter written by an ex-ROK soldier to his former brothers-in-arms: "In this civil war, which was started by the intrigues of the Communist Party, even those fellow countrymen who support the South Korean government have been forced to fire at you against their will. The thought of this unhappy situation makes us feel like committing suicide, but we have not done so yet because of our strong desire to live to see the happy day when our country will be unified on the foundation of the Republic of Korea . . . There are two of us to surrender. We have no weapons and we will come with our hands up." Tangun, the "legendary Father of Korea" and a powerfully unifying figure, is used to symbolize the brotherhood of all Koreans. The message reads "One Father, One Blood, One People."





LEAFLETS ADDRESSING TREATMENT:



Title: Food Theme (Oct 51). **Target:** NKPA Soldiers. **Message on Front:** Why be hungry? **Message on Reverse:** Why be hungry this fall when the UN offers you an abundance of good food? As a leaflet theme, subsistence was a simple but effective lure for hungry enemy soldiers.

Title: Enforced Contributions (Feb 52). **Target:** North Korean Soldiers and Civilians. **Message on Reverse:** Your crops, your money, your very life, are constantly demanded under Communist tyranny! Resist the Communists and Free Korea! This leaflet symbolizes the “shaking down” of the people by the Communists. Farmers, for one, would never receive fair treatment under Communist rule.





Title: Genocide (Jan 52). **Target:** North Korean Soldiers and Civilians. **Message on Reverse:** These Communists who call themselves liberators bring only destruction and ruin wherever they wage their wars. This leaflet describes the Communists' assaults on Korea's "rich culture, fine literature, educational programs and other native riches," as well as their harsh treatment of "anti-revolutionaries." It contrasts conditions under the Communists with treatment under the UN and in the Republic of Korea.



Versions 1 & 2

Title: Good Treatment for North Korean Communist Party Members (1951). **Target:** NKPA Soldiers. **Message:** A good father does not discriminate between his sons. A troubled and defeated son is always welcome in the house of his father. This leaflet draws a parallel between the love of a father and the compassion of the UN. It reads, "The United Nations forces do not discriminate between North Korean soldiers who come over to the UN lines . . . Communist Party leaders and non-Party members alike receive the good treatment guaranteed by United Nations forces."



Same Organization, Four Different Names: U.S. ARMY CIVIL AFFAIRS IN KOREA 1950-1953

BY TROY J. SACQUETY

In its short existence the 8201st Army Unit, was known as the UN Public Health and Welfare Detachment, UNCAC, UNCACK, and KCAC. In this article Civil Affairs (CA) will be used since it is the current branch term. Military Government (MG) and UN Civil Assistance will also be used because they are appropriate predecessor terms for modern day Civil Affairs and were used interchangeably during the Korean War.

On 25 June 1950, the uneasy peace between the divided Koreas shattered when the Soviet-backed Communist North invaded the U.S.-supported democratic South. The inexperienced and lightly-armed South Korean Army (ROKA) virtually melted away. Within a week, it had lost 44,000 of its 98,000 troops and the nation's capital, Seoul.¹ The ROKA remnants, along with hastily assembled U.S. sea, air, and ground combat forces pulled from occupation duty in Japan or from strategic naval patrols in the Far East, barely managed to stem the North Korean advance. These contingents, combined with token units pledged by countries in the United Nations (UN), kept the North Korean Army at bay outside the perimeter encircling the city of Pusan. The North Korean onslaught triggered a huge humanitarian relief effort.

Refugees clogged the Allied-controlled areas and were "a constant source of trouble and danger to the UN Command during the early part of the war. During the middle two weeks of July it was estimated that about 380,000 refugees had crossed into ROK-held territory, and that this number was increasing at the rate of 25,000 daily."² The refugee problem was compounded by the fact that the only American forces that might have helped mitigate the situation—Military Government units—had left the peninsula two years earlier in 1948.³ The commander of the U.S. and UN forces, General (GEN) Douglas A. MacArthur, realized that he had to address this problem—and quickly—with available assets.

The CA mission in the Korean War began as an *ad-hoc* effort but rapidly grew. As the strategic situation of the war evolved, so did the role of CA. Although U.S. combat divisions had separate CA officers assigned to their staffs,



The North Korean invasion sent the South Korean forces reeling. Only a stopgap infusion of American troops prevented a Communist victory. Here, a South Korean and an American soldier occupy a temporary position near Taejon.



In the early months of the Korean War, hundreds of thousands of refugees clogged South Korea's roads. The unprecedented situation made Civil Affairs a necessity.

The Communist invasion of the South created a humanitarian disaster on a tremendous scale. Many children were separated from their families and forced to survive on the streets. Many did not, especially during the brutal Korean winter. Their plight prompted U.S. soldiers to help.



Thousands of South Korean refugees crowded into the Pusan Perimeter in mid-1950. Their desperate situation caused the creation of the UN Public Health & Welfare Detachment.



a Far East Command (FECOM) element, the 8201st Army Unit (AU), was the main effort. The 8201st AU had four different titles in its short lifespan from 1950 to 1955: the UN Public Health and Welfare Detachment, the United Nations Civil Assistance Command (UNCAC), the United Nations Civil Assistance Command, Korea (UNCACK), and the Korea Civil Assistance Command (KCAC). This article explains the evolution of the unit and its various designations and describes how, even though refugee assistance was a constant theme, the 8201st missions grew with the changing situation on the battlefield. It will also show how the CA effort in Korea was the precursor for modern Civil Affairs. In contrast to WWII, where CA worked in occupied areas, Korean-era CA functioned within a sovereign friendly nation. The story begins with the UN Public Health and Welfare Detachment.

UN PUBLIC HEALTH & WELFARE DETACHMENT

Prior to the Korean War, CA units had been in South Korea since the end of WWII as part of the American occupation force. The first CA units (Military Government Companies) arrived in South Korea in October 1945 to organize basic government functions.⁴ They began by replacing Japanese and collaborationist



Brigadier General Crawford F. Sams was the commanding officer of the UN Public Health & Welfare Detachment. As the main force behind reforming the Japanese civilian medical system and personal diet during the post-WWII occupation, BG Sams became a pioneer of modern Civil Affairs.



Far East Command SSI

administrators with acceptable South Koreans. Because Korea had been a Japanese protectorate since 1910, few Koreans held civil positions, and then only at the lowest levels. This dilemma reduced the available talent pool. To solve this, Military Government personnel trained Koreans to perform administrative duties, provide law and order, and insure food distribution to the cities. They also (sometimes forcefully) repatriated the Japanese back home and brought the Korean “guest laborers” in Japan back. But, with the national election of Dr. Syngman Rhee as the first President of South Korea and the establishment of the Republic of Korea on 15 August 1948, the American military government there “came to an end.”⁵ As Military Government units returned to the United States from Europe and the Far East, interest in Civil Affairs in the active Army waned.⁶ That is, until the North Korean Communists invaded the South.

With nearly six million refugees jammed into the Pusan Perimeter, and in desperate need of aid, President Rhee appealed to the U.S. Government for food, clothing, and assistance.⁷ Acting on President Rhee’s request, GEN MacArthur, in his dual capacity as Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers in Japan (SCAP) and Commander-In-Chief of the United Nations Command (CINCUNC), directed the establishment of the United Nations Public Health and Welfare Detachment in Korea. GEN McArthur used internal assets in Japan to name Brigadier General (BG) Crawford F. Sams as the Chief of Health and Welfare, General Headquarters, United Nations Command, Republic of Korea. He was concurrently named to lead the unit that would perform the CA mission on the ground, the small UN Public Health and Welfare Detachment. BG Sams was the perfect choice for the job.

Sams had been in the U.S. Army Medical Corps since 1929 when he graduated from the Washington University School of Medicine (St. Louis, MO). He had prior service in the National Guard in both infantry and artillery units. His greatest achievements came while on occupation duty in postwar Japan. As the Chief, Public Health and Welfare Section, in the General Headquarters



The speed of the Communist advance coupled with huge throngs of refugees packing into the Pusan Perimeter, created a housing crisis. Thousands of people had moved into the city and were forced to sleep where they could. The threat of disease became a huge concern.



When Allied forces crossed the 38th Parallel, the UN Public Health & Welfare Detachment reverted to the more traditional Civil Affairs role of acting as Military Government in occupied areas. Due to the Chinese Communist intervention this mission was cut short. Once the battle lines stabilized, the main CA effort once again became assistance to a friendly sovereign nation.



The 8201st Army Unit was initially assigned to the Eighth U.S. Army (SSI on left) and then later, the Korean Communications Zone (KCOMZ) (SSI on right).



(GHQ) of SCAP, Japan, BG Sams reformed the Japanese medical system by enacting professional standards for medical schools, directing medical facility upgrades, instituting Japanese production of medicines and vaccines, creating countrywide inoculation programs, and introducing new foods into the Japanese diet (heavily based on rice) to improve nutrition.⁸ The years he dedicated to preventive medicine qualified him as an excellent choice to attack the threats to public health in South Korea.

In South Korea BG Sams faced a massive problem in determining critical needs and setting priorities. Since South Korea was a sovereign nation, he began discussing issues with government officials to enlist their assistance. BG Sams set the precedent for close liaison with the Korean government at all levels down to the CA Field Team. Thus, the UN Public Health and Welfare Detachment was organized to dovetail with the South Korean national and provincial governments to facilitate close coordination.⁹ With the South Korean government in accord with his proposals, BG Sams evaluated his personnel and equipment assets, which were few in number.

"If we could control the epidemics of disease among the civilian population, then we would also lessen the hazard of the spread of disease to our own troops and those of our United Nations allies,"
—Brigadier General Crawford F. Sams

Initially BG Sams had twenty-nine officers, sixteen enlisted men, and sixteen civilians in the detachment. Based on these numbers, he addressed the most pressing problem—the refugees and residents packed inside the Pusan Perimeter.¹⁰ Not only did the refugees need housing and food, but they also required medical care and immunizations. Administering inoculations was especially critical. "If we could control the epidemics of disease among the civilian population, then we would also lessen the hazard of the spread of disease to our own troops and those of our United Nations allies," BG Sams said.¹¹ The mission of the UN Public Health and Welfare Detachment grew as the battlefield situation changed.

When the Allies broke out of the Pusan Perimeter in September 1950, the UN Public Health and Welfare Teams extended their efforts to the rest of South Korea. As the UN forces pushed beyond the 38th Parallel and into North Korean territory, CA duties greatly expanded. The few UN Public Health and Welfare Teams now struggled with administering North Korean territory in addition to coping with the nearly 4,600,000 South Korean refugees—almost a quarter of the country's population.¹² These new responsibilities brought change. On 30 October 1950, GEN MacArthur transferred responsibility of the UN Public Health and Welfare Detachment to the Eighth U.S. Army (EUSA).

Because of this, the UN Public Health and Welfare Teams (and later UNCACK) did not support X Corps, a separate command. Lieutenant General (LTG) Walton H. Walker, the EUSA commander, then activated the UN Public Health and Welfare Detachment in the EUSA on 1 November with 161 officers and 117 enlisted men.¹³ A scramble ensued to find officers to fill the holes in the military government teams needed in occupied North Korea. Those efforts deteriorated when the war again took a dramatic turn.

Just as UN forces neared the Yalu River in November 1950, Chinese Communist Forces intervened. UN forces reeled south in confusion after being hit by the Communist onslaught. The UN Public Health and Welfare Detachments had been providing health care and food, organizing governments, and trying to rebuild rudimentary infrastructure in the major North Korean cities in the EUSA area. As the withdrawal began they found themselves once again mired in refugee assistance, this time by anti-Communist North Korean civilians seizing the opportunity to flee. UN Public Health and Welfare teams helped to organize the evacuation of friendly civilians south from the North Korean capital of P'yongyang and from the port of Chinnamp'o.¹⁴ The teams still had to fight the spread of disease, so they sprayed the refugees with the pesticide DDT.¹⁵ The number of refugees heading south in winter, as well as the number already in South Korea, presented the UN Public Health and Welfare teams with a "welfare situation unprecedented even in Europe at the end of World War II."¹⁶ Throughout these actions, it was the responsibility of all CA teams—from the UN Public Health and Welfare Detachment down to teams in the infantry divisions—

to keep refugees away from the main roads to allow for the free flow of military traffic. Refugees were directed onto secondary roads. The CA teams set up feeding and rest stations about a day's travel apart to assist with the refugee movement.

As an EUSA report described it: "the tactical situation set in motion a southward surge of homeless refugees which . . . [seriously] hampered the movement of Allied troops and supplies . . . With the withdrawal of P'yongyang, however, the situation became grave. More than 200,000 inhabitants of North Korea traveled across the 38th Parallel during the month—100,000 through the Seoul-Inchon area . . . with the civil evacuation of Seoul 1,000 residents a day were moving into (already overcrowded) Taegu and Pusan . . . Foot travelers clogged the highways and rail lines, threatening to block supply routes. It became necessary to divert all southbound non-military traffic along secondary roads and over specified bridges across the Han River."¹⁷ This was not just an EUSA problem; hundreds of thousands of refugees also poured out of the X Corps area. The CA teams, however, were better prepared to deal with the situation because they had stockpiles of supplies on hand.

The UN Public Health and Welfare Detachments could draw on two critically important items that the Army had rushed into theater. The first was the "Basic Medical Unit," which provided enough medicine and medical supplies to support 100,000 people for a month. The second was the "Basic Hospital Unit," a mobile

The Chinese Communist intervention in the Korean War in late 1950 again caught the Allies by surprise and forced them to relinquish their gains. Here South Korean troops bring four captured Chinese soldiers to the rear.



The Chinese intervention led to the fall of Seoul a second time and an even greater exodus of people from the combat zones.



40-bed surgical facility with all the necessary equipment. Both packages helped to sustain the heavily damaged and over-subscribed South Korean medical system.¹⁸ However, because of the sheer magnitude of the refugee problem, a larger civil assistance organization was necessary. To address this, the status of the UN Public Health and Welfare Detachment was raised to that of a major command in December 1950, briefly named the United Nations Civil Assistance Command (UNCAC).¹⁹ To add to the confusion, this moniker would only last a month before the unit was redesignated.

UNCACK

In January 1951, UNCAC was redesignated as the UN Civil Assistance Command, Korea (UNCACK).²⁰ It was further reorganized 12 June 1951 with an authorized strength of 91 officers and 167 enlisted men.²¹ But, filling this complement proved difficult and UNCACK's numbers were in a constant state of fluctuation. In 1951, UNCACK had only 75 officers, 154 enlisted men, and 94 civilians; a total of 323 personnel for the entire country. The officer ranks consisted of a Brigadier General, three Colonels, eight Lieutenant Colonels, twenty-two Majors, twenty-four Captains, and fourteen Lieutenants. The unit had three warrant officers.²² The civilians were the element that put the "United Nations" into UNCACK. The eighty-nine civilians in UNCACK on 30 June 1952 represented sixteen nations.²³ Among its personnel, "selected on the basis of individual specialties," were

"doctors, engineers, lawyers, teachers, economists, and specialists in all fields of government."²⁴ Its mission, size, and logistics requirements outside of the tactical zone grew so large that by July 1952, EUSA was relieved of the responsibility for UNCACK and a new command, the Korean Communications Zone (KCOMZ) assumed control.²⁵ Still, getting qualified personnel plagued the CA command throughout the war.


Civil Affairs was a capability that the Army had neglected in the postwar years. At first, the U.S. Army tried to identify WWII veterans with prior Civil Affairs or Military Government experience. One newly-trained Civil Affairs officer recalled his frustration: "I asked Camp



An UNCACK officer poses with a Jeep firetruck that was presented to the city of Taejon in October 1952.

UNITED NATIONS CIVIL ASSISTANCE COMMAND KOREA (UNCACK) 1952

(8201st ARMY UNIT)



IMMUNIZATIONS FEB 51 TO 31 AUG 1951

Province	Present Estimated Population	Smallpox	%	Typhoid	%	Typhus	%
Kyonggi-do	2,007,016	1,025,548	51	2,110,990	100	1,725,141	86
Chungchong-pukto	1,329,703	932,100	70	981,000	74	897,580	68
Chungchong-namdo	2,762,404	2,106,528	76	1,945,054	70	1,433,700	52
Cholla-pukto	2,316,621	1,881,493	81	3,174,660	100	1,421,742	66
Cholla-namdo	3,080,000	2,318,900	75	2,170,550	70	1,634,660	53
Kyongsang-pukto	4,037,382	2,980,092	74	3,585,138	89	3,510,550	87
Kyongsang-namdo	3,699,509	2,691,611	73	3,290,633	89	2,526,803	68
Kangwon-do	1,331,000	217,741	16	497,049	37	503,563	38
Cheju-do	367,381	258,188	70	281,484	77	271,698	74
Koje-do	179,000	284,735	100	267,335	100	320,889	100
TOTAL	21,110,016	14,696,936	70	18,303,913	87	14,246,326	67

Gordon for general background material on Korea before leaving the States. They had nothing except material on European occupation experiences . . . I had little idea of the Civil Affairs function in Korea except for a sketchy Pentagon briefing and 3 or 4 days [of familiarization] in Pusan . . . the real orientation [began] in the field.”²⁶ This poor training led some Army commanders to comment that Civil Affairs personnel in UNCACK were below par with their contemporaries.²⁷ Despite the lack of appreciation by the combat commanders, UNCACK filled a vital need.

Officially, the mission of the UNCACK teams, like those from the UN Public Health and Welfare Detachment, was to help “prevent disease, starvation, and unrest.”²⁸ In reality their focus was to “safeguard the security of the rear areas” and “to assure that front line action could go on without interruption by unrest in the rear.”²⁹ Often, the CA team orders were vague at best. Captain (CPT) Loren E. Davis received this guidance from the future UNCACK chief, BG William E. Crist, before going to Chinnamp’o: “Your orders are to see what needs to be done and do what you can. That was the only directive I received for the next two years,” said Davis.³⁰

By April 1951, each of the sixteen South Korean provinces as well as the islands of Cheju and Kojedo had an UNCACK Field Team headquartered near the local seat of government.³¹ Another team was later sent to work in Seoul. Although the province CA organization was not universal, each team had approximately twenty personnel consisting of five officers with the rest equally divided among enlisted soldiers and civilians. Each team was also

supplemented with South Korean personnel.³² Besides the U.S., other nations contributed food, medical supplies, and technical assistance.


By 23 June 1951, relief supplies had been donated by nineteen countries, including such diverse nations as Burma, Iceland, and Liberia.³³ The combined medical efforts immediately brought results. In the first five months of 1951 there were 39,802 cases of small pox in South Korea. By May 1953, the number had fallen to just 2,255.³⁴ Infection rates of other diseases dropped as well. By 1952, typhoid cases had dropped

96 percent from their 1950 levels, typhus, 77 percent, and diphtheria, 87 percent from just the year before. Through the first quarter of 1952, UNCACK vaccinated 5.5 million civilians for smallpox and typhus.³⁵ Their actions prevented these diseases from becoming a problem for the UN Command and the South Korean civilian population—again a strong indicator of the unit’s success. Additionally, more than 12,000 of the nation’s 40,000 lepers received treatment through UNCACK.³⁶ Only an immense effort made that possible.

UNCACK coordinated its efforts through the assistance of the 1st Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group (1st RB&L). They told the Korean people what UNCACK was trying to do. “Since the broadcast


output of Radio Psywar is in the Korean language, it may perhaps be said that our dissemination of ‘What UNCACK is doing in the field’ serves a more important purpose than that of any other communications medium in this theater, that of getting the story down to the people who are recipients of UN aid, and who are all

“Your orders are to see what needs to be done and do what you can. That was the only directive I received for the next two years.”
— CPT Loren E. Davis



Since UNCACK personnel worked with South Korean civilian leaders and government officials, business cards were a necessity.

ORGANIZATIONS CONDUCTING CIVIL ASSISTANCE AND ECONOMIC AID IN KOREA, JUNE 1952



UNCACK was based in Pusan, South Korea. MAJ Terrance A. Vangen, sixth from left, front row, was in this commanders and staff photo in 1952.



An average UNCACK Field Team consisted of twenty American personnel, and had additional South Koreans attached.



too skeptical of the sincerity of the claim that the United Nations intends to remain in Korea on a long term basis to provide the country with needed guidance, know-how and material aid.³⁷ This helped because UNCACK had been given the multi-faceted mission to rebuild the South Korean economy.

UNCACK absorbed the functions of the Economic Cooperation Administration, a postwar U.S. organization established under the Marshall Plan to rebuild war-torn nations. That effort had been stalled by the Korean War.³⁸ This additional responsibility pushed UNCACK into economics, agriculture, industry, commerce, natural

resources, finance, information, and education. Fortunately, improving these areas contributed to the war effort.³⁹ To rebuild the South Korean economy, UNCACK surveyed and monitored electrical power production, assessed and implemented more efficient practices for textile manufacturing and other industries, and supervised fishing and shipbuilding, mining operations, and transportation.⁴⁰ Agriculture, crucial to survival, received special attention.

UNCACK managed crop acreages and production quotas, thereby maximizing proper land use. The CA teams estimated the fertilizers needed, assisted manufacturers in getting required raw materials, and

REBUILDING THE SOUTH KOREAN ECONOMY



Children at an orphanage learn to knit with items donated through UNCACK channels. In an effort to stem corruption and waste, UNCACK became the lead agency that monitored the flow of supplies to orphanages.



UNCACK personnel donates women's uniforms to a Korean hospital, 1952.



Cement donated by UNCACK was used to make culverts and well casings in July 1952. As the war grew static, UNCACK's mission shifted to that of helping rebuild the South Korean economy.



The unprecedented refugee situation required a herculean effort to take care of the homeless and orphaned. Here Colonel Frank Norwood, 61st Troop Carrier Group, salutes an "honor guard" from an orphanage on Cheju-do. UNCACK was heavily involved in supporting Korean orphanages as part of its Civil Assistance mission.

UNCACK focused on revitalizing the South Korean agricultural system to ensure adequate food supplies reached everyone.



Maximizing South Korean agricultural production was critical to rebuilding the economy and making the country self-sufficient.



A group of UNCACK personnel, all from Minnesota, bid farewell to fellow kinsman MAJ Terrance A. Vangen (far left) in 1952.



With the fluid war over, the conventional forces fought from fixed positions near the 38th Parallel. Then, instead of being primarily concerned with the refugee problem, UNCACK, and later KCAC, assumed the strategic mission of helping to rebuild the South Korean economy.

helped ensure that the finished agricultural equipment was being sold to farmers at fair prices. The teams arranged to repair irrigation systems, made sure that transportation needs were addressed, and that production quotas were met. They then saw that the rice and grain produced was turned over to government authorities and properly stored and distributed.⁴¹ UNCACK oversaw importation of materials to make Korea more self-sufficient agriculturally, thereby reducing the cost and cargo space required to import basic commodities into South Korea. This saved money for the overall UN effort. With this expanded mission, UNCACK assigned more technical specialists at the team level.⁴² But, getting involved in commerce and industry led to confusion and duplication of effort because several other United Nations agencies also had responsibilities in these areas.

Among these were the United Nations Korea Rehabilitation Agency (UNKRA), an organization focused on long-term economic reconstruction, and the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (UNCURK), designed to help the reunification process. The plethora of "help" organizations created confusion for the overtaxed South Korean government officials, who often circumvented UNCACK channels by going to UNCURK and UNKRA. UNKRA realized the dilemma and sent personnel to augment UNCACK. Before the duplication problems were resolved UNCACK evolved into yet another CA command.

KCAC

UNCACK was disbanded on 1 July 1953 and its personnel transferred to the newly-created Korea Civil Assistance Command (KCAC). It took UNCACK's place as the main U.S. Army unit in charge of CA efforts in South Korea. Just a month later, the Armistice was signed, signaling another mission shift for the CA effort in Korea. With the war no longer "hot," KCAC was charged

with rehabilitating the South. To help this effort, and to enhance its liaison with the South Korean government, KCAC moved its headquarters from Pusan to Seoul in April 1954.⁴³ Under KCAC guidance, agricultural production became a major success. By the end of 1954, South Korea had more land under cultivation and was producing more food than before the war.⁴⁴

It was a mission that many U.S. soldiers appreciated. Said one officer, "This is one of the most rewarding assignments in Korea. We are really doing something, while others since the Armistice are sitting and marking time." Yet another remarked on the attitude of the South Koreans in regards to KCAC. "They are finally learning that Civil Assistance is quite different from Military Government and are appreciating the importance of the Civil Affairs officers."⁴⁵

South Korean President Syngman Rhee awarded the South Korean Presidential Unit Citation to KCAC on 6 April 1954 for its efforts in preventing disease, starvation, and unrest among the civilian population from 10 December 1950 to 30 September 1953, a period that covered all the wartime




Korea Civil Assistance Command
SSI



A Civil Assistance soldier and a ROKA female soldier paste KCAC-produced 4-H posters on a fence publicizing a self-help program.

KOREA CIVIL ASSISTANCE COMMAND (KCAC) 1953




versions of the 8201st Army Unit.⁴⁶ In addition to assisting the South Korean people with medical and agricultural needs, "the Command has aided in the support of over 90 hospitals, 500 medical aid stations and 355 orphanages, has provided refugee camps and has established and operated more than 60 feeding stations which furnished



meals to approximately 55,000 persons daily."⁴⁷ A South Korean newspaper editorial applauded Rhee's action: "It is not too much to say that thousands are alive today and able to regard the future with hope and confidence because of the work of this great organization . . . There is scarcely a family in the Republic of Korea that has not benefitted directly or indirectly through the unselfish work of the members of KCAC . . . there are literally hundreds of U.S. Army commands and other agencies which are commonly known by alphabetical abbreviations. All are important of course, and each has contributed . . . yet the meaning of many of these 'gobbled-gook' designations are relatively unknown

Both UNCACK and KCAC worked to rebuild the South Korean transportation network. This locomotive, and the freight cars below, were donated to Korea to assist that process.



ORPHANAGES: THE HUMANITARIAN SIDE OF CIVIL AFFAIRS



The Korean children placed in orphanages sponsored by U.S. military units were evacuated to Cheju, an island to the south, as a protective measure.

One of the most visible UNCACK missions was assisting agencies handle the tremendous number of children orphaned during the Korean War. Although the majority were indeed orphans, many had gotten separated from their parents during the massive displacement of civilians caused by the North Korean invasion, the UN counter-offensive, and the Chinese Communist intervention. It was an enormously complex problem, as the following case study shows.

One of the first UNCACK teams to encounter the problem of orphans was the Cheju-do (Cheju Island) Team in December 1950. The South Korean government decided that Cheju-do was a secure sanctuary for orphans should the Communists force another UN retreat. The island, off the southern tip of Korea, therefore became a

collection area for thousands of refugees crowding into the UN-controlled zone. A lot of credit for suggesting this solution goes to U.S. Air Force (USAF) Chaplain Lieutenant Colonel R. L. Blaisdell, who made daily rounds of the streets and back alleys of Seoul rescuing forgotten and neglected children. These waifs would then be placed in orphanages, most of which had a sponsoring U.S. military unit. When the Communist Chinese were poised to take Seoul, Blaisdell saw the need to move the orphans lest the children be targeted for retribution because of their association with U.S. soldiers.

He arranged to airlift them to Cheju-do, which was not under threat of being overrun. He recalled that "All during the trip I worried about taking 1,000 helpless people to a place I had never seen . . . The longer I thought the more concerned I became. 'How will we haul them from the airstrip?' 'Where can we procure billets?' 'How can we cook food?' 'Where will we put the hospital patients?'

Many questions now bothered me." He worried about these things because coordination was not done with the U.S. Army Civil Assistance team already on the island.¹

Captain Loren E. Davis, the UNCACK team commander on Cheju-do was on hand to observe the unexpected arrival. "We looked up one morning to see U.S. Air Force planes landing on the airstrip just west of town . . . What was arriving on Cheju-do was the entire clientele of The



American GIs quickly felt the need to help Korea's orphans. Here, (left) LT Donald F. Barris and LTC William M. Hales of the 1903rd Engineer Aviation Battalion distribute clothing donated by the Officers' Wives Club of Beale Air Force Base (California) to the Kupo Orphanage in 1952.



American officers of the 1903rd Engineer Aviation Battalion pose with children and staff of the Tae Jee Orphanage in 1952 with boxes of donated clothing.



Korean orphans drew the sympathy of American GIs.



An American officer poses with children at the Catholic-run Our Sweet Home Orphanage in 1952. U.S. soldiers still sponsor orphanages in South Korea.

Orphans Home of Korea, being evacuated en masse from Seoul. By the time the airlift was over late in the afternoon, we had another problem. There on the airstrip were . . . orphans, ranging in age from infant to adolescent, exposed to the elements."² Sixteen C-54 aircraft packed with nearly 1,000 children and 100 Korean adult workers had landed. Now they were CPT Davis' problem. Since this was a new mission to him, he took some liberties.

"The first problem was getting the kids out of the weather and into some kind of shelter. An arrangement had been made for them to occupy a school complex." He then took his mission a step farther. "Remembering my orders to 'do what you can,' I commandeered every truck I could find . . . I went through stores, shops, government and privately owned warehouses, collecting rice, veggies, cooking pots—whatever I could find." He continued, "I wrote receipts for things taken—'The United Nations Will Pay.'"³ Davis hoped that would actually be the case, but he could not worry about it because the children had more immediate needs.

Lieutenant Colonel Blaisdell explained, "Water was a great problem as the nearest water for drinking and cooking was 3 1/2 miles to the city source. Water for

bathing, cleaning, etc. was over 3 miles in the opposite direction. There was no transportation available. At first the [UNCACK Team] hauled some water in 5 gallon cans. Then a 500 gal. tank was repaired."⁴ With these immediate duties complete, CPT Davis could go on to his other tasks. But, that did not mean the UNCACK team was finished with assisting the orphanages. Davis recalled that helping the children was a favorite duty and that an UNCACK member "found occasion to visit the orphanage on almost a daily basis."⁵

On Cheju-do, as elsewhere in South Korea, assisting orphanages became another of the many missions of UNCACK. It became the unit's responsibility to help the orphanages get assistance, and to monitor the flow of supplies and aid. U.S. military units supported Korean orphanages then and still do today.

Endnotes

- 1 R.L. Blaisdell, "Orphan Care and Evacuation Korea December 1950," Parts 1 and 2 found online at <http://www.koreanchildren.org/docs/kiddycarairlift.html>, accessed 22 October 2010.
- 2 Loren E. Davis, "Korean Diaries," 9 March 2002, copy provided to the USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.
- 3 Davis, "Korean Diaries."
- 4 R.L. Blaisdell, "Orphan Care and Evacuation Korea December 1950," Parts 1 and 2 found online at <http://www.koreanchildren.org/docs/kiddycarairlift.html>, accessed 22 October 2010.
- 5 Davis, "Korean Diaries."



A Korean girl sits on the lap of Lieutenant Colonel Jack T. Shannon, who served first as the Psywar officer, then the Chief of the Civil Information Section with KCAC from October 1954 to April 1955 (note the KCAC SSI). Prior to his service in KCAC, Shannon was an OSS officer in WWII, the Executive Officer of the 10th Special Forces Group when it was formed in 1952, and the first commanding officer of the 77th Special Forces Group.




A legacy of the Korean War that continues to this day is the sponsorship of orphanages by U.S. military units.

to many of our people. But throughout the length and breadth of the Republic of Korea, the meaning of the three English letters 'CAC' are well known—and long will be remembered with gratitude."⁴⁸ No better "Thank You" to the men engaged in the Civil Affairs effort could have been given. It was also an appropriate farewell because on 1 December 1955, KCAC was dissolved.⁴⁹

Despite an uncertain beginning, the U.S. Army Civil Affairs effort in the Korean War was a significant success. The immunization and refugee assistance programs



A KCAC poster showing how agriculture, manufacturing, and transportation are the pillars of a rebuilt and renewed South Korea.



Just like it was with UNCACK, assisting agricultural programs was a core mission of KCAC. This insert from a KCAC-printed newspaper explains the proper method of planting.



Civil Affairs
Branch Insignia



95th Civil Affairs
Brigade SSI

The KCAC Information
Branch, 1 April 1955.



alone proved its worth. By keeping civilians free of disease and away from the combat areas, CA allowed tactical units to focus on their mission. Indirectly, the 8201st Army Unit also helped move the Civil Affairs effort away from its traditional Military Government role. Thereafter, the primary function of CA was not to set up military government in occupied areas, but was directed towards more humanitarian purposes in friendly sovereign nations. The CA effort in Korea—and its utility in a friendly as opposed to occupied nation—helped lead to the establishment of the Civil Affairs/Military Government Branch in the U.S. Army Reserve on 17 August 1955. The branch designation allowed for the commissioning of Reserve officers directly into CA as well as transferring from another basic Army branch as was previously the case for commissioned officers. The Regular Army rejuvenated Civil Affairs with the reactivation of the 95th Military Government Group—in the lineage of today's 95th Civil Affairs Brigade—at Camp Gordon, Georgia on 9 February 1955. On 2 October 1959 the USAR branch was renamed Civil Affairs, dropping all connection by name to military government, to become a permanent element in the U.S. Army.⁵⁰ The branch was established in the Regular Army on 16 October 2006.⁵¹ ▲

Thank you:

I would like to thank UNCACK/KCAC veteran Mr. Roger E. Bradley for his assistance in providing material for this article, Mr. Nicolaas Kitsch of the Korean War National Museum for his assistance in providing photographs, the family of Jack Shannon, and Mr. Joseph R. Frechette of the U.S. Army Center of Military History for assisting with research materials.

Troy J. Sacquety earned an MA from the University of Nebraska–Lincoln and his PhD in Military History from Texas A&M University. Prior to joining the USASOC History Office staff he worked several years for the Central Intelligence Agency. Current research interests include Army and Office of Strategic Services (OSS) special operations during World War II, and U.S. Army Civil Affairs.

Endnotes

- 1 Roy E. Appleman, *South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu* (June–November 1950), (Washington DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 2000), 35.
- 2 Appleman, *South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu*, 251.
- 3 In this article: Civil Affairs (CA) will be used as it is the current branch term. Military Government (MG) and Civil Assistance will also be used as appropriate as predecessor terms of modern day Civil Affairs.
- 4 One of the CA units that served in Korea at this time was the 41st Military Government Headquarters Company. Later renamed as the 41st Civil Affairs Company, the unit served in Vietnam from 1965–1970. See Troy J. Sacquety, "Battle Without Bullets: The 41st Civil Affairs Company in Vietnam Part I," in *Veritas* Vol 5, No. 4.
- 5 Stanley Sandler, *Glad to See Them Come and Sorry to See Them Go: A History of U.S. Army Tactical Civil Affairs/Military Government, 1775–1991* (No publication place or date given), 323.
- 6 Carlton L. Wood, Robert A. Kinney, Charles N. Hemming, *Civil Affairs Relations in Korea* (Chevy Chase, MD: John's Hopkins University Operations Research Office, 1954), 10.
- 7 Crawford F. Sams, "Medic" *The Mission of an American Military Doctor in Occupied Japan and Wartorn Korea* (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1998), 212.
- 8 BG Sams concurrently served as the Advisor for Health and Welfare to the U.S. Army Forces in South Korea from 1945–1948.
- 9 Colonel James E. Mrazek, "Civil Assistance in Action," *Military Review*, October 1955, 31.
- 10 The UNCACK Story, Release no. 135, copy provided to the USASOC History Office by Mr. Roger E. Bradley, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.
- 11 Sams, "Medic," 217.
- 12 Sandler, *Glad to See Them Come and Sorry to See Them Go*, 332. Sandler does not provide the source of the UNCACK officer's quote.
- 13 Appleman, *South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu*, 670.

- 14 See Charles H. Briscoe, "The UN Occupation of P'yongyang" and "Do What You Can': UN Civil Assistance, Chinnamp'o, North Korea, November-December 1950," in *Veritas: Journal of Army Special Operations History*, Vol 1, 2010.
- 15 "History of the Public Health Section UNCACK," 12 September 1951, National Archives II, RG 207, E 429, B 4995.
- 16 "United Nations Command Civilian Relief and Economic Aid-Korea, 7 July 1950-30 September 1951," USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.
- 17 *Case Study of Civil Affairs Operations: Mid Intensity Conflict: Korea: A Case Study* (Fort Bragg, NC: School of International Studies, United States Army Institute for Military Assistance, January 1977), AS-1-3.
- 18 "Special Report, UNCACK Civil Relief Activities in Korea," 19 October 1951, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.
- 19 The UNCACK Story.
- 20 Billy C. Mossman, *Ebb and Flow: November 1950-July 1951* (Washington DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1990), 29.
- 21 8201st Unit Card, copy provided by the Center of Military History, Fort McNair, Washington DC.
- 22 C. Darwin Stolzenbach and Henry A. Kissinger, *Civil Affairs in Korea 1950-51*, (Washington DC: The Johns Hopkins University, Operations Research Office, 1952), 43.
- 23 United Nations Command, Civil Assistance and Economic Affairs-Korea, October 1951-June 1952, Copy in USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC. **These nations were Australia (3), Belgium (1), Canada (6), Denmark (16), France (6), Greece (1), India (1), Mexico (1), The Netherlands (3), New Zealand (1), Norway (5), Peru (3), Syria (1), Thailand (2), United Kingdom (20), and the United States (19).**
- 24 The UNCACK Story.
- 25 Organization for Assistance to Korea (June 1953?), Copy in USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.
- 26 Sandler, *Glad to See Them Come and Sorry to See Them Go*, 327-328. **Sandler does not cite the source of the UNCACK officer's quote.**
- 27 Stolzenbach and Kissinger, *Civil Affairs in Korea 1950-51*, 43.
- 28 Wood, Kinney, Hemming, *Civil Affairs Relations in Korea*, 39.
- 29 Walter G. Hermes, *Truce Tent and Fighting Front* (Washington DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1966), 217; The UNCACK Story.
- 30 Loren E. Davis, "Korean Diaries," 9 March 2002, copy provided to the USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.
- 31 "Special Report, UNCACK Civil Relief Activities in Korea."
- 32 Mrazek, "Civil Assistance in Action," 31.
- 33 "With the United Nations Civil Assistance Command, Korea," 23 June 1951, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC. **The nations included Australia, Burma, Canada, Cuba, Denmark, Great Britain, Taiwan, Greece, Iceland, India, Jamaica, Liberia, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand, Turkey, and Uruguay**
- 34 Wood, Kinney, Hemming, *Civil Affairs Relations in Korea*, 37.
- 35 Command Report, United Nations Civil Assistance Command, Korea 8201st Army Unit, January 1952, copy in USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.
- 36 PFC James De Rose, "The Job of KCAC" *Stars and Stripes* date unknown. Copy provided by Mr. Roger E. Bradley, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.
- 37 Radio Operations Division, 1st Radio Broadcasting & Leaflet Group, "Report on Psywar Radio Operations in conjunction with THE KOREAN BROADCASTING SYSTEM, August 1951-March 1952," copy in the History Support Center, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.
- 38 "Special Report, UNCACK Civil Relief Activities in Korea."
- 39 The UNCACK Story.
- 40 Lieutenant General Van Fleet to Commander, UNCACK, "Industrial Rehabilitation of Korea," 8 July 1951, contained in Stolzenbach and Kissinger, *Civil Affairs in Korea 1950-51*, 120-123.
- 41 Lieutenant General Van Fleet to Commander, UNCACK, "Assistance in Agriculture Production Korea," 5 August 1951, contained in Stolzenbach and Kissinger, *Civil Affairs in Korea 1950-51*, 124-126.
- 42 Welcome to the Korea Civil Assistance Command, copy provided to the USASOC History Office by Mr. Roger E. Bradley, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.
- 43 Interview with Roger Bradley, Valatie, NY," found online at http://koreanwar-educator.org/memoirs/bradley_roger/index.htm, accessed 26 October 2010.
- 44 Mrazek, "Civil Assistance in Action," 32.
- 45 Wood, Kinney, Hemming, *Civil Affairs Relations in Korea*, 37.
- 46 The Republic of Korea Presidential Citation Award to KCAC, copy provided by Mr. Roger E. Bradley, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.
- 47 Welcome to the Korea Civil Assistance Command.
- 48 The Korean Republic, Seoul, Friday, April 9, 1954, Salute to KCAC (Editorial), memo sheet provided to the USASOC History Office by Mr. Roger E. Bradley, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.
- 49 8201st Unit Card.
- 50 Sandler, *Glad to See Them Come and Sorry to See Them Go*, 337.
- 51 Francis J. Harvey, "General Orders No. 29: Establishment of the United States Army Civil Affairs Branch," 12 January 2007, copy in USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC, 28311.



The Refugee Evacuation from Hungnam:

9-24 DECEMBER 1950

BY CHARLES H. BRISCOE



The axis of advance arrows for the X Corps offensive into North Korea.

The success of the amphibious landing at Inch'on had reversed the fortunes of the United Nations (UN) forces on the battlefield in Korea in the fall of 1950. Reestablishment of South Korea's government in Seoul on 29 September 1950 allowed General (GEN) Douglas A. MacArthur, United Nations Commander in Korea and Commanding General, Far East Command (FECOM), with U. S. Presidential approval, to formulate a plan to extend UN operations into North Korea.¹ MacArthur announced his intention to conduct a second amphibious landing at the North Korean naval base of Wonsan.

The FECOM Joint Strategic Plans and Operations Group concept called for the U.S. X Corps to re-embark on naval transports at Inch'on, sail around Pusan to Wonsan Harbor and assault Korea's east coast by 20 October 1950. The Republic of Korea (ROK) I Corps would drive north up the east coast in support of X Corps. After establishing a beachhead, X Corps would occupy northeast Korea and attack west across the mountains toward P'yongyang while the Eighth U.S. Army (EUSA) attacking north from Seoul headed to the Communist capital. Dismissing concerns about splitting his forces (Eighth Army and X Corps) by terrain and distance, MacArthur believed this assault, coordinated from Japan, was in no danger of NKPA counterattacks or intervention by Chinese forces.²

With well-constructed minefields blocking the harbors of Wonsan and Hungnam in North Korea, Major General (MG) Edward M. "Ned" Almond was quite frustrated. His two-division amphibious invasion force was stymied, with half on land at Pusan and the other half at sea. The 1st Marine Division

MG Edward M. "Ned" Almond
commanded the X Corps
in Korea, 1950-1951.



SSI for X Corps, MG Edward M. Almond
had X Corps personnel wear the SSI upside down to
differentiate Korean War soldiers from the WWII veterans.

was "yo-yoing" north and south in the Sea of Japan off the east coast of Korea. In the meantime, the ROK I Corps had attacked northward along that same coast and had captured Wonsan. By 20 October 1950, they were advancing rapidly on Hamhung, the industrial center of North Korea, and the port of Hungnam.³ I Corps established six provincial governments north of the 38th Parallel, but guerrilla operations that followed in the wake of the attacking ROK forces caused them to collapse by the end of October.⁴

Despite having no American ground forces ashore to command in North Korea, MG Almond decided to establish a X Corps headquarters presence on land. A small, advanced command post (CP) was shuttled into Yonp'o airfield near Wonsan aboard twelve C-119 *Flying Boxcars*. Navy helicopters carried the American corps commander ashore daily. Each afternoon Almond returned to spend the night on the amphibious flagship USS *Mount McKinley* (AGC-7) with half of his headquarters staff.⁵

This article explains the evacuation operations conducted by X Corps from the North Korean east coast ports of Hungnam, Wonsan and Sonjin from 9-24 December 1950. General MacArthur had directed Lieutenant General (LTG) Walton H. Walker, the EUSA commander, to form a UN civil assistance command. Therefore, the United Nations Public Health and Welfare Detachment became an integral part of EUSA. However, since General MacArthur elected not to subordinate X Corps under Eighth Army, the responsibility for civil affairs in X Corps rested with MG Almond.

As a result, the X Corps decision to support the evacuation of almost 100,000 refugees from North Korea was accomplished using organic CA assets. They faced a more complicated refugee problem than EUSA and the UN civil assistance teams during the withdrawals south in December 1950. (See "The UN Occupation of P'yongyang" and "Do What You Can!": UN Civil Assistance, Chinnamp'o, North Korea, November-December 1950" articles published in *Veritas*, Vol. 6, No. 1, 2010).

At noon on 20 October 1950, GEN MacArthur gave MG Almond responsibility for all Allied operations in

northeast Korea. This authority extended to the ROK I Corps, scattered along roads north of Wonsan, the 1st Marines offshore, the 7th Infantry Division (ID) boarding ships at Pusan, and the 3rd ID in Japan being readied to reinforce the X Corps.⁶ Before the American troops could land, he spent a lot of time evaluating civil rehabilitation needs. Almond showcased his presence by touring the area and announcing plans to create local democratic governments. He felt that every effort within reason should be made to convince the populace that the United Nations effort to establish democratic practices in the North Korea was sincere.⁷

Three days later, MG Almond began speaking to city leaders and soliciting their concerns. Wonsan officials requested medical supplies, land reallocation, lumber and oil to rebuild the fishing industry, South Korean *won*, support for the refugees, and help finding their missing relatives. After passing out candy and cigarettes, he repeated the routine in Hamhung on 31 October, five days after the Marines came ashore. The superficiality of his ceremonies, proclamations, and promises quickly became apparent as the troops landed and immediately marched north. The limited logistics were needed to support the offensive, not to rebuild North Korean infrastructure. That would have to wait for the occupation.⁸

Shelby L. Stanton, author of *Ten Corps in Korea 1950*, labeled these city conferences as "cosmetic forgeries" and criticized the whirlwind effort by X Corps Civil Affairs (CA) teams to organize four city and twenty-four province government councils by December 1950.⁹ General Almond later recalled in 1952 that provincial governments had been established in 14 of 15 counties.¹⁰ Stanton claimed that they did little to restore public order. The lightly armed civilian police proved no match for Communist guerrilla bands already reinforced by North Korean military stragglers.¹¹

There were only two small CA teams assigned to the Corps G-1 (Personnel) section. One was headed by Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) James A. Moore, the Corps CA Officer responsible for Hamhung, and the other by LTC Lewis J. Raemon, the Occupation Court Officer responsible for public safety in the Hamhung-Hungnam area and CA in Hungnam. The 3rd and 7th IDs each had CA teams and the 1st Marine Division had an attached Army CA team, but these elements were focused on tactical problems. They assisted the Provost Marshal and military police (MPs) with refugee and disease control and prevented infiltration by saboteurs and guerrillas.¹² Once the Corps headquarters was ensconced in Hamhung, the offensive north absorbed MG Almond.

The isolation of X Corps was compounded by a daily growing separation of units as MG Almond spurred them forward to attack along three axes that "diverged like the splayed fingers of a hand."¹³ Because the enemy appeared beaten, units were "deployed more in the manner of a quail hunt than a military campaign."¹⁴ By 26 October 1950 when the 1st Marine Division landed at Wonsan along the east coast of North Korea, that country's capital,



MG Edward M. Almond awards Legion of Merit to USMC COL Edward H. Forney at Hungnam on 14 December 1950. Note: MG Almond is wearing the X Corps SSI upside down to distinguish Korean War soldiers from WWII veterans.

P'yongyang, eighty miles to the west, had been controlled by the EUSA for ten days. Two very rugged north-south mountain chains separated the two major combat elements of GEN Douglas A. MacArthur's UN command on the Korean peninsula. As the two ROK divisions charged north in trail along the east coast, the 7th ID did likewise to the north-northwest, and the 1st Marines attacked to the northwest. By late November, the advances were so rapid that X Corps elements were spread out across three hundred miles of North Korea. High, rugged mountains disrupted communications and denied mutual support when Chinese Communist Forces (CCF) intervened in overwhelming numbers to halt UN advances that threatened the People's Republic of China (PRC).¹⁵

Massive Chinese attacks against the Eighth Army and X Corps on 26 and 27 November 1950 radically changed the military situation in North Korea. The Communist counterstroke wrecked General MacArthur's offensive that had been poised to end the war in just a few days.¹⁶ General Almond stated, "The new conflict was recognized as undeclared war by the CCF (Communist Chinese Forces) in great strength and in organized formations."¹⁷

Now, the preservation of the UN combat forces on both sides of the peninsula called for orderly withdrawals that emphasized saving equipment and vehicles as well as troops. As American and ROK units pulled back, anti-Communist North Korean civilians who openly supported the several UN civil assistance teams in the west and X Corps CA teams in the east by serving as city and province officials, law enforcement, and laborers were suddenly at great risk. Flight south to safety was the preferred option.

The return of Communist officials with a strong military force prompted hundreds of thousands of anti-Communist North Korean civilians to flee south. Having already endured harsh Communist rule for five years, these refugees were "voting with their feet," according to two seaman aboard a ship supporting the request for help.¹⁸ This flood of humanity was a major problem for X Corps.



When X Corps withdrew from North Korea they abandoned some 23,000 square miles of liberated territory.

From the start, X Corps realized the magnitude of the problem and factored air and sea evacuation of anti-Communist civilians in its planning for withdrawal from Wonsan, Hamhung, and Hungnam. But, since General MacArthur decided to withdraw on 11 December 1950, scarcely two weeks were available for the final planning and evacuation of 100,000 troops and their equipment. X Corps Operations Order No. 10, the scheme of withdrawal, however, was in the hands of troop commanders that day.¹⁹ It was empathetic staff officers, in particular USMC COL Edward H. Forney, the X Corps Shore Control Officer at Hungnam, Dr. Bong Hak Hyun, the civilian CA advisor to MG Almond, and Major (MAJ) James Short, X Corps History Section, who had garnered the general's support to rescue the North Korean refugees after UN combat forces were evacuated.²⁰

Dr. Bong Hak Hyun, a pathologist trained at the Medical College of Virginia in Richmond, was the interpreter for the ROK Marine brigade commander when MG Almond established his corps headquarters in Hamhung. It had a very large anti-Communist Christian





Masses of Refugees Evacuated From Hungnam

1. Roads south that led to Hungnam and the sea were flooded with refugees. 2. Fleeing North Korean refugees with only the possessions that they could carry on their backs or pile onto carts jammed the roads to Hungnam. 3. Infantry division MPs tried to control the thousands of North Korean refugees struggling to reach safety inside the Hungnam perimeter. 4. The Allied military force was hard-pressed to turn back the large numbers of North Korean refugees fleeing Hamhung along the railroad to Hungnam. 5. & 6. North Korean refugees waited apprehensively to board U.S. Navy LST 845 at Hungnam. 7. Some of the 14,000+ panic-stricken North Korean refugees stand shoulder to shoulder on the main decks of the SS *Meredith Victory* - December 24, 1950.

The 1st Mobile Army Surgical Hospital (MASH) was set up in this schoolhouse in Hungnam before being evacuated aboard the SS *Towanda Victory* on 18 December 1950.



population, and Dr. Hyun pressed for their evacuation. LTC James A. Moore, X Corps CA Officer and Hamhung team chief, someone who did everything strictly by the book, became annoyed with Hyun's pleas for help and snapped, "Doctor, this is war, and in a war the military comes first. That port facility in Hungnam is damn small. We don't even know whether the military personnel can be evacuated. Don't ask for the impossible."²¹

Fortunately for the North Korean refugees General Almond would decide to evacuate "as many loyal and non-Communist citizens as shipping space would allow." He did not believe this humanitarian act would interfere with the movement of X Corps troops, equipment, and supplies as planned. "As we loaded our ships with equipment and materials, particularly the LSTs in loading tanks out, there was a lot of vacant space between tanks and on deck," noted Almond.²² How to do this rested on the shoulders of Marine COL Forney.

The X Corps evacuation of UN forces from Sonjin, Wonsan, and Hungnam, North Korea, in December 1950 was estimated to take ten days. It was not considered to be an amphibious operation in reverse. Unlike the Allied evacuation at Dunkirk, France in late September 1940, all X Corps soldiers, equipment, and supplies [105,000 men (five infantry divisions—three American and two ROK), 17,500 pieces of equipment, and 350,000 tons of bulk cargo] were to be evacuated.²³ When X Corps and the ROK I Corps left North Korea they abandoned some 23,000 square miles of liberated territory.²⁴

One division of the ROK I Corps had advanced to within thirty-eight miles of Manchuria. Its three regiments were to withdraw by land and sea to Hamhung while the other division's three regiments were to pull back to the fishing port of Songjin for sealift back to Samch'ok in South Korea.²⁵ Evacuation was dictated by how fast ships and aircraft could be loaded in the face of a situation where military manuals and planning guides did not exist.²⁶ Artillery, naval gunfire, and air strikes created a "ring of fire" to neutralize serious Communist threats to an orderly withdrawal.²⁷



Major Harold F. Hamit, 1st MASH commander, poses in front of his tent headquarters in Hungnam, December 1950.

Yonp'o airport, south of Hungnam, remained open within the constantly shrinking defensive perimeter. The 44th Construction and 73rd Combat Engineer Battalions built two emergency, C-47 capable airstrips, one on the Hungnam beach and the other three miles north of the city near Pongung.²⁸ One hundred and twelve Air Force and ten Marine aircraft ferried 3,600 troops, 196 vehicles, 1,300 tons of cargo and hundreds of Korean civilians out of Yonp'o.²⁹ But, airplanes lacked sufficient carrying capacity and the harsh winter weather in Korea limited their availability.

Rail traffic was not hindered by the season, however. On the afternoon of 15 December, General Almond announced, "We'll evacuate four thousand to five thousand civilians from Hamhung by train." Almost 60,000 people swarmed the train station hoping to get out, but the CA personnel and ROK MPs maintained control until the train left at 2 a.m. Allied troops were hard-pressed to turn back the large numbers of refugees intent on following the train tracks or using backcountry trails to flee south towards Hungnam behind the withdrawing soldiers.³⁰

MOVING THE NORTH KOREAN REFUGEES:

Almost 100,000 North Korean refugees were transported from Hungnam, Songjin, and Wonsan to the south by sea. The breakdown by ship and port of embarkation (POE) were:

<u>Vessel</u>	<u>Evacuees</u>	<u>Port of Embarkation</u>
<i>Lane Victory</i>	7,000	Wonsan
BM 501 (ROK)	4,300	Sonjin
<i>Yonayama Maru</i>	3,000	Hungnam
<i>Torbata Maru</i>	6,000	Hungnam
<i>Mada Ket</i>	6,400	Hungnam
<i>Meredith Victory</i>	14,500	Hungnam
<i>Virginia Victory</i>	14,000	Hungnam
LST 668	10,500	Hungnam
LST 666	7,500	Hungnam
LST 661	9,400	Hungnam
LST 059	8,000	Hungnam
LST 081	4,000	Hungnam
LST 074	3,500	Hungnam ⁴¹

“This great exodus of military forces and civilian refugees was made possible by extremely rapid planning, the closest cooperation between the Army, Navy, and Air Force, adherence to logical plans during the execution phase, and diligent work by junior leaders, soldiers, sailors, and civilian workers.” x
—X Corps Special Report on Hungnam Evacuation⁴⁸

Korean laborers hired by X Corps CA teams reopened the railroad line from Wonsan to Hungnam while X Corps assembled hundreds of freight cars. This enabled the movement of 8,900 tons of ammunition and supplies north to Hungnam for evacuation.³¹ Simultaneously, the ROK I Corps units that advanced the farthest north along the coast withdrew to Hungnam by rail, ships, and trucks.³²

Ships, however, were the key to evacuation success. Minesweepers enlarged the anchorages at the east coast ports to give warships more effective shooting positions and to enable the cargo vessels to “heave to” in the outer harbors.³³ Wherever they could reach land, fishing sampans and junks, operating like ferries, carried refugees further south along the coast to escape the resurgent North Korean and intervening Chinese armies.³⁴

On 10 December the evacuation of Wonsan was complete after outloading 3,874 troops, 7,000 Korean civilians, 1,146 vehicles, and 10,013 tons of cargo by ship. While Army forces secured the beachhead from threatening NKPA forces, it was a Navy show and Wonsan served as a small-scale rehearsal for Hungnam.³⁵ “We incorporated the lessons of Wonsan in the evacuation and redeployment

plans,” commented Rear Admiral James H. Doyle, the U.S. Navy Pacific Fleet Amphibious Commander.³⁶


Despite its small size, Hungnam was a good harbor. While there were only seven berths on the docks, “double-banking” four more ships on the outboard side of each pier allowed for docking multiple ships at once. The engineers constructed wooden plank causeways across interior banked ships to the outermost vessels. This allowed eleven ships (four double-banked) to be unloaded and loaded simultaneously from the piers at Hungnam.³⁷ In addition, eleven Landing Ship, Tank (LSTs) could be beached at two separate sites in the harbor.³⁸

Hence, the vast majority of maritime movement would leave from Hungnam (87,400 soldiers). Songjin was used to evacuate 16,500 ROK troops, vehicles, equipment, and supplies.³⁹ The bulk cargo at Hungnam included 29,500 55-gallon drums of petroleum, oil, and lubricants, 8,635 tons of munitions, and 1,850 tons of food. Ammunition and food stores were outloaded between 18-23 December.⁴⁰ The USS *Consolation* (AH-15) hospital ship anchored in Hungnam harbor to handle casualties. Its presence enabled the Army’s 1st Mobile Army Surgical Hospital (MASH) to redeploy early with the Corps troops.⁴¹

The most significant decision concerning the evacuation was made by MG Almond when he directed that all civil government officials and their families be evacuated along with as many anti-Communist citizens as possible.⁴² As refugees converged on the three ports, CA personnel organized them into groups of a hundred at Sohojin, a suburb of Hungnam, and put one member in charge. Then, they were moved into holding areas for questioning by Military Police (MP) and Counter-Intelligence Corps (CIC) linguists and given food and water. All available fishing craft and small ROK Navy vessels were used to evacuate them until the larger ships became available.⁴³

Thus, 98,100 North Korean refugees plus the babies swaddled on their mothers’ backs, were transported from Hungnam, Songjin, and Wonsan to the south by sea. “Sardines were never packed as intimately as the first installment of 50,000 Koreans jammed into three Victory ships and two LSTs. It became standard practice to embark at least 5,000 on an LST, not counting carried children. The record for one ship was 14,500 refugees,” said author Lynn Montross.⁴⁵ The total evacuation operation was accomplished by the vessels making multiple round trips totaling 105 cargo ship loads and 89 LST loads.⁴⁶


The SS *Meredith Victory*, the ship that carried the most Korean refugees from Hungnam, was one of 150 vessels that supported the rescue of American and ROK troops and North Korean refugees. It was 450 feet long and 50 feet wide with five cargo holds, each with three decks. Based on the uncertain threat ashore the *Meredith Victory* was “double-banked” alongside the other vessels at the pier. The ship faced out to sea and kept its boilers at full steam pressure during the twenty-six hours spent loading. To load, sixteen Koreans stood shoulder-to-shoulder on wooden pallets as they were lowered like cargo into the bottom holds where the fuel drums were stored. When





Troops and Equipment Evacuated

1. The sanctuary of Hungnam and the Sea of Japan was a welcome sight to withdrawing X Corps troops. 2. The magnitude of the logistics problem associated with the evacuation from Hungnam was enormous. 3. & 4. A field of 55 gallon fuel drums at the beach landing sites at Hungnam. 5. Despite the vast quantities of vehicles, equipment and supplies and troops to be evacuated from Hungnam, the Control Group expedited the process and maintained continual flows with lots of coordination. 6. North Korean refugees volunteered to unload trucks to speed up the evacuation. 7. Hungnam city and port buildings were used to house troops awaiting evacuation. These were destroyed when Allied forces left on 24 December 1950. 8. American troops entering Hungnam aboard trucks before the facility is blown up with demolitions. 9. Marines boarding USS Bayfield (APA-33) at Hungnam. 10. Operating a winch in a snowstorm off Hungnam in December 1950. 11. One of 1,400 USMC vehicles is swung aboard a merchant ship at Hungnam dock on 14 December 1950. Some transports made two and three round trips before the evacuation was completed. 12. A U.S. Marine Corps' ambulance jeep is hoisted aboard ship at Hungnam, North Korea, 12 December 1950.



Hungnam harbor showing piers and loading beaches.

each compartment filled, the hatch boards were put in place and the next level was loaded with humanity. After the holds were fully packed, the overflow of people spilled onto the main deck where they stoically endured below freezing temperatures and frigid ocean spray that instantly iced surface structures.⁴⁷

Large numbers of male refugees volunteered to augment civilian stevedores contracted by X Corps CA personnel to speed-up loading at Hungnam, Wonsan, and Sonjin. Junior CA leaders, officers, and sergeants worked most closely with the anti-Communist North Korean citizens in the cities to recruit reliable workers.⁴⁹ Throughout the evacuation CA personnel supported Marine COL Edward H. Forney, who coordinated the loading of ships in the port.

COL Forney's operational force was the 2nd Engineer Special Brigade (ESB) commanded by COL Joseph J. Twitty, who acted as the base and port commander. It was 2nd ESB soldiers who organized and supervised military and civilian personnel (1,000 Japanese contract stevedores and as many as 5,000 North Korean laborers) who loaded the ships.⁵⁰ Seven beach landing sites (Pink, Blue, Green One & Two, and Yellow One, Two & Three) accommodated the LSTs.⁵¹ The Control Group provided the flexibility needed where set plans were extremely difficult to develop and carry out. By keeping a reserve of cargo ships and LSTs, COL Forney accommodated large numbers of refugees seeking transport from North Korea.⁵²

"We thought the Wonsan evacuation gave us a handle on how many Koreans wanted to leave, so we planned shipping for 25,000. At least that many followed the Marines down from the Chosin Reservoir. Those who had not gotten out at Wonsan soon reappeared at Hungnam. Virtually overnight, 50,000 North Korean

refugees had assembled wanting to leave. That soon doubled. The temperatures never got above freezing and they suffered terribly. Colonel Forney maintained warming fires along the beach and I had rice delivered from the ships' stores. It was only enough for survival," stated Rear Admiral Doyle.⁵³

Understated was how cold and miserable it was throughout the evacuation. "They stood in masses, their worldly possessions strapped to their backs, children clutching at the hands of parents, hunger, fear, and despair etched deeply in the faces of all" read a 3rd ID after action report.⁵⁴ High winds with gale force gusts up to twenty-seven knots buffeted loading operations and wind chill lowered the temperatures into the teens throughout 21 December. Just before midnight, the Control radio-teletype facility exploded in flames, destroying almost all of the communications equipment and injuring several soldiers.⁵⁵

When the time approached to evacuate refugees, X Corps sent wires to the ports of Inch'on and Pusan requesting all available shipping. Having gotten the refugee evacuation started, CA team members LTC Raemon and LT Dodge were relieved of that responsibility and boarded their assigned ship, the USTS *SGT Miller* on 19 December 1950. The next day MG Almond left his bunker at Hungnam for the USS *Mt. McKinley*. 3rd ID CA personnel, assisted by ROK Marines and Navy, and the X Corps Provost Marshal rear detachment continued to coordinate the loading of refugees. 3rd ID leaders at every level became involved in the refugee problem—from guarding and feeding them to moving groups to assembly areas prior to boarding ships.⁵⁶ The refugees carried sufficient rice and barley rations from CA-controlled stores at the Hungnam rice mill for the duration of the voyage south. By 24 December 1950, more than 98,100 refugees had been evacuated from the three North Korean ports.⁵⁷

As the last of the evacuation vessels made ready to sail out of Hungnam harbor at 2:34 P.M. on 24 December 1950, one full day ahead of schedule, all the bridges, airfields, port facilities, and other buildings of military value had been rigged for destruction.⁵⁸ As the defensive perimeter had been reduced, engineer demolition

teams systematically rendered unusable anything that could benefit the Communists. Bridges were dropped, roads cratered, railroad tunnels blocked, and more than 300 railcars and locomotives burned, blown up, derailed, or pushed into rivers. The explosive charges were being placed on loading cranes, piers, and sea walls as the last refugees boarded vessels.⁵⁹

But, as Rear Admiral James Doyle reflected, "Had there been sufficient shipping, twice that (number) could have been saved. For when the last ship sailed, I estimated that as many Koreans remained (behind), vainly hoping for transport."⁶⁰ The waiting refugees were quickly scattered



2nd Engineer Special Brigade (ESB) SSI

by thundering naval gunfire barrages that were followed by the massive explosions of timed demolitions that blew the Hungnam waterfront sky-high in volcanic-like eruptions of flame and rubble.⁶¹

Captain Leonard P. LaRue, the master of the SS *Meredith Victory*, said, "With this cargo of souls, we steamed out to the open sea toward Pusan on the southeast coast of Korea, about 450 sea miles, or about 28 hours journey away."⁶² The ship arrived in Pusan on Christmas Eve, only to be denied entry because the port was filled to capacity with evacuees and retreating U.S. and ROK military. Authorities ordered the ship to Koje-do, an island fifty miles to the southwest. To help calm the refugees, ROK MPs and interpreters were put aboard.⁶³ The SS *Meredith Victory* was one of many ships lying off Koje-do on Christmas waiting to be unloaded. The ROK Navy and the recently arrived UN civil assistance team from Chinnamp'o were caught completely by surprise.⁶⁴

Offloading human cargo at sea was a tricky affair. ROK LSTs were lashed alongside the *Meredith Victory*. Winch-operated cargo cranes raised pallets of sixteen refugees, starting with those on the deck, and then those in the hold, to swing and carefully lower the human cargo into the LSTs. The whole operation was done while the two vessels pitched perilously in the rolling sea, hulls separating and banging together constantly. As the pallets left the *Meredith Victory*, the Koreans aboard gave a half bow of thanks to the crew. "There was no overwhelming joy on their faces because they had only begun their journey to freedom," commented the ship's Staff Officer, J. Robert Lunney.⁶⁵

The Allied military humanitarian effort received high praise from Syngman Rhee, the President of South Korea.⁶⁶ Initial efforts by MG Almond to gain support from anti-Communist Christian populations in Wonsan, Hamhung, and Hungnam can be likened to CA-arranged councils with village elders and assessments in Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Philippines today that have yielded little because resources were not immediately available to support viable current needs. Candy and cigarettes were short-lived enticements that got polite listening.

Once American forces landed, General Almond, the operational commander, focused totally on his mentor's final offensive much like our leaders did on combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq several years ago. Reconstruction was seen as part of the occupation or "post-conflict" phase. Whether it was guilt for having sold out the North Koreans supporting the CA-instituted local governments in late October 1950 with a "promissory bill of goods" or just common decency, in the end, MG Almond could not have provided a better demonstration of UN sincerity and appreciation to those willing to support democratic principles than evacuating 100,000 refugees before Christmas 1950. And, it should not be forgotten that X Corps staff did the planning and evacuations in just two weeks while tactical unit commanders protected these operations within a constantly shrinking defensive perimeter.



**U.S. Merchant
Marine Staff Officer
J. Robert Lunney
aboard the
SS *Meredith Victory*.**

The evacuation of 98,100 civilians by ship from the three ports in North Korea, after the successful redeployment of all X Corps units, was a major accomplishment. Years later retired LTG Edward Almond gave due credit for the evacuation, "I would say that the success [of the evacuation] was due 98 percent to common sense and judgment and that this common sense and judgment being practiced by all concerned was turned over to General Forney who organized the activities in line form. I mean Colonel Forney; he should have been a General."⁶⁷ ▲

Charles H. Briscoe has been the USASOC Command Historian since 2000. A graduate of The Citadel, this retired Army special operations officer earned his PhD from the University of South Carolina. Current research interests include Army special operations during the Korean War, in El Salvador, and the Lodge Act.

Endnotes

- 1 Shelby L. Stanton, *Ten Corps in Korea, 1950*, 2nd edition (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1989), 125; U.S. Army. Far East Command. X Corps. *Big X in Korea* (1951), 1, 2, 8.
- 2 Stanton, *Ten Corps in Korea*, 126. This was part of X Corps Operations Order #4, dated 4 October 1950.
- 3 Stanton, *Ten Corps in Korea, 1950*, 145.
- 4 Edward M. Almond, "Conference on United Nations Military Operations in Korea, 29 June 1950 – 31 December 1951" (Washington, DC: National War College, 1952), 18.
- 5 Stanton, *Ten Corps in Korea, 1950*, 145; *Big X in Korea*, 8..
- 6 Stanton, *Ten Corps in Korea*, 149; One 3rd Infantry Division preparatory task before combat was to equip, train, and integrate KATUSA (Korean Augmentation to U.S. Army) conscripts into its infantry regiments. Few draftees spoke any English, no English-speaking Republic of Korea (ROK) officers accompanied them, and interpreters were not provided. "They were civilians in the truest sense of the word. Most were wearing typical Korean peasant clothing and had never worn shoes. We gave demonstrations for everything from how to put on and wear the buckle top, combat boots to basic infantry skills. And, when we got to Wonsan, we did an unopposed amphibious landing, off-loading the ships into landing craft using cargo nets. It was a real circus," recalled retired COL James H. Morris, a 15th Infantry Regiment veteran. Retired COL James H. Morris, interview by Dr. Charles H. Briscoe, 15 December 2010, Fort Bragg, NC, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter cited by name and date.
- 7 X Corps Commanding General's Diary Extracts, dated 21 October 1950, quoted in Stanton, *Ten Corps in Korea*, 150. MG Almond's obsessive desire that farmers be paid in cash for requisitioned food caused him to lecture Brigadier General (BG) Song Yo Chan, the ROK Capital Division commander on 21 October 1950.



1.



2.



3.



4.



5.



6.



Hungnam, Small But Good With Double Banking


1. Snow covered the port of Hungnam the week before Christmas 1950. 2. The USS *Mt. McKinley* (AGC-7), the amphibious flagship, served as headquarters for MG Edward Almond before going ashore in late October 1950. 3. Hungnam was jam-packed with ships in the final week of the evacuations. 4. & 9. A truck convoy approaches the beach landing sites at Hungnam. 5. The hospital ship USS *Consolation* (AH-15) remained in the Hungnam harbor after the 1st MASH departed. 6. The Hungnam harbor was stacked with ships on 13 December 1950 waiting "to be called" in to begin outloading troops, equipment, and supplies. 7. Refugees packed themselves aboard these fishing boats in Hungnam harbor. 8. Shipping off Hungnam, 10 December 1950, as the evacuation of troops and supplies commenced. 10. Aerial view of Hungnam port facilities.



Hungnam Demolished

1. U.S. Navy demolition teams rig explosives to a pier at Hungnam. 2. Underwater Demolition Teams "Frogmen" studied the situation prior to destroying North Korean minefields in Wonsan harbor, 26 October 1950. 3. As the last troops of the 3rd Infantry Division leave Hungnam, smoke columns rise hundreds of feet into the air from the burning port facility and abandoned supplies. 4. The USS Begor (APD-127) on left and last LST off Hungnam as the demolition begins. 5. The USS Mt. McKinley (AGC-7), the amphibious flagship, served as headquarters for MG Edward Almond before going ashore in late October 1950. 6. USS Begor (APD-127) in foreground of Hungnam harbor on 24 December 1950 as explosions rage the port facility.





1.

2.



Imagery shown around maps (above) depicts the harsh climate and terrain during the Hungnam evacuation.

X Corps in North Korea, October-December 1950

These original X Corps maps appeared in the *Big X in Korea* yearbook, circa 1950 and depicted the X Corps movements and involvement in North Korea from Oct 1950 through Sept 1951. **1.** In October 1950 X Corps was assigned operational responsibility for Northeast Korea. Some elements drove north along Korea's east coast while others prepared for new amphibious landings, that later became unnecessary. **2.** In December 1950 plans for amphibious evacuation through the port of Hungnam were mapped out. These plans called for a speedy withdrawal in successive phases starting just south of Hamhung and concluding in an arc encircling Hungnam.

- 8 X Corps Commanding General's Diary Extracts, dated 21 October 1950, quoted in Stanton, *Ten Corps in Korea*, 150. Retired LTG Edward M. Almond caveated X Corps support in 1952: "In order to provide something tangible to alleviate the misery and poverty of the conquered people, every effort was made by the military to assist materially with transportation, gasoline, and oil, and with food and medical supplies." Almond, "Conference on UN Military Operations in Korea," 18.
- 9 Stanton, *Ten Corps in Korea*, 1950, 151.
- 10 Almond, "Conference on UN Military Operations in Korea," 18.
- 11 X Corps Commanding General's Diary Extracts, dated 21 October 1950, quoted in Stanton, *Ten Corps in Korea*, 150.
- 12 U.S. Army. Headquarters X Corps. Special Report on Hungnam Evacuation, 9-24 December 1950, 29, 30, hereafter cited as X Corps Special Report on Hungnam Evacuation; Stanton, *Ten Corps in Korea*, 323, 329.
- 13 Vice Admiral James H. Doyle and Arthur J. Mayer, "December 1950 at Hungnam," *Proceedings of the Naval Institute* (April 1979), 47.
- 14 Glenn C. Cowart, *Miracle in Korea: The Evacuation of X Corps from the Hungnam Beachhead* (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1992), 105.
- 15 Doyle and Mayer, "December 1950 at Hungnam," 47; *Big X in Korea*, 9.
- 16 Lynn Montross, "The Hungnam Evacuation: Amphibious Landing in Reverse," *The Marine Corps Gazette* (December 1951) as reprinted by the *Korean War Educator* at http://www.koreanwar-educator.org/topics/branch_accounts/marine/p_hungnam_evacuation accessed 2 September 2010.
- 17 Almond, "Conference on UN Military Operations in Korea," 20; *Big X in Korea*, 11.
- 18 Bill Gilbert, *Ship of Miracles: 14,000 Lives and One Miraculous Voyage* (Chicago: Triumph Books, 2000), 104. Staff Officer J. Robert Lunney and Third Mate Henry J.B. Smith served aboard the SS *Meredith Victory*.
- 19 Montross, "The Hungnam Evacuation," 4 of 9; *Big X in Korea*, 15.
- 20 Gilbert, *Ship of Miracles*, 94. MG Edward M. Almond's aide de camp, CPT Alexander M. Haig, Jr., remembered his guidance after flying above the assembling refugees: "We can't leave those people. Take care of that, Haig."
- 21 Bong Hak Hyun, "Christmas Cargo: A Civilian Remembers the Hungnam Evacuation," *Korean and Korean-American Studies Bulletin* 8:1/2 (Spring/Summer 1997) at http://afe.easia.columbia.edu/tps/1950_ko.htm accessed 2 September 2010.
- 22 Retired LTG Edward M. Almond interview by CPT Thomas G. Ferguson, 1975, U.S. Army Military History Institute, Carlisle, PA, Section V, 23-24 in Richard W. Stewart, *Staff Operations: The X Corps in Korea, December 1950* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, April 1991), 6, 7, 25 of 26 (e/n 39). <http://www.cgsc.edu/carl/resources/csi/stewart/stewart.asp> accessed 17 November 2010.
- 23 X Corps Special Report on Hungnam Evacuation, 2- 3.
- 24 Almond, "Conference on UN Military Operations in Korea," 22.
- 25 Montross, "The Hungnam Evacuation," 3 of 9.
- 26 X Corps Special Report on Hungnam Evacuation, 2- 3.
- 27 *Big X in Korea*, 15.
- 28 X Corps Special Report Hungnam Evacuation, 19.
- 29 Montross, "The Hungnam Evacuation," 6 of 9.
- 30 Gilbert, *Ship of Miracles*, 98.
- 31 Montross, "The Hungnam Evacuation," 6 of 9.
- 32 X Corps Special Report on Hungnam Evacuation, 9.
- 33 Doyle and Mayer, "December 1950 at Hungnam," 48.
- 34 Gilbert, *Ship of Miracles*, 30, 31, 112 photo section.
- 35 Montross, "The Hungnam Evacuation," 5 of 9.
- 36 Doyle and Mayer, "December 1950 at Hungnam," 48.
- 37 Gilbert, *Ship of Miracles*, 32, 104; Doyle and Mayer, "December 1950 at Hungnam," 53.
- 38 Montross, "The Hungnam Evacuation," 5 of 9.
- 39 X Corps Special Report on Hungnam Evacuation, 19.
- 40 X Corps Special Report on Hungnam Evacuation, 4.
- 41 X Corps Special Report on Hungnam Evacuation, 19; Doyle and Mayer, "December 1950 at Hungnam," 53; "Medical Team Overcomes Major Problems in Korea," *Journal of the American Medical Association*, vol. 144, no. 12, (November 18, 1950), 1012; Harold F. Hamit, "Last Days at Hungham," in Arthur W. Wilson (editor), *Korean Vignettes: Faces of War: 201 Veterans of the Korean War Recall That Forgotten War: Their Experiences and Thoughts and Wartime Photographs of That Era* (Portland, OR: Artwork Publications, 1996), 241.
- 42 X Corps Special Report on Hungnam Evacuation, 4.
- 43 X Corps Special Report on Hungnam Evacuation, 25.
- 44 X Corps Special Report on Hungnam Evacuation, 4.
- 45 Montross, "The Hungnam Evacuation," 7 of 9. It was the SS *Meredith Victory*, carrying 300 tons of aviation fuel that managed to squeeze 14,000 Korean refugees aboard. Rosanne Fohn, "Voyage of Mercy: Merchant Mariners Rescue 14,000 Korean Refugees Facing Death," *USAA Magazine* (November/December 2002) reprinted in the *Mariners Weather Log* (Spring/Summer 2003), vol. 47, no. 1 at http://www.vos.noaa.gov/MWL/spring_03/voyage.shtml accessed 2 September 2010.
- 46 X Corps Special Report on Hungnam Evacuation, 4. Lynn Montross listed the total number of ship loads as: 6 APA (Attack Transport), 6 AKA (Amphibious Cargo Ship) 12 TAP (US Navy Troop Ship), 76 time-charter ships, 81 LST (Tank, Landing Ship) and 11 LSD (Dock, Landing Ship) loads. Montross, "The Hungnam Evacuation," 7 of 9.
- 47 Fohn, "Voyage of Mercy," 2, 3 of 5.
- 48 X Corps Special Report on Hungnam Evacuation, 4.
- 49 X Corps Special Report on Hungnam Evacuation, 48.
- 50 X Corps Special Report on Hungnam Evacuation, 5; Doyle and Mayer, "December 1950 at Hungnam," 53. USMC COL Edward E. Forney had brought Mobile Training Group (MTG) Able to train Army units in Japan on amphibious operations prior to the Korean War. When General Douglas A. MacArthur activated X Corps to conduct the In'chon landing, Forney was selected to be Deputy Chief of Staff for Amphibious Planning. After getting Marine officers attached to all primary staff sections, the assignments became semi-permanent. Forney, capable of getting along with anyone without compromising himself, was appointed by MG Edward M. Almond on 9 December 1950 to be the Control Officer for the Hungnam evacuation. As such, he was responsible for operating the port, withdrawing units to the staging areas, embarking the troops, outloading equipment, supplies, munitions, and fuel, and evacuating the refugees. Rear Admiral James H. Doyle, who was charged with the entire redeployment operation stated, "Forney ran the shore end of the evacuation, and he did it magnificently. He was an expert at loading ships." Doyle and Mayer, "December 1950 at Hungnam," 49, 50, 51; Montross, "The Hungnam Evacuation," 4 of 9.
- 51 Montross, "The Hungnam Evacuation," 7 of 9.
- 52 X Corps Special Report on Hungnam Evacuation, 7; Stewart, *Staff Operations: The X Corps in Korea, December 1950*, 6 of 28 at <http://www.cgsc.edu/carl/resources/csi/stewart/stewart.asp> accessed 17 November 2010.
- 53 Doyle and Mayer, "December 1950 at Hungnam," 50.
- 54 Gilbert, *Ship of Miracles*, 124.
- 55 Stanton, *Ten Corps in Korea*, 312.
- 56 Stewart, *Staff Operations: The X Corps in Korea, December 1950*, 16 of 28 at <http://www.cgsc.edu/carl/resources/csi/stewart/stewart.asp> accessed 17 November 2010.
- 57 X Corps Special Report on Hungnam Evacuation, 25; Exact numbers of refugees evacuated from Hungnam are difficult to substantiate because some totals only address those carried by U.S. Navy assets. Glenn Cowart sets the number at 86,000 by the U.S. Navy. Cowart, *Miracle in Korea*, 95.
- 58 X Corps Special Report on Hungnam Evacuation, 28; *Big X in Korea*, 17.
- 59 Doyle and Mayer, "December 1950 at Hungnam," 55; Cowart, *Miracle in Korea*, 26 (photos 6 & 7).
- 60 Doyle and Mayer, "December 1950 at Hungnam," 55.
- 61 Montross, "The Hungnam Evacuation," 8 of 9.
- 62 Fohn, "Voyage of Mercy," 3 of 5.
- 63 Fohn, "Voyage of Mercy," 3 of 5.
- 64 Retired LTC Loren E. Davis, interview by Dr. Charles H. Briscoe, 31 January 2006, Fort Bragg, NC, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.
- 65 Fohn, "Voyage of Mercy," 4 of 5.
- 66 Doyle and Mayer, "December 1950 at Hungnam," 55.
- 67 BG Edwin H. Simmons, *Frozen Chosin: U.S. Marines at the Changjin Reservoir*, (Washington, DC: US Marine Corps Historical Center, 2002), 127 at www.usmc.mil/.../U.S.%Marines%20in%20the%20Korean%20War%20%20PCN%2010600000 accessed 17 November 2010.

PSYWAR

Smoke Bomb Hill: BIRTH OF THE PSYWAR CENTER, PART I

BY EUGENE G. PIASECKI

*"The PsyWar Center represents an effort unique to the military history of the United States. For the first time, the techniques of attacking both the minds and the bodies of our enemies have been coordinated in a single training operation."*¹

— Colonel Charles H. Karlstad

This description of the Psychological Warfare Center on Fort Bragg, North Carolina's Smoke Bomb Hill was prepared by Colonel (COL) Charles H. Karlstad, and included in the visitor's booklet for the U. S. Army psychological warfare seminar in 1952. COL Karlstad, former Chief of Staff of the Infantry Center at Fort Benning, Georgia was then commanding the Army's Psychological Warfare Center. The purpose of this article is to explain the background and early development of the U. S. Army Psychological Warfare (Psywar) Center that dates from the end of World War II through the 10th Special Forces Group's deployment to Germany in December 1953.

Victory over Japan in September 1945 was followed by a decades-long period of conflict with the Soviet Union known as the Cold War. As America rapidly demobilized hundreds of military units and millions of uniformed men and women between 1945 and 1946 the country's defense capabilities were severely reduced. One of the nation's top domestic priorities was to reestablish a sense of familiar order and routine as seamlessly as possible. Unfortunately in foreign affairs, eliminating one enemy (the Axis Powers) facilitated the rise of Communism. This situation was not lost on serving veterans, especially those overseas with the occupation forces, who faced daily challenges by the Soviet Union. Among the military leaders, Brigadier General (BG) Robert A. McClure, General (GEN) Dwight D. Eisenhower's wartime director of the Psychological Warfare Division of the Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force (PWD/SHAEF) recognized the seriousness of the Communist threat.²

Familiar with how Psychological Warfare (Psywar) contributed to winning the North African and Sicilian Campaigns, BG McClure began a vigorous letter writing

effort to rekindle interest among senior American military officers and government officials. In letters to GEN Dwight D. Eisenhower (now Army Chief of Staff), McClure emphasized the necessity to rebuild U.S. Army Psywar capabilities to counter Soviet expansion. He recommended that psychological warfare material and training be integrated into Army service school curricula, that Psywar annexes be prepared for all war plans, and sent GEN Eisenhower a list of former PWD/SHAEF staff members that he believed capable of forming a Psywar reserve.³ Based upon his war and post-war Psywar experiences in Europe, BG McClure was recognized as a subject matter expert (SME) on that capability. More interestingly, in the summer of 1948, BG McClure was reassigned from Europe to become the Chief, New York Field Office, of the War Department's Civil Affairs (CA) Division.⁴

BG McClure reported directly to Major General (MG) Daniel C. Noce, Director, Civil Affairs Division, in the War Department. This CA Division controlled all military government assets in occupied areas and supported U. S. reorientation and re-education efforts in the occupied countries of Germany, Austria, Japan, and Korea. McClure restructured the New York operation into press, periodical, motion picture, radio, theater, music, art, exhibits, library, and book rights sections as he had in Europe. From New York, BG McClure continued his campaign to resurrect Psywar in the Army.⁵ All the services faced massive defense readiness issues as a result of demobilization. Thus, rebuilding Army Psywar fell on many deaf ears.

Despite the perceived lack of attention, the Army had not abandoned Psywar. In response to the tactful presentations of BG McClure, Psywar was moved from the War Department G-2 to the Policy Section of the G-3 Plans and Operations Division in November 1946.⁶ In

June 1947, the Director of Organization and Training in G-3 activated a "Tactical Information Detachment" (TID) at Fort Riley, Kansas to support Army Field Forces (AFF) maneuvers. AFF TID teams, equipped with loudspeakers and leaflets, worked with Army units and the Aggressor Force during maneuvers in the continental United States, the Caribbean and Hawaii.⁷ Simultaneously, two powerful commanders, GEN Lucius D. Clay, the U. S. High Commissioner for Occupied Germany, and GEN Douglas A. MacArthur, the Supreme Commander Allied Powers (SCAP) in occupied Japan, sought Psywar support to counter Soviet/Communist Cold War propaganda.⁸

In February 1949, the Wallace Carroll Report, a study of the Army's role in current psychological warfare activities, was submitted to Secretary of the Army Kenneth C. Royall. Through members of Royall's staff that included Under Secretary William H. Draper, Assistant Secretary Gordon Gray and Lieutenant General (LTG) Albert C. Wedemeyer [Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Operations (G-3)], Carroll recommended that a separate organization, headed by a general officer or qualified civilian, be established for Army Psywar.⁹ This prompted Major General (MG) Charles L. Bolte, the new director of Plans and Operations (G-3) to write BG McClure soliciting recommendations for candidates for a civilian appointment in the Office of the Secretary of the Army.¹⁰ While discussions to reinvigorate the Army's Psywar program had bogged down concerning organization, equipment, doctrine, training, etc. two catalysts renewed the momentum.

First, Frank Pace, Jr. replaced Gordon Gray as the Secretary of the Army on 12 April 1950. He was very interested in Psywar and soon made the Army Chief of Staff, GEN J. Lawton Collins aware of this in a memorandum. Secretary Pace wanted a study done that addressed assignment of more personnel to Psywar and special operations and the formation of a separate Subsidiary Plans Branch within the Plans Group, of the G-3 Plans and Operations Directorate. Pace directed the assignment of sixteen officers possessing Psywar and special operations experience to Headquarters, Department of the Army; to U. S. Army, Europe; to Army Field Forces (AFF); and to the Command and General Staff College (CGSC) beginning July 1951.¹¹ Events in Korea in June 1950 soon accelerated that assignment schedule.

On 25 June 1950, North Korea's surprise invasion of South Korea demonstrated that once again the U. S. was unprepared for a major world crisis. Realizing the gravity of the situation, MG Bolte, now the Army's G-3, requested that Sixth Army Headquarters at the Presidio of San Francisco, California release BG McClure temporarily for return to Washington, DC to assist him with Psywar. Bolte wanted to capitalize on McClure's experience "to determine the further organizational steps necessary to meet the operational Psywar requirements of the Korean situation or of a general war."¹² When BG McClure arrived in Washington on 29 August 1950, he met with Secretary Pace, Mr. James E. Webb, the Assistant Secretary of State, Public Affairs, members of the Joint Staff as well as



BG Robert A. McClure, General Eisenhower's former WWII Chief of Psychological Warfare Division, became the Department of the Army's Chief of the Office of Psychological Warfare (OCPW) on 15 January 1951.



MG Daniel C. Noce was a WWII veteran who gained civil affairs experience during the occupation of Germany from 1918 to 1919. Following European service during WWII, he became Director of the War Department's Civil Affairs Division and was BG McClure's superior from 1946 to 1948.



MG Charles L. Bolte, a combat veteran of WWI (4th Infantry Division), commanded the 34th Infantry Division in Italy from the Apennine Mountains to the capture of Bologna during WWII.



Frank Pace, Jr. became President Harry S. Truman's Secretary of Army on 12 April 1950. His interest in Psychological Warfare Operations was instrumental in establishing the OCPW and Psychological Warfare Center.

General John E. Hull, the Army's Vice Chief of Staff, and the principal Deputy Chiefs of Staff.¹³

Based on this meeting, BG McClure, with MG Bolte's endorsement, obtained approval from GEN Collins to activate a Psychological Warfare Division of 102 personnel on 1 September 1950. The Army G-3 Subsidiary Plans Branch was expanded to do psychological warfare planning. McClure's second step was to form a completely new and independent division within the G-3. While senior government and military leaders supported the revival of Psywar with authorizations, filling specialized Psywar requirements almost derailed the effort. As a stopgap measure, the Army sent six Army officers to attend a thirteen-week course at George Washington University beginning on 2 October 1950. These six were to augment the seven officers on active duty qualified/experienced in psychological warfare.¹⁴

CALL

General J. Lawton Collins replaced General Omar N. Bradley as Army Chief of Staff in August 1949 and focused the Army Staff's efforts to activate the Psychological Warfare Center and Special Forces.



LTC Melvin R. Blair, former Merrill's Marauder and Korean combat veteran, was assigned to OCPW in March 1951 and became responsible for developing the initial training and recruiting programs for Special Forces.



COL Wendell W. Fertig led the civil government and guerrilla army on Mindinao, Philippines from 1942 through 1945 during the Japanese occupation.



LTC Russell W. Volckmann, WWII Commander of the U.S. Army Forces in the Philippines, North Luzon (USAFIP-NL) was one of OCPW's first members. He developed the position, the policy papers, and led the planning that established U. S. Army Special Forces.



As the Army struggled to react to events in Korea into early 1951, BG McClure integrated Psywar into the Army G-3 staff and throughout the Pentagon. On 31 October 1950, at his first weekly staff meeting, McClure emphasized two key factors: First, not everyone in the Army understood them or their purpose; Second, MG Bolte agreed that unconventional warfare (UW) did not belong in the G-3 and should be a Psychological Warfare Division responsibility.¹⁵ The Psychological Warfare Division consisted of the psychological warfare, cover and deception, and unconventional warfare sections. In December 1950, Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) John O. Weaver took charge of the Psychological Warfare Division in the General Subjects Directorate of the Army General School at Fort Riley, Kansas.¹⁶ It was 15 January 1951 when the Army Staff recognized BG McClure as the head of the Office of the Chief of Psychological

Warfare (OCPW), and OCPW as an independent staff element on the Army Staff.

OCPW's mission was to "formulate and develop psychological and special operations plans for the Army in consonance with established policy and to recommend policies for and supervise the execution of Department of the Army programs in those fields."¹⁷ BG McClure divided OCPW into the Psychological Operations, Requirements, and Special Operations Divisions. The Psychological Operations and Special Operations Divisions had plans, operations and intelligence, and evaluation branches. The Requirements Division focused on organization, personnel, training, logistics and research for psychological and special operations activities. As the OCPW evolved, so did other U. S. Governmental departments (State) and agencies (CIA) with an interest in Psywar. Realizing the potential for interagency conflict and confusion, President Harry S. Truman established the Psychological Strategy Board (PSB) on 4 April 1951 by Executive Directive.

Composed of the offices of the Under Secretary of State, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Director of Central Intelligence, and representatives from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the PSB was "to authorize and provide for the more effective planning, coordination, and conduct of psychological operations within the framework of approved national policies."¹⁸ This strategic group reported to the National Security Council. Since the PSB conducted no operations, its primary function was to prevent interagency rivalries from developing. This was to be accomplished by evaluating national psychological operations, implementing approved objectives, policies and programs, and coordinating and planning psychological warfare efforts.¹⁹ With the PSB focused on formulating national Psywar policy guidance, BG McClure could return to the Psywar issues in the Army.

The demand for Psywar assets grew daily. BG McClure prioritized and allocated resources. Supporting the war in Korea made MG Charles A. Willoughby's need the highest priority. MG Daniel C. Noce's [U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) Chief of Staff] requests for qualified psychological warfare and special operations staff officers for EUCOM was number two. Third was the development of training programs and support for Psywar in the United States.²⁰ Between late 1950 and early 1951, the Army activated five Psywar units: the 1st Loudspeaker and Leaflet (L&L) Company for the Eighth Army in Korea; the 2nd L&L Company at Fort Riley; the 5th L&L Company at Fort Riley slated for Europe; the 1st Radio Broadcast and Leaflet (RB&L) Group; and the 301st RB&L Group (U. S. Army Reserve) to be organized and trained at Fort Riley before being shipped overseas.²¹

Having solved that immediate Psywar resources need, BG McClure began the staff action to transfer the UW function in G-3 to the OCPW. Realizing that his knowledge was lacking in special operations, McClure began searching for officers with WWII combat experience in this area. The guerrilla warfare and long-



The Smoke Bomb Hill area of Fort Bragg, NC as seen in 1970 had experienced no significant changes in appearance since LTC Melvin R. Blair made his first visit there in 1951.

range penetration unit officers selected were: LTC Melvin R. Blair (Merrill's Marauders); LTC Martin J. Waters, Jr. (OSS, Detachment 101 Burma); COL Aaron Bank (OSS, Europe and China); COL Wendell W. Fertig (Mindanao guerrillas, Philippines); and LTC Russell W. Volckmann (Luzon guerrillas, Philippines).²² As Chief of the Special Operations Division in late March 1951, COL Bank credited LTC Volckmann with preparing the staff work required to develop the position, planning, and policy papers used to establish Special Forces units in the active Army.²³

As BG McClure dealt with these challenges, there were two factors that determined solutions. First, any outbreak of unconventional warfare would be in Europe and fought using foreign nationals from East European countries who had enlisted in the American Army under the Lodge Act. Second, no type of special unit had been designated and its primary objective mission had not been assigned.²⁴ The first effort to resolve these dilemmas was a UW conference called by Chief of Staff of the Army, GEN J. Lawton Collins, at Fort Benning in early 1951. LTC Volckmann, representing OCPW, was tasked to take the CSA guidance, determine what kind of unit could accomplish UW, and prepare its mission.

On 9 April 1951 LTC Volckmann submitted his report to the Commandant of the Infantry School. "Subversive activities" meant, in reality, "special forces operations." Based on GEN Collins' reference to the use of indigenous personnel, Volckmann's framework clarified the objectives of "special forces operations."²⁵ Several additional observations were key: he believed special forces operations should be an accepted field of conventional ground warfare not regarded as irregular or unconventional warfare; the ultimate objective of special forces operations was to "organize and support guerrilla or indigenous forces that are capable of efficient and controlled exploitation in

conjunction with land, air and sea forces; the Army had the inherent responsibility in peace to prepare and plan for the conduct of special forces operations; and it was unsound, dangerous, and unworkable to delegate these responsibilities to a civilian agency."²⁶

LTC Volckmann's recommendations were taken seriously in Washington. At the end of May 1951, the Department of Defense tasked the Army to enlist eight-hundred Eastern European recruits under the Lodge Act to conduct anti-Soviet guerrilla warfare in Communist-controlled countries. LTC Melvin Blair, the OCPW training officer designated as a Special Forces recruiter, stated that these (Lodge Act) men had a special motivation, linguistic abilities, and knowledge of terrain in potential enemy countries that made them especially valuable.²⁷ A month later, OCPW proposed the formation of a "Special Forces Regiment" of three battalions totaling 2,481 men; 1,300 of the enlisted were coded as Lodge Act recruits.²⁸ On 23 August 1951, the necessary personnel authorizations were provided by the Army. The Airborne Ranger Infantry Companies created during the Korean War were inactivated and those personnel spaces were reallocated to Special Forces. BG McClure realized that Fort Riley, Kansas could not accommodate this new Army organization. The Psywar and Special Forces had to be stationed at a military post with a variety of field and garrison locations to simultaneously train and develop doctrine for these distinctly different UW elements.

Finding the right facility was no easy task. Having visited the best three options, Fort Benning, Georgia, Fort Campbell, Kentucky, and Fort Bragg, North Carolina, McClure instructed COL Aaron Bank to "make it Fort Bragg if you can."²⁹ It finally took McClure's diplomacy with GEN Mark W. Clark, Chief of Army Field Forces at Fort Monroe, Virginia, and LTG Alvan C. Gillem,

Commanding General, Third Army at Fort McPherson, Georgia, to gain support to establish the Army's Psychological Warfare Center at Fort Bragg on 4 December 1951. That decision enabled LTC Blair and the OCPW survey team to negotiate with LTG John W. Leonard, Commanding General, Fort Bragg for a location.

After canvassing the post, the best available area was the former World War II mobilization area known as Smoke Bomb Hill. LTC Blair told BG McClure that, "in general, the area is exactly what we wanted." There were sufficient barracks, mess halls and administration buildings, classrooms and a library. He estimated the facilities could be quickly rehabilitated and occupied for \$151,000.³⁰ After briefing the Psychological Strategy Board (PSB) and GEN Collins, BG McClure finally received approval to establish the Psychological Warfare Center at Fort Bragg, North Carolina on 27 March 1952 with activation on or about 1 May 1952.³¹

On 14 April 1952, the new home of the Army's Psywar Center came under the jurisdiction of the commanding general, Third Army. This was quickly followed by moving equipment and personnel of the 6th RB&L and the Psywar teaching staff from Fort Riley to Fort Bragg. The Center's Table of Distribution (TD) contained the mission:

To conduct individual training and supervise unit training in Psychological Warfare and Special Forces Operations; to develop and test Psychological Warfare and Special Forces doctrine, procedures, tactics, and techniques; to test and evaluate equipment in Psycyological Warfare and Special Forces Operations.

On 29 May 1952, the Chief of Army Field Forces at Fort Monroe, Virginia announced the activation of the U. S. Army Psychological Warfare Center at Fort Bragg and the transfer of responsibility for Psywar doctrine development and teaching responsibilities from the Army General School at Fort Riley.³² The next step was to assemble the Psywar Center assets on Smoke Bomb Hill.

The Psywar Center initially consisted of a Psywar School (Provisional), a Psywar Board, and the 6th Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group (RB&L). These were followed by the 10th Special Forces Group in April 1952. The Center's first commander and Psywar School commandant was COL Charles N. Karlstad, a combat veteran of World Wars I and II and former Chief of Staff of the Infantry Center at Fort Benning, Georgia.³³ Although the Psywar Center was formally established by the Department of the Army, there were still administrative issues to resolve. The first one was to change the Psywar School status from "provisional" to that of a formal Army service school. This was quite important. The Psychological Warfare Division at Fort Riley had been conducting U. S. Army recognized service school courses as part of the Army General School. Service schools were accorded more prestige, funding, and authorized to procure equipment and attracted quality staff and faculty members. Building on previous recognition, BG McClure convinced the Army staff to accord the Psychological Warfare School official service school status.³⁴

PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE CENTER, SEPTEMBER 1952

Headquarters Psychological Warfare Center

CO & Commandant

COL Charles N. Karlstad, a combat veteran of WWI and WWII, was Fort Benning's Chief of Staff when selected to be the Psywar Center's first Commandant. Like MG Noce, he also did occupation duty in post-WWI Germany.



6th RB&L Group

**HQ & HQ Co. • 7th Reproduction Co.
8th MRB Co. • 2nd L&L Co.
9th L&L Co. • 12th Consolidation Co.**

LTC Lester L. Holmes commanded the 12th Armored Division's 100th Military Police Battalion during WWII and assisted in the liberation of the Dachau, Hurlag, and Landsberg concentration camps.



Psywar School

Psywar Dept.

LTC Otis E. Hays, Jr. was a journalism professor at the University of Tulsa when recalled to active duty to become the Director of the School's Psywar Department. During WWII, LTC Hays was assigned to the Alaska Defense Command as an intelligence and foreign liaison operations officer.



Special Forces Dept.

COL Filmore K. Mearns, commissioned in the Field Artillery, received the Silver Star while commanding the 3rd Battalion, 135th Infantry, 34th Infantry Division at Casino during the Italian Campaign.



10th SF Group (Airborne)

COL Aaron Bank, OSS veteran of Europe and Asia and OCPW staff officer, assumed command of the 10th Special Forces Group on 19 June 1952.



Psywar Board

Research & Development • Test & Evaluate • Doctrine

Organized into a small headquarters staff and two departments, Psychological Warfare and Special Forces, the Psywar School's purpose was "to prepare selected individuals of the Army to perform those psychological warfare and special forces duties which they may be called upon to perform in war."³⁵ While initially both departments appeared equally important, this would not be true until the mid 1950s. The Psychological Warfare Department, headed by LTC Otis E. Hays, Jr. was organized into staff planning, intelligence requirements, propaganda input, and dissemination committees to support instruction. They conducted the eight-week officer courses, six-week Psywar noncommissioned officer course, and a two-week Psywar familiarization course. On the other hand, the classified nature of its organization and mission dictated that little publicity be given to either the Special Forces Department directed by COL Filmore K. Mearns or the 10th Special Forces Group commanded by COL Aaron Bank. This allowed Special Forces personnel to concentrate more on learning the fundamentals of unconventional warfare and conducting guerrilla operations than contending with external interference.³⁶

The second element of the Psywar Center was the Psychological Warfare Board. Its mission was to "test, evaluate, and compile reports on materiel, doctrine, procedures, techniques, and tactics pertaining to and for Psychological Warfare and Special Forces."³⁷ Although straight-forward, the mission was misleading in its applicability to Special Forces. Since the security surrounding Special Forces was so restrictive, the Psywar Board gave it little attention, only assisted when asked, made no mention of any unconventional


warfare projects, and had no Special Forces members on the board. By early 1954, their accomplishments included over forty projects ranging from improvements to Psywar transmitters and receivers, loudspeakers, and mobile reproduction equipment, to leaflet dissemination by mortar and artillery shells, rockets, light liaison planes, and balloons.³⁸

The 6th RB&L Group, permanently organized on 2 May 1951, traced its beginnings to the provisional Psychological Warfare Detachment formed at Fort Riley, Kansas on 14 September 1951.³⁹ Designed to conduct strategic propaganda in direct support of military operations, it could also support the efforts of national world-wide propaganda when so directed. Initially, the

The Coat of Arms for the 6th Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group.




SGT Frank R. Haus was the Personnel Sergeant for the 6th RB&L Group's 2nd L&L Company.



This collage created by the 7th Reproduction Company shows the equipment used to produce leaflets, newspapers, and other printed Psywar materials.



The 8th Mobile Radio Broadcasting Company (MRBC) at Fort Riley, Kansas before moving to the Psywar Center on Fort Bragg, North Carolina in 1952.



COLs Charles H. Karlstad (U.S. Army Psychological Warfare Center & School Commandant) and Aaron Bank (Center Executive Officer) with LTCs Lester L. Holmes (6th RB&L Group commander) and John O. Weaver (Chief of the Psywar Division of the Army General School at Fort Riley, Kansas) pose by the Headquarters sign on Smoke Bomb Hill, Fort Bragg, NC.



The 10th Special Forces Group's unit sign on Smoke Bomb Hill, Fort Bragg, NC. Until the current Special Forces shoulder sleeve insignia was approved on 22 August 1955, all Special Forces soldiers wore the WWII Airborne Command Patch.



The 2nd Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company (L&L) unit logo.



The DUI of the current 9th Military Information Support Operations (MISO) Battalion. The 9th Battalion traces its lineage back to the 9th Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company formed on 14 April 1952.

6th RB&L Group was comprised of three companies. Headquarters and Headquarters Company contained the command, administrative, supervisory and intelligence personnel necessary to direct propaganda operations. The 7th Reproduction Company had the print equipment and skilled technicians to produce leaflets and newspapers of varying sizes and in multiple colors. The 8th Mobile Radio Broadcasting Company could replace or augment broadcasting of propaganda by radio.⁴⁰

The Group remained organized this way until it moved from Fort Riley to Fort Bragg. Under the command of LTC Lester L. Holmes, it became part of the Psychological Warfare Center in June 1952. Soon after its arrival, three more organizations were added to the Group. Two of these were the 2nd and 9th Loudspeaker and Leaflet (L&L) Companies, created to provide tactical propaganda to an army in the field. Like the 6th RB&L, they could support national propaganda objectives and were capable of propagating the theater commander's directives via loudspeaker or print media. Their targets were tactical and presented highly vulnerable, rapidly changing propaganda opportunities. On 27 May 1953, the third and final element was formed in the 6th RB&L. The 12th Consolidation Company focused on post-conflict Psywar in support of consolidation operations in areas under military government control.⁴¹

On 19 May 1952, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 10th Special Forces Group (SFG) was formally activated at the Psywar Center. Its mission was: "To furnish command, supply, and organizational maintenance for



AERIAL VIEW OF SMOKE BOMB HILL AREA AT FORT BRAGG, N.C. CIRCA 1960.

1. Green Beret Club. 2. Smoke Bomb Hill Chapel. 3. 1952-1953 10th SFG, 1953-1960 77th SFG. 4. 8th MRBC. 5. 1952-1956 6th RB & L, 1952-1953 2nd L & L Co. 6. Psychological Warfare HQ.

a Special Forces Group located in rear areas and, when provided with the necessary augmentation in personnel and equipment, for subordinate units committed in the objective area; to furnish administration for a Special Forces Group.”⁴² Its authorized strength was one hundred and twenty-two officers and men, but only one warrant officer and seven enlisted men were present when COL Aaron Bank arrived on Smoke Bomb Hill on 19 June 1952. An aggressive Special Forces recruiting campaign was well underway. LTC Melvin R. Blair remembers: “I hit the road on a search for recruits. While Colonel Volckmann went to Europe on the same mission, I visited the headquarters of all the continental armies, all the Army’s combat arms and technical-service schools, training divisions, and Army installations in Alaska, Hawaii, and the Far East.”⁴³

Epilogue

On 27 July 1953, an Armistice was signed between North and South Korea and the United Nations (UN). It signaled the official end to hostilities on the peninsula and a two and one-half mile wide Korean Demilitarized Zone separated the countries. With its military commitment to the United Nations and South Korea fulfilled, the United States Government looked to cut military spending. The Psychological Strategy Board was replaced by the

Operations Coordinating Board (OCB). Unlike the PSB, the OCB had no Psywar planning capability. It reported to the National Security Council and was responsible for integrating national security policies across several government agencies. U. S. Army Field Forces command suggested that the Psychological Warfare Center be deactivated and the Psywar training mission be given back to the Army Ground School at Fort Riley, Kansas. Special Forces training would become a unit mission and no longer be a school function.

Fortunately, BG McClure was able to fight off that initiative. The Psywar Center was retained at Fort Bragg, but its strength levels were reduced. That was BG McClure’s last hurrah for Psywar and SF. President Dwight D. Eisenhower needed the diplomatic skills that McClure so ably demonstrated in London in 1943. The Psywar Center survived, but the first major change came in 1956 when Special Forces became the dominant force on Smoke Bomb Hill. Then, the Psychological Warfare Center was renamed to the U.S. Army Special Warfare Center and School.⁴⁴ Promoted to Major General, McClure was sent to Iran to be the Chief of the Military Mission to Shah Mohammad-Reza Pahlavi. Major General McClure retired in 1956 after forty years of service and died at Fort Huachuca, Arizona, on New Year’s Day 1957. ♣

Eugene G. Piasecki is a retired Special Forces officer who has been with the USASOC History Office since 2006. A USMA graduate, he earned his Masters Degree in military history from Norwich University and is currently pursuing a PhD. His current research interests include the history of Army Special Forces, Special Forces involvement Korea and Somalia, and the History of Camp Mackall, NC.

Endnotes

- 1 Dr. Alfred A. Paddock, Jr., "The Psychological Warfare Center and the Origins of Special Warfare," *Special Forces The First Fifty Years: The United States Army Special Forces 1952-2002*, 2002, 80.
- 2 Colonel Alfred H. Paddock, Jr. (USA Retired), "Major General Robert Alexis McClure, Forgotten Father of US Army Special Warfare," <http://www.psywarrior.com/mcclure.html>, 4.
- 3 Paddock, "Forgotten Father of US Army Special Warfare," 4.
- 4 Paddock, "Forgotten Father of US Army Special Warfare," 3.
- 5 Paddock, "The Psychological Warfare Center and the Origins of Special Warfare," 328.
- 6 Alfred H. Paddock, Jr., *U.S. Army Special Warfare: Its Origins*, (Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 2002), 44.
- 7 Paddock, *U.S. Army Special Warfare*, 56. The TID was comprised of two officers and approximately twenty men (Paddock, 64).
- 8 Stanley Sadler, "Cease Resistance: It's Good For You!": A History of U.S. Army Combat Psychological Operations, Second Edition, (Washington, DC: Army's Center of Military History, 1999), 204.
- 9 Paddock, *U. S. Army Special Warfare*, 57. Gordon Gray replaced Kenneth C. Royall as Secretary of the Army in June 1949.
- 10 Paddock, *U. S. Army Special Warfare*, 59. Also consulted during this process was Professor Paul Linebarger who had recently published a book on psychological warfare. Linebarger's position was that Plans and Operations could not meet its Psywar responsibilities unless the officers designated were assigned full time and given the opportunity to travel. (Paddock, 60)
- 11 Paddock, *U. S. Army Special Warfare*, 63. Frank Pace, Jr. had little or no practical experience in Psywar operations. Commissioned as a Second Lieutenant in 1942, he served for the remainder of WWII as a personnel and administration officer in the Air Transport Command, Army Air Force, and was discharged as a Major in 1945. From 12 April to 20 January 1953, as Secretary of the Army, he implemented policies to broaden the Army's utilization of Negro manpower, elevated research and development to the Deputy Chief of Staff level, and was chairman of the Defense Ministers Conference, NATO 1950. General Collins had replaced GEN Omar N. Bradley as the Army Chief of Staff in August 1949.
- 12 Paddock, "Forgotten Father of US Army Special Warfare," 4.
- 13 Paddock, *U.S. Army Special Warfare*, 93.
- 14 Paddock, *U.S. Army Special Warfare*, 93.
- 15 Paddock, *U.S. Army Special Warfare*, 94.
- 16 Dale Story, "Army Psychological Warfare Training," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 1952, 16 (3), 446. LTC Weaver had served in Italy during WWII as the commander of the 5th Army's Combat Propaganda Team and was a graduate of the British psychological warfare school in Cairo (Paddock, 93)
- 17 Paddock, "U. S. Army Special Warfare," 95.
- 18 Harry S. Truman Papers, "Psychological Strategy Board Files, 1951-1953" <http://www.trumanlibrary.org/hstpaper/physc.htm> . Accessed 9/7/2010.
- 19 Harry S. Truman Papers, "Psychological Strategy Board Files."
- 20 Paddock, *U. S. Army Special Warfare*, 116. In the Far East Command (FECOM), Psywar operations were part of a small Special Projects Branch in MG Willoughby's G-2 Division of Headquarters, FECOM. In Europe, MG Noce was the U.S. European Command Chief of Staff.
- 21 Paddock, *U. S. Army Special Warfare*, 117.
- 22 Paddock, *U.S. Army Special Warfare*, 119.
- 23 Paddock, *U.S. Army Special Warfare*, 120.
- 24 Paddock, *U.S. Army Special Warfare*, 120. The Lodge Act was also known as Public Law 597, 81st Congress, 30 June 1950.
- 25 Paddock, *U.S. Army Special Warfare*, 122. Volckmann's memorandum was to the Commanding General, the Infantry Center, subject: Analysis and Suggestions re Gen. J. Lawton Collins' Conference, 5 April 1951, from Lt. Col. Russell W. Volckmann, 9 April 1951, filed with Psy War 337 TS (16 April 1951), Record Group 319 Army-Chief of Special Warfare, 1951-54, TS Decimal files, Box 12, National Archives.
- 26 Paddock, *U. S. Army Special Warfare*, 123. (This note is also from the same reference cited in red in endnote 16).
- 27 LTC Melvin Russell Blair, "Toughest Outfit in the Army," *Saturday Evening Post*, Vol. 228 Issue 46, 12 May 1956, 89.
- 28 Paddock, *U.S. Army Special Warfare*, 124-125.
- 29 Paddock, *U.S. Army Special Warfare*, 137.
- 30 Paddock, *U.S. Army Special Warfare*, 138.
- 31 Paddock, *U.S. Army Special Warfare*, 139.
- 32 Paddock, *U.S. Army Special Warfare*, 140. Department of the Army General Order No. 37, 14 April 1952 established the Psychological Warfare Center as a Class I activity and installation effective 10 April 1952. A copy of the Recommended Table of Distribution for the Psywar Center can be found with Psy War 320.3 (16 April 1952), National Archives. (Paddock, 201).
- 33 Dr. Alfred A. Paddock, Jr., "The Psychological Warfare Center and the Origins of Special Warfare," 80. Remaining in Europe after the Armistice ended WWI, COL Karlstad performed occupation duty with the American forces located at Brohl between the towns of Nieder-Breisig and Andernach, Germany. In 1933, CPT Karlstad (Infantry) along with CPT William F. Marquat (Coast Artillery) and MAJ Daniel C. Noce (Corps of Engineers) graduated from the Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Also stationed at Fort Leavenworth during this period was MAJ Charles A. Willoughby (Infantry), the CGSC school librarian and course instructor.
- 34 The Psywar School was accorded official service school status by Department of the Army General Order No. 92 on 22 October 1952.
- 35 Paddock, "The Psychological Warfare Center and the Origins of Special Warfare," 81.
- 36 Paddock, *U.S. Army Special Warfare*, 142-143.
- 37 Paddock, *U.S. Army Special Warfare*, 143.
- 38 Paddock, "The Psychological Warfare Center and the Origins of Special Warfare," 82. One example of the Board's ability to expedite projects was their development of mobile radio broadcasting studio and transmitter vans that were urgently needed after the start of the Korean War. Experts estimated that it would take five to seven years to field the systems, but the Board had them built in six months. (Paddock, *U.S. Army Special Warfare*, 143).
- 39 Paddock, "The Psychological Warfare Center and the Origins of Special Warfare," 82.
- 40 Paul M. A. Linebarger, *Psychological Warfare* (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1954), 302-303.
- 41 Paddock, "The Psychological Warfare Center and the Origins of Special Warfare," 82 and Linebarger, *Psychological Warfare*, 302-303. Consolidation Operations are Psychological operations conducted in foreign areas inhabited by an enemy or potentially hostile populace and occupied by United States forces, or in which United States forces are based, designed to produce behaviors by the foreign populace that support United States objectives in the area (Joint Pub 1-02).
- 42 Paddock, *U.S. Army Special Warfare*, 145.
- 43 Blair, "Toughest Outfit in the Army," 89.
- 44 Paddock, *U.S. Army Special Warfare*, 155.



Commander, USASOC
ATTN: AOHS (*Veritas*)
E-2929 Desert Storm Drive
Fort Bragg, NC 28310

Upcoming Articles...

ARSOF in the Korean War: Part IV

The coming issue will explain the 1st Radio Broadcasting & Leaflet Group Psywar mission in Japan and Korea and detail the specific activities of its organic 3rd Reproduction Company, the 4th Mobile Radio Broadcasting Company, and special assignments that cover Armistice negotiations and Psywar effectiveness assessments. It will also explain the roles of Brigadier General (BG) Robert A. McClure, the U.S. Army Chief of Psychological Warfare and his OCPW (Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare) staff in the Pentagon. Additionally, it will show how the Psywar Division of the Army General School at Fort Riley, Kansas becomes the U.S. Army Psychological Warfare Center at Fort Bragg in 1952, and deploys the 10th Special Forces Group (SFG) to Germany and SF-trained officers and sergeants for duty in Korea.



4th MRBC Antenna Riggers, Corporals Keith H. McDaniel, Billy J. Eakes, and William S. Keenan, mount twin halo ring transmitter-receivers atop a 365-foot KBS Radio Seoul antenna ten miles north of the South Korean capital.

